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Abstract 
The telecommunications sector in Brazil has been facing a particular attention from international 
groups during the last decade. All four main players in Brazil are controlled by global telecom 
players and several strategic moves have taken place during the past few years in Latin America. 
This is the case of Telefónica ownership in Vivo, Telecom Italia participation in TIM, the recent 
merger between Oi and Portugal Telecom, among several asset divestures throughout Latin America 
countries from both Telefónica and Telecom Italia.  
Many analysts and investment bankers have suggested that a possible sell of TIM from Telecom 
Italia is likely to occur due to high leverage ratios from the parent company. The company has 
divested in several Latin American and European operations in order to reduce debt, but, the 
leverage continues to increase. 
We foresee that an acquisition of TIM by Vivo would completely change the industry in Brazil and 
that the overlap between both players would create synergies above the value of TIM. We forecast 
a standalone valuation for Vivo and TIM of BRL 56.2 Billion and BRL 26.5 Billion, respectively, and a 
merged firm enterprise value of BRL 113.8 Billion, corresponding to an expected synergies amount 
of nearly BRL 31.2 Billion.  
Nevertheless, the Brazilian regulator could impose several restrictions to the merger, since the 
combined firm would have market shares above 70% in several states, and, as a result, we expect 
that an asset by asset sale would be the most appropriate scenario in reality. 
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0. Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions have been a pillar in the Telecommunications industry in the past few 
years. In the last decade, the industry has spent an impressive USD 1.5 Trillion on Telecom M&A 
deals, driven by the need of market consolidation and higher competitiveness. The last decade has 
faced an enormous disruption in terms of technology and communications capacity: from the 
introduction of the first mobile phone, to mobile broadband, through technologies such as 2G, 3G 
and more recently LTE, and, finally, the expansion of fiber, allowing people to browse the internet 
as never before and downloading entire HD movies in a matter of seconds, telecom operators have 
suddenly faced a strong need of high investments that were not possible if M&A did not occur.  
As a result, as we have seen and we expect, M&A deals will continue to occur in the future in order 
to surpass all these high investment needs, and, at the same time, continue battling other 
disruptive competitors that have emerged, such as Google, Apple or Facebook, which are also 
entering in the communications industry and could become a major threat to all operators. 
The telecom landscape in Brazil has been an interesting case study. Several global telecom groups 
have invested in the past few years in Brazilian telecom operators, given its high growth potential. 
This is the case of Telefónica ownership in Vivo, América Móvil stake in Claro, TIM Participações 
subsidiary of Telecom Italia and, more recently, Portugal Telecom stake in Oi, which, 2 years after, 
resulted in a merger between both. Moreover, Brazil is a 200 million people country where mobile 
communications are expanding at a rapid pace, from only 59% penetration in 2007 to more than 
140% in 2013, and where GDP growth has been growing at an astonishing 3.6% over the past decade 
and is expected to keep growing at 2.5% in the long-term. 
In our dissertation, we will simulate a possible acquisition of TIM Participações by Vivo. This lies on 
the fact that Telecom Italia is facing high capital pressure and has been increasing their debt to 
unsustainable levels. As a result, as predicted by many analysts and investment bankers, a sale of 
TIM is more than expected and, additionally, a Brazilian market consolidation is expected in order 
to improve in-country infrastructure and achieve OPEX and CAPEX synergies. 
We have forecasted a Vivo enterprise value of BRL 56,211 Million and TIM Participações total 
enterprise value of BRL 26,451 Million, corresponding to total price per share of BRL 48.39 and 
BRL11.25, respectively. We forecast an expected premium paid of 40% over TIM value, resulting in a 
combined valuation of BRL 113,823 Million with expected synergies of nearly BRL 31,161 Million. 
The dissertation is, therefore, structured in the following way. Firstly, we will present the 
literature review that bases our analysis, secondly, we will look at the telecommunications industry 
globally and in Brazil. Then, we will look at Vivo and TIM’s standalone valuations, followed by a 
small review of the parent companies (Telefónica and Telecom Italia) and a detailed analysis on the 
achievable synergies with the merger. Finally, we will perform the deal and look at the new 
forecasted financials of the merged entity.  
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1. Literature Review 
In this first section we will briefly discuss the main drivers for valuing a company and provide a 
brief guidance for valuation of synergies. We will start by explaining the cost of capital, followed 
by an introduction to different valuation methods, a review of valuation methods in emerging 
markets, and, finally, a discussion on the mergers and acquisitions topic. 
1.1. Cost of capital 
According to Koller et al. (2010), when we value a company, we have to take into consideration the 
opportunity cost that investors face when investing in a certain asset instead of another with a 
similar risk and return. According to Myers et al. (2011), intuitively, all other things equal, we 
should demand higher rate of returns for riskier projects and lower rates of return for the opposite 
case. 
Koller et al. (2010) states that there are three different methods to estimate the cost of equity: 
the Fama-French three factor model, the arbitrage theory model (APT) and, the most commonly 
used, the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Most practitioners use the CAPM model due to its simplicity 
in computing the Beta and getting a rough estimate of the cost of capital. As a result, we will 
follow the CAPM method. 
1.1.1. CAPM 
The Capital Asset pricing model was developed based on Markowitz’s theory (1959) of the mean-
variance model. According to the author, investors chose its investment strategy according to two 
main guidelines: minimizing the variance of a portfolio, given the expected return, while 
maximizing the expected return, given its variance. 
Following this baseline idea, Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Treynor (1961) introduced the CAPM 
theory. According to them, the expected return should follow a linear function, as described below. 
(1)          (          )            
Where Rf represents the expected return of a risk-free asset, [Rm – Rf] represents the market risk 
premium and the βim the Beta of the market or the stock’s sensitivity to the market. As a result, 
Sharpe (1965) argues that the return of an asset corresponds to the sum of the risk-free rate 
(corresponding to the time value of money) with the risk premium (which is the simply the market 
risk premium multiplied by the firm’s beta). 
However, only one decade after the finding of CAPM, many authors started arguing about the 
verifiability of the CAPM model. Roll (1977) argues that the CAPM has never been truly tested, 
while Stambaugh (1982) finds that that CAPM is not sensitive to portfolios beyond common stock. 
Moreover, Lakonishok (1994) and Fama and French (1996) show that the average returns are not 
positively correlated to the Betas, while Fama and French (2004) outlines the failures imposed by 
the CAPM across different empirical studies. 
Nevertheless, as argued by Damodaran (2002), the method is still the most intuitive and simplest 
method to be used by practitioners, compared to alternative solutions such as APT or Fama-French 
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three factor model. In addition, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) find that there is no significant 
improvement from using a different approach than the traditional CAPM and that “those techniques 
are both useful and reliable”. 
As a result, we will not investigate alternatives to the CAPM and we will base our analysis with the 
CAPM. 
1.1.2. Risk-Free rate 
Koller et al. (2010) defines risk-free rate “as the return of a portfolio that has no covariance with 
the market”. This means that a risk-free rate is a rate that has no risk of financial losses such as 
long-term government bonds or a government treasury Bill from developed countries such as US or 
Germany. 
As a result, we can relate the risk-free rate as the time value of money since this rate is almost 
riskless (Cornell and Green 1991), but the question about which maturity to use arises. 
According to Koller et al. (2010), ideally we should use a risk-free rate with the same maturity time 
but in fact, the most commonly used risk-free rate is the 10-year government bond. In case of US 
valuations, the recommended risk-free rate is the 10-year US government bond yield whereas in 
case of a European valuation, the 10-year German Eurobond is the most appropriate. In the case of 
emerging markets, however, the cost of equity is slightly more difficult to calculate. 
In emerging markets the concept of riskless investments in government bonds it’s not true 
anymore. As explained by Koller et al. (2010), the risk-free rate assumes that the investment in 
government bonds needs to be accessible and actively traded, thus, in the case of emerging 
markets, this might not be the case. In addition, emerging market’s government bonds may be 
traded in foreigner currency such as US Dollars or Euros, so the availability of a local risk-free rate 
is even more difficult due to lack of liquidity of the local currency. As a result, as we can 
understand, the main assumptions of the risk-free rate are not present in emerging markets, and 
therefore, it has to be inferred using a different method. 
Koller et al. (2010) suggests one practical and easy way to arrive to an emerging risk-free rate: by 
starting with a common 10 year government US T-bill and then, adjusting the rate with the inflation 
rate difference between both countries. Using this approach, we will arrive to a reasonable 
estimation of the risk-free rate in emerging markets that is closer to the reality, as represented in 
the formula below: 
(2)                     (      )  
(                          )
(              )
 
1.1.3. Beta 
The Beta is the slope of the capital asset pricing model, or in other words, it is the systematic risk 
between the asset and the market. In order to calculate the Beta, we start by estimating a raw 
beta using the regression presented below. 
(3)                  
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This formula estimates the covariance between the stock return and the market return in order to 
understand how correlated the stock is with the market (Ross, 1978). As a result, a Beta higher 
than 1 indicates a higher risk than the market and a beta lower than 1, the opposite. 
According to Koller et al. (2010), three major guidelines are considered when estimating the raw 
beta: (1) The estimating period must be of at least 60 observations, (2) the regressions must be 
done using monthly returns and (3) the regression must be compared to a well-diversified market 
index such as the S&P 500 or the MSCI world Index. 
Moreover, it is a good practice to use the peer group or industry comparable to adjust the Beta. 
Koller et al. (2010) argues that companies in the same industry face similar operational risks and 
similar capital structures, thus, it is recommended to compare our raw beta with the industry 
median raw beta and understand if we need to adjust the Beta to become more comparable to our 
peer group. 
Finally, Blume (1975) states that “estimated beta coefficients tend to regress towards the grand 
mean of all betas over time” so high risky companies tend to lower their risk over time and 
approximate from one. He finds two reasons for this – (1) the riskiest projects may tend to become 
less risky over time and (2) new projects may be less risky than the previous ones due to 
management reluctance to accept risky projects. As a result, Beta smoothing is nowadays a 
standardized process to reduce the possible extreme observations when calculating the raw beta. 
As used by Bloomberg, the formula (4) will be used on that account. 
(4)                  (  ⁄ )          (  ⁄ ), where             
On a different note, an important measure for us to define is the difference between the levered 
and the unlevered cost of capital.  
Hamada (1972) wrote a paper where he explains the difference between using a levered and an 
unlevered Beta. While the levered Beta takes into account the leverage of the firm, the unlevered 
eliminates the debt effect. As a result, as we will see further, this distinction is extremely 
important for the APV valuation method, where we will separate the valuation between the 
unlevered firm value and the financial side effects. As a result, following the work from Harris and 
Pringle (1985) and Hamada (1972), they present the formula below: 




Where the Beta levered is made of the beta unlevered and leverage side effects. However, Hamada 
(1972) refers that the value of tax shields equals to multiplication of debt with the tax rate, and 
thus, many authors such as Damodaran (1994) or Koller et al. (2010) proposes an unlevering method 
that assumes that the Beta of debt equals to zero, since there is no correlation between the stock 
market and the risk of debt payments. Furthermore, Koller et al. (2010) states that “the finance 
literature does not provide a clear answer about which discount rate for tax benefit of interest is 
theoretically correct” and, as a result, the authors say that “we leave to the reader’s judgment to 
decide which approach best fits his or her situation”. 
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Concluding, Damodaran (1994) and Koller et al. (2010) presents an unlevering method that assumes 
a Beta of Debt equals to zero: 
(6)                          (  (
 
 
)  (   )) 
In our dissertation, as with many practitioners, we will use formula (6) in order to unlever the Beta 
for the adjusted present value methodology. 
1.1.4. Market risk premium 
The Market risk premium (MRP) might be one of the most important and also difficult topics to 
conceptualize. 
MRP represents the additional reward an investor has by adding risk to the investment. Thus, it is 
the excess return that one investor receives by investing in a risky asset, and the weight given is 
measured by the Beta. 
According to Fernandez (2004), there are three different designations for this matter:  (1) The 
required MRP, (2) the historical MRP and (3) the expected MRP. The first concept is the required 
rate of return by an investor, and thus, not necessarily what the market is rewarding, the second is 
an estimation based on historical data and, thus, less important in our case. And third, the 
expected MRP, which represents the difference between the stock market return and the risk free 
asset. The CAPM assumes that the required MRP and the expected MRP is the same and so, this will 
represent our MRP. 
Additionally, Damodaran (2013) considers three main approaches to calculate the market risk 
premium: (1) surveys to investors (2) the historical market risk premium, where MRP is computed 
by annualizing the difference between expected returns and government bonds and (3) using the 
implied approach, where the MRP is calculated based on equity prices or “risk-premiums in non-
equity markets”. 
However, the calculation of the MRP is not unanimous and depends on the estimation window used. 
As a result, many authors have presented similar results for the value of the MRP: Van Horne (1992) 
recommend between 3 and 7%, Damodaran (2011) recommend 6%, Claus and Thomas (2001) 
recommend 3% to 4% and Koller et al. in his latest edition of 2010 presents a MRP between 4.5% and 
5.5%. 
According to Damodaran (2013), the author suggests a simple way of calculating the correct MRP for 
markets without AAA ratings. Starting with a mature market risk premium (e.g.: USA, 5% market 
risk premium), we have to add the estimated default spread for the country in question. The author 
suggests extracting the sovereign rating for the country from Moody’s and, by using the rating-
based default spread, we should multiply it by the relative standard deviation between stocks and 
bonds from the specific country (7) 
(7)                             
(            )
(           )
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1.1.5. Cost of debt 
The cost of debt is the cost owning interest-bearing liabilities. Firms use debt to finance 
themselves and to reduce the amount of tax payables. However, as proven by Barclay (1995) and 
Berk and DeMarzo (2007), different industries may have different levels of debt to value, suggesting 
that the asset tangibility (Bradley et al., 1984 and Mackie-Mason, 1990) and the business risk 
(Bradley et al., 1984) impact the  level of debt used.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) stressed the importance of debt in the calculation of the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital since different levels of debt can have an impact on the final cost of capital 
of a firm. The author suggests that firms with different levels of debt are subject to different levels 
of financial risk and, thus, different interest rates. In general, assuming everything else equal, the 
higher the leverage level, the higher the cost of debt. 
Most firms can obtain interest-bearing liabilities by two main sources: through traditional bank 
loans or by issuing debt in the stock market such as bonds or securities. The first source of 
financing usually calculates the interest based on the default spread of each company’s ratings, 
after including the risk free rate (8). 
(8)                                       
However, global firms such as Vivo or TIM sometimes may have access to international financing at 
better terms than even the country government bonds. As a result, in the Brazilian case, although 
the 10-year yield rate is between 9% and 12%, both operators are able to get outside financing at 
lower rates than the Brazilian government bonds. 
1.1.6. WACC  
After explaining the concepts of cost of equity and cost of debt, we can now explain the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital. As the name suggests, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital is the rate at 
which we discount cash-flows, proportionally weighted by the capital structure of the firm. 
(9)    W    
 
 
    (   )  
 
 
    
Modigliani and Miller (1958) were the first authors to introduce the prevailing knowledge on capital 
structure, which was then developed by other authors such as Myers (1974) and adjusted by Miles 
and Ezzel (1980). 
The WACC method, as criticized by Luehrman (1997), relies on one single capital structure for the 
perpetuity, where financing costs follow the same risk, thus, excluding the existence of different 
costs of debt, covenants or collaterals that may influence the risk of different loans. The same 
author also refers the tax as one weak element of the WACC approach since it assumes one single 
tax environment, and thus, becoming a weak method for multinational firms. 
Likewise, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) points out that the WACC approach assumes that the capital 
structure of the company is relatively stable across periods and if the company is committed to 
maintain a constant capital structure, then it is reasonable to use this approach. 
The case of Vivo and TIM   7 
 
Nevertheless, most practitioners still use the WACC approach in case the company maintains a 
relatively stable capital structure since it is the easiest way of calculating the firm value. 
In the case of telecom operators, where technology shifts are constant and many players are now 
introducing new technologies such as fiber, more enterprise solutions and so on, many new 
investments in infrastructures make the assumption of constant capital ratio difficult to obtain. As 
a rule of thumb, the typical telecom firm should not be valued using a WACC discount factor if it is 
evident that the company is not maintaining a stable capital structure. Nevertheless, as we will see 
in both valuations, TIM Participações has a stable capital structure, and so, it is reasonable to 
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1.2. Valuation methods 
After reviewing the concepts on discount factors, we will now explain three different methods for 
valuing a company: the discounted cash flow method, using the WACC approach, the adjusted 
present value and the relative valuation. We will start by explaining a brief introduction to the free 
cash flow method, followed by the three valuation methods. 
1.2.1. Note on Free Cash Flow method 
Starting with the Free Cash flow (FCF), the FCF is the total cash that is available for Equity or Debt 
holders. Each firm need to compute these FCF’s to compute its valuation because firms deduct non-
cash items from the P&L (e.g.: Depreciations and amortizations) and may also invest in new assets 
which are not taken into consideration in the P&L. Moreover, sometimes firms need to invest in 
working capital, since the time of the purchase is not the same of the time of the cash received. As 
a result, according to Koller et al. (2010), Free Cash Flow to the equity is defined as the total cash 
flow available to equity holders (10), while Free Cash flow to the Firm is the total cash flow 
available for both Debt and Equity holders (11). 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Schweser (2012) present two distinctive ways of calculating the Free 
Cash Flows: starting from the net income and from EBIT. In theory, these two formulas arrive to the 
same result, but following different approaches.  As a result, we can calculate Free Cash Flow to 
Equity (8) and Free Cash Flow to the Firm (9) according to the expressions below: 
(10.1)  FCFE = Net Income + D&A– ∆Net Working Capital – CAPEX + Net Debt  
or 
(10.2)   FCFE = EBIT*(1-tax rate) + D&A - ∆Net Working Capital – CAPEX + Net Debt 
(11.1)  FCFF = Net Income + D&A + Interest*(1-Tax) - ∆Net Working Capital – CAPEX 
or 
(11.2)  FCFF = EBIT*(1-tax rate) + D&A - ∆Net Working Capital – CAPEX 
When looking to each formula we understand that the subtraction “D&A – CAPEX” can be somehow 
related in the long-term since if there was any investment in CAPEX, at a certain point in time, the 
D&A would start reducing due to low value of firm’s assets.  Kaplan and Ruback (1995) states that 
when computing the terminal value and “assuming a growing perpetuity”, in order for the firm to 
continue its operational activity in the future, “capital expenditures should be at least as large as 
depreciation and amortization”. 
1.2.2. Discounted Cash Flow method using WACC 
As already discussed before, the WACC-based DCF method assumes a constant capital ratio that 
many authors state that is not realistic. Nevertheless, many practitioners still use this method due 
to its simplicity and easiness for the calculation of discount factor. 
(12)                     ∑ (
     
(      ) 
)     
     
(      ) (      ) 
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As we can see by formula 10 presented above, the enterprise value comprises an explicit period 
forecast and a perpetuity growth rate assumption. Starting with the time frame, we must select a 
specific explicit period that is not too short or too long. We must take into consideration future 
investments that the company is doing and forecast any incremental revenues or costs that may 
arise. For example, in cyclical companies, a forecast of the whole cycle period is fundamental for 
an accurate valuation, or if the country is facing a downturn or economy boost, we should forecast 
a timeframe that reaches a stability period for the company. As a rule, the forecasted explicit 
period must ensure that the firm will reach a stability period and no more significant changes are 
expected in the future.  
On the other hand, the perpetuity growth rate is also a key point, when making a valuation. 
According to Young et al. (1999), the terminal value can represent “80% to 90% of the market value 
estimate” so, inferring the right long-term growth rate is essential. 
Damodaran (2008) argues that the growth is “the driver of future cash flows and by extension the 
value of these cash flows” but stressed that the type of growth is also key, since investing in more 
risky projects also increases the cost of capital, thus, reducing the firm value. 
In a different line of thought, Chan et al. (2003) studied the long-term growth rate and points that 
“following superior growth in profits, competitive pressures should ultimately tend to dilute 
future growth” and, as a result, “earnings growth is, in general, unpredictable”.  Furthermore, the 
authors concludes that the median estimation of growth rate is close to the Gross Domestic Product 
evolution and suggests that “It is difficult to see how the profitability of the business sector over 
the long term can grow much faster than overall gross domestic product”, suggesting that in the 
long term, a firm should not grow more than the expected gross domestic product evolution. As a 
result, many practitioners follow the same approach, where the long term growth rate should 
follow the expectations of the economy. We will follow the same approach for the calculation of 
Vivo and TIM valuations. 
1.2.3. Adjusted Present Value 
The Adjusted Present Value method (APV), firstly introduced by Myers (1974), appeared as an 
alternative method to the traditional method of Weighted Average Cost of Capital, where it 
assumes that the firm will maintain a constant Debt-to-value ratio. In fact, although the WACC 
method could be adjusted on a year-over-year basis, the process can become complex, especially 
when it comes to the assumption of a constant debt-to-value ratio in perpetuity. 
As a result, the adjusted present value method pretends to measure the value of cash flows 
separately, distinguishing the value as if the company was all-equity-financed and then, valuing the 
present value of the interest tax shields. According to Luehrman (1997), the APV method unbundles 
both parts as described in the formula below: 
(13)     
Unlevered firm value Leverage side effects
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1.2.3.1. Free Cash Flow valuation at unlevered cost of equity 
As already described above, the APV separates the valuation into the unlevered value of operations 
and the value created by tax shields, but which discount rates should we use when calculating each 
part of the equation? The free cash flows can be obtained according to the method described by 
Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and the cost of equity, using the CAPM approach, as suggested by Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965) and Treynor (1966).  
Nevertheless, the CAPM uses a levered Beta, since the estimation of the Beta comes from levered 
firms. As a result, in order to use the correct cost of equity, as proposed by several authors such as 
Ruback (2002) or Modigliani and Miller (1963), we should unlever the Beta, using formula (6) or the 
correspondent formula below, if assumed a Beta of Debt different from zero: 
(14)                         
 
 
 (                ) 
1.2.3.2. Leverage side effects valuation 
According to Luehrman (1997), “interest tax shields arise because of the deductibility of interest 
payments on the corporate tax return”, this means that, a firm may benefit if they use debt, since 
it can reduce the amount of tax paid. However, at the same time, as firms become more levered, 
the benefits of tax shields may offset with additional costs due to increased leverage. If debt 
holders suspect that a firm may enter in financial distress, financing costs increase due to higher 
bankruptcy costs.  
Although the interest tax shields represent the biggest contributor to the leverage side effects, 
Luehrman (1997) also suggests several types of financial effects such as subsidies, hedges or issue 
costs.  
But how should we discount these financial side effects? There has been a debate on which rate to 
use. Some authors suggest it should be used the cost of debt, while others argue that the tax 
shields are slightly more uncertain than debt payments, so the rate should be adjusted upwards. 
Ruback (2002), however, suggests that the discount rate used for the tax shields should be the cost 
of Debt. 
The last step in the valuation, when using this method, is to estimate the value of the bankruptcy 
costs (BC). These costs are related with direct and indirect costs associated in the case of 
bankruptcy such as attorney fees, claims and possible compensations to suppliers, employees and 
even the government. Damodaran (1996) suggests an easy way to calculate the BC based on the 
bond rating of each firm. Based on a studied made by Altman and Kishore (1998), the credit rating 
of a company gives a good indication of the default risk of a company. As a result, for instance, a 
company with a rating of BBB has a default probability of 2.3%. 
(15)                                                                                  
Furthermore, the costs of bankruptcy are usually a difficult value to estimate since it depends on 
several variables such as the social impact of bankruptcy, the creditor’s loss and all losses to all 
stakeholders of the firm. Although this assumption did not have the proper attention in the finance 
books, many banks, investors and shareholders depend a lot on how to quantify the expected loss in 
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case of default. Schuermann (2004) made a study where the author calculates the expected loss 
given default per industry. For instance, in the case of the communications industry, the average 
recovery is 53% of the firm value, thus, the expected costs of bankruptcy are 47% (see appendix for 
average recovery per industry). 
Concluding, the bankruptcy costs, as proposed by Damodaran (1996), can be computed, using the 
formula above, where the probability of default is based on the rating1, then the costs of 
bankruptcy are usually a percentage of the unlevered firm value (in our case will be 47%), and, 
finally, the unlevered firm value is the total unlevered firm value. 
1.2.4. Multiples valuation 
In the last two chapters, we have discussed two valuations methodologies that are commonly used 
by investors and scholars. However, most of the times, a more simple method to measure the value 
of a firm is the relative valuation, where investors select comparable companies to value the firm 
in question. 
According to Goedhart (2005), “A properly executed multiples analysis can make financial 
forecasts more accurate” since it can position a DCF or APV valuation with the respective industry.  
In the last two chapters, we have discussed valuation methods that are based on cash flows and on 
discount rates, but at this point, it is important to refer an important method that helps investors 
guide their valuations and extract meaningful and efficient insights.  
Koller et al. (2010) argues that a multiple valuation, when computed accurately, is an important 
tool to understand how the market is valuing each company, prove the feasibility and plausibility of 
the forecasts and to understand the expectations of the market in that industry and firm. 
The same author suggests three main steps to calculate multiples - choosing the right multiple, 
being consistent with the calculation and choosing the appropriate peer group. 
Using the right multiple is a key step in order to make a reliable valuation. The EV-to-EBITDA is 
argued by several authors to be good performance indicator since it is less vulnerable to changes in 
capital structure or non-operational cash-flows (i.e.: depreciations and amortizations, one-time 
gain or losses or debt payments can vary from firm to firm and distort analysis) when compared 
with other multiples as price-to-earnings ratio or the PEG ratio.  
Fernandez (2001) presents three main multiples bundles: multiples based on company’s 
capitalization, based on company’s value and based on growth. 
The most common multiples based on company’s capitalization are the price-to-earnings ratio, 
price-to-cash-earnings2, price to sales, price to book value, price to levered cash flow and others 
that relate price with operational data such as customers, output or units sold. Secondly, multiples 
based on company’s capitalization are, for instance, EV to EBITDA, EV to sales or EV to unlevered 
free cash flow. Finally, according to Fernandez (2001), PER to earnings per share growth or EV to 
EBITDA growth are the most common multiples used under the growth category. 
                                                     
1 See appendix 
2 Net income before depreciation and amortization 
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Figure 1 show the most widely used valuation methods, according to Fernandez (2001), in a study 
made by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter’s analysts. Surprisingly, most practitioners prefer PER and EV 
to EBITDA multiples, while the DCF approach is only used by slightly more than 20% of the survey. 
This may be caused by the easiness and efficiency that the multiples method offer, when compared 
with free-cash flow approaches. 
Figure 1 – Most widely used valuation methods 
 
Furthermore, Koller et al. (2010) argues that being consistent in the calculation of multiples is 
crucial since very often investors make mistakes on the calculation of the enterprise value or 
EBITDA. As suggested by Koller et al. (2010), enterprise value must only include assets that 
contribute to EBITDA and exclude items such as excess cash or nonconsolidated subsidiaries. When 
computing peer group multiples, we must exclude from enterprise value all values that do not 
generate cash flows to the core business. 
The last but not the least, according to Koller et al. (2010), choosing the peer group can be the 
most challenging part of the analysis since investors have to use judgement to select a group of 
companies that best represent our firm.  Critical thinking is essential in this step and the author 
suggests that the investor must answer key questions in order to understand differences across 
ratios such as company products, competitive advantages, economies of scale, growth capacity and 
so on. As suggested by Goedhart (2005), the selection must have similar expectations in terms of 
ROIC and growth. 
Once all these assumptions and peer group formation are met, the valuation using multiples is 
simple and easy to perform. It is simply the multiplication of the peer group multiple by the 
operational indicator. The formula below illustrates with the EV-to-EBITDA multiple. 
(16)                      (
           
      
)              
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1.3. Valuation in emerging markets 
Although valuation in developed markets seems to converge in a certain agreement between 
practitioners and scholars, the topic reveals more ambiguity when we value firms in emerging 
markets. 
Many authors have suggested several solutions to the topic such as James and Koller (2000), Bekaert 
et al. (2003), Damodaran (2003), among others. 
1.3.1. Why is emerging market valuation so important? 
Bruner et al. (2002) present several reasons to explain why emerging markets valuations are usually 
more difficult to estimate and why it has gathered so much attention in the past few years. Firstly, 
since practitioners and scholars still didn’t find any “consensus” for a general practice, it has been 
strongly debated to achieve a common solution. Issues such as how to define a “risk probability” on 
factors such as war, corruption or expropriation and how to value the right cost of capital are 
examples of how investors disagree on the right methodology. 
Secondly, the emerging countries are no longer outside the investor’s horizons since the capital 
flows to and from emerging markets are getting bigger and bigger and, currently, there are more 
portfolios formed by emerging stocks. Moreover, there is a need to better evaluate these assets 
since the right methodology can have a great impact even in social causes (the higher the 
transparency, the easier it is for investors to enter in emerging markets). 
Finally, the last but not the least, emerging markets are much different from developed countries, 
since several areas present additional risks, compared to developed countries. These countries face 
additional risks such as liquidity, expropriation, corruption, information asymmetry, high volatility 
or accounting transparency. In fact, these factors represent the majority of the difficulty when 
discount cash flows. For instance, investors need to add a premium to the risk of corruption and 
control from official entities, or to the lack of transparency in the accounting procedures in 
emerging markets. Therefore, practitioners and scholars have spent a significant time in finding the 
best way to calculate all these risks. 
Additionally, the author also reflects about the difference between local and global companies 
valuations. The author states that global firms obtain a significant portion of revenues, supplying 
resources and even financing from outside markets in developed countries, thus, these companies 
should have a different cost of capital from the local firms, where the whole business depends on 
the country risk. As a result, it is common for global firms to have a lower cost of equity or 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital from the government yields. 
1.3.2. Proposed solutions 
As mentioned previously, there is not a consensus on how to value an emerging market valuation, 
but several suggestions from several different authors. 
Koller et al. (2010) suggest a an average valuation based on three different methodologies. The 
first method, suggests computing a probabilistic model that takes into account each risk such as 
war, expropriation, liquidity risks, among others. Then, the author suggests building a model that 
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only adds a country risk premium in the cost of capital and, finally, by using trading multiples from 
the peer group. 
Alternatively, James and Koller (2000) suggest that adjusting an emerging market valuation must 
come from two different sources: the numerator (free cash flows) and the denominator (discount 
factor). The free cash flows must take into consideration risks of information asymmetry, cash flow 
volatility or even war. On the other hand, the discount factor must also add a risk premium to 
consider other factors such as expropriation or high stock market volatility. Therefore, a 
probabilistic evaluation is considered the most solid method for the valuation, since it provides a 
weighted valuation, depending on several scenarios and provide a deep understanding of where 
value might be destroyed or not. 
Additionally, in the same line of thought, Damodaran (2003) proposes a three step approach to 
adjust the valuation in emerging markets. Firstly, the author suggests adjusting the scale to reflect 
any difference in accounting procedures, then we should control for country risk, and, we can use 
country ratings or default spreads as a proxy for added risk for the company (17). Finally, an 
adjustment to control for interest rates and inflation must be also taken into consideration in case 
the valuation is being done in a different currency from the source of cash flows. 
(17)                                      (                               ) 
Concluding, although there is not a consensus on the right way of calculating an emerging market 
valuation, several authors suggest some similarities on which approach to use. As a result, since the 
Brazilian economy had a relevant growth in the past few years, we believe that Brazil is in between 
an emerging market economy and a pre-developed country. Thus, a valuation that follows a 
probabilistic approach based on several country risks such as war, expropriation, corruption, etc. 
seems to be exaggerated. We will base our valuation according to the recommendations made by 
Damodaran, where the author includes a country risk premium in the cost of capital in order to 
adjust for the risks of an emerging market. 
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1.4. Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.4.1. Why M&A happens? 
Mergers and Acquisitions are an important topic of discussion in today’s business environment. As 
technology evolves, different industries gain more strength or new opportunities for new businesses 
arise, there are always opportunities for new mergers and acquisitions to occur. Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) argue that, most of the industry takeover activity is actually driven by economic 
shocks like technological innovations or demographic shifts. Moreover, DePamphilis (2012) presents 
several reasons behind this phenomenon. 
Since some industries depend a lot on fixed costs (IT, R&D, infrastructures, etc.), economies of 
scale is a plausible reason for M&A. By increasing the sales volume, it consequently reduces the 
dollar amount of the fixed costs per unit sold and, as a result, the merged company might become 
more competitive. 
Diversification is also another key reason since it allows an increase in growth opportunities of both 
companies. A recent example of this was the merger between Zon and SonaeCom, where the 
merger allowed the company to start selling bundled products (Quad play3). Moreover, it can be a 
good move in case a company want to shift the core product line. 
Strategic realignment is also another cause for M&A. It allows companies to make fast adjustments 
in their business that would be, if developed internally, more difficult and time consuming to 
implement. 
The author also suggests market power as an important driver for M&A, since it may increase their 
market share, profitability and, possibly, reduce the competitor’s strength.  
Additionally, DePamphilis (2012) also presents another type of causes for M&A as managerialism 
(managers augmenting their sphere of influence and power), tax (if one company is accumulating 
losses, it can offset with a profitable acquirer) or even misevaluation (when investors value a 
certain company above or below the true value). 
In the case of TIM and Vivo, the main reason for the acquisition will be a technological innovation, 
combined with the opportunity for synergies in CAPEX investments, OPEX savings and strengthening 
market power in the Brazilian market. 
1.4.2. Why is cross-border M&A important? 
On a different perspective, Zenner et al. (2008) reflects about the new era of cross-border M&A. 
The author refers that more often mature market global firms are turning their strategy to 
emerging markets in a search for additional wealth and future growth. They suggest several reasons 
for this event such as Globalization, diversification and deregulation. 
The first reason comes as a natural evolution of the world economy, where people are increasingly 
more connected through better communications, transports and information technologies. 
Secondly, Zenner et al. (2008) suggest diversification since firms are pursuing new sources of 
                                                     
3
Quad play is the telecom term for a service made of television, fixed broadband, fixed voice and mobile communications  
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growth as well as new ways of reducing the sovereign risk of their local economies. And finally, 
deregulation, because it is being increasingly common to see emerging markets to leave a 
protectionist approach and to let the free flow of capital and goods trade freely. 
This is exactly the case of Telefónica Group and Telecom Itália, where both telecom groups have 
had significant investments in Latin America due to deregulation and risk diversification. Telefónica 
group a footprint of more than 20 countries, with a special focus on Latin América, with presence 
in 15 countries and more than 190 million subscribers. 
1.4.3. Does M&A pay? 
In a different perspective, many authors have suggested that M&A sometimes does not pay off since 
the premium paid for the acquisition offsets any possible revenue or costs savings that may arise. 
Several authors and respectable magazines4 have raised questions whether M&A really pays or not. 
Dennis Mueller (1980) states that “the firms themselves are performing no better on average than 
they would have been in the absence of the mergers” and Narayanan et al. (1992) concludes that 
acquiring companies don’t realize significant returns. 
Bruner (2003) suggests several arguments where M&A pays or not. On one hand, the author refers 
the expected synergies as the most important factor influencing the M&A success or failure. This 
may come under the form of business restructuring or economies of scale gaining’s.  
On the other hand, “glamour acquiring” does not pay since these companies may be overvalued 
with empirical evidence of -17% abnormal returns (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  Bruner (2003) refers 
that paying with stock is costly, whereas with cash is neutral due to investors temptation to time 
the announcement when the stock price is high and also that M&A with the objective of building 
market power may not be a good source of value addition, as empirically proven by Stillman (1983) 
and Eckbo (1983). 
Ruback (1997), together with You et al. (1986) also found that managers equity participation was 
lower when bidders returns were lower (zero or even negative), suggesting that when managers 
have more at risk, more value is created. 
Regarding M&A cyclicality, DePamphilis (2012) highlights 7 waves of M&A and identifies two major 
explanations for this phenomenon: industry reaction to “shocks”, such as deregulation, and the 
emergence of disruptive technologies. Additionally, the author explains that these waves follow 
common economic patterns such as high GDP growth rate, declining interest rates and bull stock 
market, proposing that it is during these periods that most mergers and acquisitions happen and it 
should continue in the future. 
1.4.4. Payment methods 
M&A is mostly financed either with stock, cash or a mix between both. Bruner (2004) synthetises 
some conclusions from several studies related with the type of payment used. Usually, target 
companies have significant positive returns in both payment scenarios, but, in absolute terms there 
                                                     
4 Business Week wrote an article where they show that out of 302 major M&A deals from 1995 to 2001, 61% lost 
wealth to their shareholders 
The case of Vivo and TIM   17 
 
are slightly differences. When cash payments occur, target returns are significantly positive, 
whereas when stock payments occur, target returns are also positive but lower than with cash. 
On the other hand, acquirer’s returns, in the announcement day, are significantly negative with 
stock payments and null or slightly positive with cash payments, as showed by Loughran and Vijh 
(1997). 
Bruner’s findings are consistent with market timing theory, where managers time the stock 
purchases when the price is low and sell stock when the price is high (Baker and Wurgler 2002). As 
briefly explained before, acquirers may have a tendency to time the stock issuance when the price 
is high since managers are able to raise more money with less stock issuance. Consequently, the 
market reacts negatively since it may indicate that the company is timing the issuance and the 
price is adjusted downwards. However, Korajczyk et al. (1991) suggest that managers, knowing 
this, tend to announce equity issuance when the market is most informed (usually followed by 
information releases) in order to reduce information asymmetry and reduce possible downwards 
stock reaction. 
Bruner (2004) also refers LBOs, earnouts and collars as alternative payment methods in M&A deals. 
In LBOs, it is expected that large operational efficiencies and CAPEX reductions are obtained to 
compensate the increased amount of debt payments. Secondly, earnouts are a good clause to 
ensure feasibility of future performance commitments and, thirdly, collars exist as a deal 
cancelation option or deals restructure to prevent possible risks. 
1.4.5. How to avoid the synergy trap 
One of the main reasons for managers and investors to fall in the synergy trap is by not being able 
to oversee the above-the-premium price they pay for a deal. As illustrated by Koller et al. (2010), 
the value created by the acquirer is illustrated in the figure below, where if the acquirer is able to 
generate enough synergies above the premium paid to the business, he will be able to create value. 
Figure 2 – Acquisition valuation framework 
 
Koller et al. (2010) suggest that the value creation depends on two major factors: the performance 
improvements (or synergies) and the premium paid to the target company. As a result, we can 
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(18)                (                               )  (                       
       )  
Hence, this formula will give us the foundations for the computation of the “meet the premium 
line“(MTP) as suggested by Sirower and Sahni (2006). The MTP line is a helpful tool to understand if 
investors are paying too much for the business and if they are being too optimistic. 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) presents a formula that combines both efforts in costs and revenue 
synergies with the current profit margin and premium paid, thus, creating a frontier where the 
investor can “avoid the synergy trap”: 
(19)             
            
              
 (                )  
In the example in figure 3, the authors have computed a scenario where a certain company is 
willing to pay a premium of 35% for a business with 18% profit margin. As a result, the amount of 
synergies generated to pay off the investment needs to be above the blue line.  
Figure 3 – Meet the premium line 
 
Let’s look, for instance point 1. In this point, the synergies are 8% cost efficiency gains and nearly 
7.5% for revenue increases, which, by modifying formula (17), we see that the amount of synergies 
are above the premium paid.  
        
   
 
       )           ⇔     
(     )
   
         ⇔            
On the other hand, case 2 and 3 don’t generate enough synergies for the premium paid, therefore, 
investors should “avoid the synergy trap”. 
Furthermore, Sirower and Sahni (2006) suggest that firms are much better reducing costs than 
increasing revenues due to competitor’s response or customer’s reaction to the merger. As a result, 
following previous studies and benchmarks made by the authors, a 10% decrease in costs and 10% 
increase in revenues comes as a reference in calculating both types of synergies. As explained by 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) , when setting the parameters by the acquirer, the plausibility box helps 
investors to better triangulate and understand if they are being too optimistic on cost reductions or 
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2. Industry review and market assessment 
The telecommunications industry is a broad market that throughout the past century has suffered 
numerous shifts. From the invention of the fixed voice line,  the first steps in the world wide web, 
the mobile phone and lastly, the high speed broadband, it has enabled people to communicate 
more, better and change information faster. This industry was one sector where the companies had 
to adjust their business plans, invest huge amounts of money and keep innovating. 
This chapter will be divided into five main categories: an introduction to the main telecom macro 
trends, data trends, the Brazilian market and the macro trends, how the telecom sector in Brazil is 
evolving and what we expect the Brazilian market to be in the next couple of years and, finally, a 
deep dive into Vivo and Tim service providers. We will conclude with a brief description of the 
revenue and cost drivers. 
2.1. Global telecom trends 
In this first chapter, we will take a look to the telecom landscape. How countries are evolving in 
the telecom space, take a brief look at the different rhythms per region, how the 2010’s decade is 
reshaping the telecom industry and what should be the next challenges and improvements for 
operators that want to boost their competitiveness. 
Using data from wireless intelligence from February 2014, we have computed the correlation 
between GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and country penetration. As we can see in 
figure 4, purchasing power is a strong indicator of mobile penetration with an explanation power of 
53%. 
This correlation suggests that the higher the economic growth and development, the higher the 
propensity for mobile phone acquisition. The African continent is still the region with the lower 
mobile penetration, followed by the Americas (with the exception of US and Canada) and then the 
Asia and Pacific. On the other hand, Europe shows already a high penetration of mobile phones with 
almost all countries with penetrations above 100%.  
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Moving to the wireless market, the global mobile subscribers have grown in the past few years from 
700 million subscribers in 2000 to almost 7 billion subscribers in the end of 2013. Although this 
growth was mostly driven by emerging markets such as Asian-pacific countries, other continents 
such as Africa, the Americas and Europe have experienced significant growth between 12-14% in 
more developed continents and some astonishing 35% in the African country. 
In figure 5, we see the growth per continent as well as the expected growth of mobile subscribers 
until end of 2017. Asia-pacific countries will continue to be the most relevant market worldwide, 
mostly driven by big markets such as India and China but also Pakistan, Philippines, Russia or 
Indonesia. 
Moreover, one key trend is the deceleration of the mobile subscriber’s growth into a more stable 
growth. While the first decade of 2000 was shaped by an average 20% growth rate per annum, the 
next 4 years will “only” have a growth rate of 5%. 
Figure 5 – Mobile subscribers per continent  
(Bln users) 
 
Nevertheless, this mobile deceleration is also followed by a reshape on the telecom sector through 
the mobile broadband (MBB). The GSM technology took his first steps in 1991, but only in late 90’s 
it started being commercialized the first handsets with mobile broadband capabilities. According to 
wireless intelligence, in 2002 there was only MBB in South Korea but in 2006 it started being mass 
deployed by service providers while handsets were also being developed with this technology by 
known handset manufacturers such as Nokia or Erikson.  
As a result, it was only between 2008 and 2010 that MBB subscribers started growing and from 2010 
onwards, growing at a rapid pace. Figure 6 shows the MBB subscribers evolution with forecasts until 
2017. As we can see, from the past 4 years until the next 3 years it will be expected an annual 
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In addition, again, Africa will be the continent with the highest growth rate, mostly due to the 
early development stage of the telecommunication sector in those countries. The Americas will also 
have a relevant MBB growth, of around 46%. Brazil, in this case, plays an enormous role, where it is 
expected, according to wireless intelligence, to growth its MBB subscriber base from 17 million in 
2010, to more than 227 million in 2017. 
Finally, looking to the share of MBB subscribers, it is clear that the biggest share of market will still 
come from the Asian countries; however developed countries such as the European or US and 
Canada still represent 35% of global MBB subscribers in 2013 and is expected to decrease to 27% in 
2017.  
Figure 6 - Global broadband evolution 
 
2.2. Data Trends 
As we have seen previously, data is going to be a main driver for growth in the telecom sector. 
According to Cisco analysis, mobile data consumption is expected to increase at an annual pace of 
61%, on average, and will be mainly driven by video and data traffic. In other words, data 
consumption will be ten times higher in 5 years than it is today. 
Moreover, as data evolves, the share of data consumed by a smart device will keep rising and is 
expected to be 96% in 2018 (right side of figure 7). 
Figure 7 – Global data consumption5 
 
                                                     
5 1 Exabyte = 1 Billion gigabytes 
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This data explosion may be explained by a couple of factors. On one hand, the handset 
manufacturers are evolving and producing more data consuming smartphones and leaving feature 
phones, while at the same time, Telco operators are deploying faster and with higher capacity 
networks and, the last but not the least, internet players are growing and expanding their services. 
Figure 8 shows an illustration of how internet enables all these products to be online such as 
content (news, music, books or video), social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), online gaming, 
online communications (Skype, Whatsapp, Viber, etc.) and also applications and cloud services such 
as iCloud, Dropbox and Google Drive.  
As a result, it is expected that telecom operators will move from being a fully service provider to 
an enabler of this new online world, where information, social networks and cloud are the new 
paradigm.  
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2.3. Telecom operators trends 
The old fixed voice line that we used to have at home has passed away a long time ago. Telecom 
operators, in the last 5 to 10 years were still used to sell end-to-end services. From the deployment 
of infrastructure, the network management and then customer facing activities such as sales, 
customer care or marketing, Telcos used to manage the entire supply chain.  
However, with the entrance of new digital players, with requirements of faster services, the 
appearance of more personalized products and increase in complexity of products and technologies, 
telecom operators are now starting to change their business plan, from being an end-to-end service 
provider to an enabler of products and services. 
Figure 9 pretends to illustrate this game shift that telecom operator are facing. The game is now 
much more complex: from a technology point of view, there are many new technologies and 
expertise that makes it difficult for operators to have fully control in all new technologies that are 
evolving. As a result, Telecom operators may outsource specific services such as OSS/BSS 
(operations support system and business support business) management, call centre outsourcing, 
tower management or even network infrastructure outsourcing. 
In addition, while before telecom operators could have control on all business, now, the business is 
much bigger. The new paradigm became the information world and so, operators operate more as a 
3rd party service provider (while still outsourcing specific components of its enablement). 
Figure 9 – A business model for telecom operators 
 
This game shift makes the work of telecom operators more complex. In order to gain traction and 
not loose competitiveness to other communication suppliers, they need to focus on four main 
actions: provide adjacent services such as mobile apps, mobile advertising and mobile financial 
services (through partnerships with banks for instance), establish partnerships with internet players 
(Google, Skype, Whatsapp, etc.), deploy faster network infrastructure such as LTE towers and fiber 
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Figure 10 – New challenges for telecom operators 
 
Concluding, the market is changing and telecom operators must be up-to-date with the newest 
technologies. As a market leader, it is important to take the first move in order to not be surpassed 
by another player that provides these services first with better quality. Moreover, operators need 
to start offering bundled services in order to get economies of scale and reduce churn. An example 
of this is Portugal Telecom, which was the first true Telco to offer Quad play offers, and thus, 
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2.4. Economics and demographics of Brazil 
The Brazilian country is the 5th biggest country in terms of population and is expected to grow at a 
pace of 0.8% per year to an estimated number of 208 million people in 2017. In terms of 
demographics, Brazil is in the middle of the process from being a characteristic young country to an 
“old” country, as characterized by developed countries (right side, figure 11). 
Brazil has an estimated urban population of 87%, where São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are the 
biggest cities, with nearly 20 and 12 million people, respectively. 
Figure 11 – Demographics of Brazil 
 
In terms of economy, Brazil is characterized by large agricultural, manufacturing, mining and 
service sectors and outweighs any of the other Latin American countries. It has experienced high 
economic growth in the past 25 years with the peak in 2010 with a GDP growth rate of 7.5%. 
Moreover, unemployment is at historic low (5.5% in 2012) and income disparities are reducing on a 
year-over-year basis since 2000.  
As a result, the Brazilian economy has been growing with an average 3.5% in the last decade and is 
expected to keep growing in the next 4 years at 3% per year, according to World Bank (figure 12). 
Figure 12 – Brazilian GDP evolution 

















Population distribution pyramid – gender & age
(2013 Pop, Mln)
























GDP growth rate per year (%)
5.7% 3.2% 4.0% 6.1% 5.2% -0.3% 7.5% 2.7% 0.9% 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.7%
+2.9%
Source: World Bank
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2.5. The telecommunications sector in Brazil 
The telecommunications sector in Brazil is facing a strong growth outlook in 2013, following the 
growth showed in the last 4 years. The mobile subscribers are expected to keep growing at a rate 
of 7% per year. However, much of this growth has been driven by pre-paid customers with a share 
of 80.2% and 19.8% for post-paid customers. Following international benchmarks, there is still room 
for improvements in the post-paid segment, since average revenues per user (ARPU) are higher than 
in pre-paid customers. 
The mobile market has entered into a new stage of development with all four players starting to 
deploy LTE and 3G infrastructures in their networks, which allowed the growth of the MBB with an 
expected annual compounded growth rate of 28%. Furthermore, this deployment of LTE is a great 
opportunity for all four players to gain new opportunities for monetization, such as value added 
services (VAS). 
Figure 13 shows the mobile subscribers in Brazil, as well as penetration and mobile connections. As 
we can see, penetration level is 143% and is expected to keep growing in the next years. In part, 
this growth can be explained by the unconnected remote areas that Brazil still has and can help all 
four operators to get higher organic growth, together with the strong economic growth showed in 
the past few years. 
Figure 13 – Mobile, 3G Connections and Brazilian mobile penetration 
(Mln, %) 
 
Mobile Broadband is also evolving fast. The 3G take-up has been strong and the new deployments of 
4G infrastructure can help Telcos to go into the data business, while voice revenues start eroding 
due to new ways of communicating (Whatsapp, Skype, Viber, etc.).  
The four main telecom operators in Brazil are Vivo, TIM, Claro and Oi. These four players have 
maintained a sustained market share in the last few years with Vivo as the market leader with 27% 
market share, followed by TIM and Claro with nearly 25% each and then Oi with almost 20% market 
share. The remaining 2% are niche players such as Nextel, Algar Telecom and Sercomtel. 
Nevertheless, Vivo has been losing market share due to fierce competition from the other three 
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Note: In 2017, it is expected that 75 Million subscribers will have either 2G or 4G connections
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Figure 14 - Market Share per operator 
 
In terms of average revenues per user, according to wireless intelligence, the revenues are slightly 
declining since 2007. This effect is mainly caused by the increase in the number of mobile 
subscribers that is reaching lowered income subscribers and also the expansion to rural areas. This 
last cause is, in fact required by the regulatory authority, under the National broadband plan. 
However, the later trends on LTE deployments can help operators to penetrate into higher 
segments that demand higher internet speeds and, thus, could encourage higher spending for this 
services.   
In a nutshell, the ARPU is expected to slowly increase due to higher economic growth and 
additional revenue streams such as new data plans or more focus on the post-paid segment. 
Figure 15 shows the ARPU per operator since 2007. As we can see, ARPU started to erode since 
2008, but in 2012 and 2013 the ARPU started to increase, driven by data hungry consumers and new 
opportunities in bundled services. 
Figure 15 – Average revenue per user per operator 
(BRL, per month) 
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On the other hand, the fixed voice line market has experienced a flat evolution and is expected to 
maintain its size until 2017. This is also explained by the other technologies being deployed that 
can bring fixed voice with the service. This is the case of fixed broadband, that, by using this 
infrastructure, it enables the usage of bundled services over a fixed carrier: TV, fixed internet and 
fixed voice. 
The Brazilian broadband market is evolving fast since income is rising and services are becoming 
more affordable. Moreover, as PCs and online devices are increasing, more people have access to 
internet, contributing to this fast growth of the internet connections. 
Furthermore, the Brazilian government launched in 2010 the PNBL (“Plano Nacional de Banda 
Larga”, or National Broadband program) with the objective of “digital inclusion” and increase 
economic growth, which contributed to the initial growth from 82 million in 2010 to 112 million 
internet users in 2013. 
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2.6. Vivo company review 
Vivo is the leading telecommunications operator in Brazil with almost 80 million subscribers and it 
is 73.9% owned by Telefónica Group.  
In 2010, when Vivo was still owned by Portugal Telecom and Telefónica (29.71% and 30.31%, 
respectively), Telefónica group bought Portugal Telecom shares in Vivo and became owner of Vivo 
with 59.42% of shares. Throughout the next months, Telefónica strengthen his position to 73.90% of 
all shares until mid-2011. 
The Brazilian incumbent has two main businesses lines: fixed and mobile telecommunications but 
the fixed business is declining, while the mobile is growing at an average pace of 9% per year.  
As the world is moving towards the convergence of mobile and fixed connections, the same is 
happening in Brazil through Vivo. The operator aims to merge the fixed and wireless entities to 
create a strong consolidated brand that offers bundled services such as Triple and Quad play 
(television + internet + fixed voice or television + internet + fixed voice+ mobile, respectively). 
Vivo has a clear strategy for the mid-term. As presented in the last earnings announcement, Vivo 
brand wants to become a national leader in three main fronts: Mobile, Fixed and Corporate. In the 
mobile business, supported by the LTE network expansion, the incumbent has initiated a process to 
increase the internet adoption by subscribers. Moreover, in the fixed business, Vivo wants to double 
the number of homes passed6 in São Paulo, expand the IPTV offering, while investing more CAPEX in 
infrastructure and IT to improve the efficiency of the network. In addition, it is also clear to the 
operator the focus on the corporate segment, where Vivo want to explore opportunities in new 
data centers, offering tailored solutions to clients along with new opportunities in M2M (e.g.: smart 
cities) and in B2B such as health, security or financial services. 
2.6.1. Revenues 
The operator has seen a compounded annual growth rate of 3% in revenues in the overall business, 
which was mainly driven by the mobile market with almost 10% growth year-over-year. On the 
other hand, the fixed business is declining and has declined 15% in the last 3 years. Moreover, the 
EBIDTA margin has suffered a significant drop in 2013 mostly due to the competitive environment 
between Claro, TIM and Oi, together with regulatory constraints that demand the operator to 
provide services in less profitable rural areas.  
                                                     
6 Home passed is the technical term for a connected household with fiber 
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In terms of cost structure, Vivo is divided into 5 main components. Personnel correspond to salaries 
and benefits associated will all direct employees. Services rendered are all costs related with 
infrastructure maintenance, interconnection costs, quality assurance, TV and mobile content 
purchasing and all costs associated with the services offered by the operator. Costs of goods sold 
are the purchasing costs of mobile phones to handset manufacturers, while selling costs are all 
costs related to selling efforts such as marketing expenses, call centre and commissioning to 3rd 
party sellers. Finally, general and administrative expenses are all costs related with administrative 
purposes, thus, non-customer facing activities. 
On the right-hand side of figure 18, we see the average percentage of costs for the last three years 
for each category. As we can see, services rendered and selling costs represent 77% of all 
operational costs, while personnel only 11%.  
Figure 18 – Cost analysis 
 
2.6.3. Capital expenditures 
Vivo is increasing its absolute CAPEX investments in the past 4 years. In 2013, the incumbent has 
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Most of the investments were focused on quality enhancement and, more importantly, on capacity 
increase to support expected data traffic. Vivo is also investing in fiber infrastructures, especially 
in São Paulo, where they plan to connect 2.5 million homes until end of 2014. 
In addition, excluding licence fees (we exclude since these costs are not constant), Vivo has been 
able to maintain a stable CAPEX per operational revenues, of around 15%. 
Figure 19 - Vivo Capital Expenditures 
(BRL Mln) 
 
2.6.4. Net Debt 
Vivo is experiencing solid levels of net debt in the past 4 years.  The ratio of net debt to EBITDA 
was in 2013 below 20% and was actually more 330% than last year due to higher dividend payments 
from Vivo to its shareholders. 
The long-term debt has increased in the past few years to more than BRL 7 Billion, however, the 
cash and cash equivalents have also experienced a significant growth of more than 20% per year. 
The short-term debt has been stable, around BRL 1 Billion and BRL 2 Billion. As a result, the growth 
in gross debt is offset by cash and cash equivalents, and thus, Vivo has been able to have a 
sustained level of debt that allows them to increase leverage and invest on new opportunities that 
may arise. 
Figure 20 - Vivo net debt analysis 
(BRL Mln) 
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2.7. TIM Review 
TIM is the second player in the Brazilian market with a market share of 26%. It is owned by Telecom 
Italia Group in 66.68% and by Telefónica Group in 9.97%. In 2006, Telecom Italia received a sale 
proposal from América Movil (owner of Claro) but they refused, arguing that it was an asset with 
high strategic importance for the group. In the meantime, Telefónica also bid an offer of TIM Brasil, 
which was successfully achieved, having bought 6.95% of shares in the second quarter of 2007. 
The stake owned by Telefónica Brazil in TIM Participações was allowed by ANATEL (the Brazilian 
regulatory authority) because management of both participations would remain separate. However, 
Telefónica managed to create partnerships between both operators and share infrastructures and 
gain some savings by acquiring equipment jointly. Yet, according to analysts, in the long-term, it 
seems likely that Telefónica will either merge both operators or leave stake in one of them. 
Moreover, industry analysts have suggested that parent Telecom Italia might sell his assets to relief 
debt pressure, but the group have denied. 
TIM provides mobile, fixed and broadband services and his GSM technology covers nearly 95% of 
urban population in 3383 cities. Moreover, the mobile broadband coverage is quite extensive, with 
an estimated coverage of 72% of the urban population through its 3G network. Furthermore, 
analysts say that TIM Brazil has the most developed fixed broadband network and is a leader in 
implementing MVNOs in Brazil. 
In terms of type of subscriptions, TIM has been efficient in growing the pre-paid customers, with an 
average growth rate of 17% per year and coming from a base of 24 million subscribers in 2007 to 
almost 65million by end of 2013. On the other hand, the post-paid segment has not been very 
successful. Although the segment has grown, it has been at a much slower pace, compared to the 
prepaid segment, 4.1% per year from 2007 to 2013. As a result, the post-paid segment is made of 
nearly 8.6 million subscribers. According to analysts, TIM strategy should continue to be on the pre-
paid segment in order strengthen its position as a solid second leader.  
In addition, now that TIM is launching new technologies and improving its infrastructures, the 
operator also wants to develop further the post-paid segment, boost data revenues and explore 
value added services. 
TIM presents a positive outlook for mid-term. Its investments in fixed broadband as well as LTE and 
also high mobile coverage create an ideal scenario for launch of bundled services and also for 
development of other drivers of revenue growth such as value-added services, post-paid, more 
premium data plans or even develop the corporate segment.  
2.7.1. Revenues 
The company has been reporting a strong revenue growth in the past 4 years, from nearly BRL 20 
billion to almost BRL 30 Billion. While the mobile business represents the major revenue stream of 
TIM with a revenue growth year-over-year of approximately 11%, the fixed business is shrinking and 
represents as of end of 2013 less than 4% of the total business (figure 21). However, as we have 
seen previously, the mobile revenue growth hides important messages such as the ARPU. The 
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second biggest player by number of subscribers has reported the second lowest ARPU from the four 
competitors over the past 5 years.  




In terms of costs, TIM Participações follow a typical cost structure of a telecom operator. Almost 
64% of total costs in 2013 were driven by network, interconnection and selling and marketing 
expenses. The first component was BRL 5.3 billion and corresponds to all operating expenses 
related with infrastructure maintenance, IT expenses and fees paid to other operators through 
interconnection costs. The second item, selling and marketing costs, are all expenses related with 
the sales force and marketing investments such as commissions to 3rd party sellers, marketing 
campaigns, TIM stores (employees, rents, electricity and water, maintenance…), among others. 
The third largest cost component was costs of goods sold, with a total value of BRL 3.35 billion in 
2013. This component is mostly driven by handset sales and other communication devices such as 
routers or fixed line phones. As a result, as we can imply from the handset revenue (the revenue 
item with the highest growth), it is also the operating expense with the highest growth, with an 
year-over-year growth of 38% since 2009. 
TIM had 12,167 employees in 2013, more 517 than in 2012 and its costs were BRL 832 million, while 
general and administrative costs were BRL 625 million and corresponds mainly to central office 
work, non-customer facing employees, office rentals and maintenance, water and electricity and 
other various office items. Finally, the last operating expense component, others, are related with 
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Figure 22 – TIM cost analysis 
 
2.7.3. Capital Expenditures 
TIM had the highest historical CAPEX per operational revenues, of around 18% to 20% due to its 
efforts in improving service quality and infrastructure expansion. The main strategy will be the 
market shift to data and, as a result, the operator has already started its fiber expansion and is 
expecting to pass one million homes by end of 2013. However, in the long-term, we expect the 
ratio CAPEX to Revenues to decrease in the long-term in order to generate cash flows to its 
shareholders 
In August 2013, TIM released an investment plan for the next 3 years. The roadmap will continue to 
be the focus on infrastructure expansion, through investments in backhaul and targeting more than 
100 cities until end of 2016, increase the fiber network from 46,000km in 2013 to more than 
65,000km in 2016, and continue the mobile coverage expansion through investments in 3G and LTE 
base stations throughout the country7.  
As a result, TIM’s long term strategy will be focus on creating new bundled services, increase the 
service quality of its network through faster fixed and mobile broadband, while gaining market 
share in the “ultra broadband”8 and developing the corporate segment such as the SME segment. 
                                                     
7 See appendix for more detailed information about the slide presented by TIM with its roadmap until 2016. 
8 Term used by TIM for internet speed above 34Mbps 






















Average TIM costs per category
(%)
Others G&A
The case of Vivo and TIM   35 
 
Figure 23 – TIM capital expenditures 
(BRL Mln) 
 
2.7.4. Net Debt 
Although TIM Participações has been increasing long-term debt at a pace of 18% per year, its cash 
and equivalents and derivatives positions are also increasing, offsetting the net debt to minus BRL 
743 million. 
The investments in network infrastructure made throughout the last 4 years have been the main 
reason for the increase in long-term debt. Short term debt, on the other hand, has been stable and 
is mainly used for short-term commitments or even accounting procedures of long-term debt with 
less than one year maturity.  
In terms of cash and cash equivalents, TIM has been able to collect significant amount of cash due 
to stable net cash flows in the past 3 years. The last item, derivatives position, corresponds to the 
net position held on the last day of the fiscal year of all derivative assets (Information on 
derivatives investments has not been disclosed by TIM Participações).  
TIM, along with Vivo, has a big financial slack that allows the operator to invest in new 
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Figure 24 – TIM net debt analysis 
(BRL Mln) 
 
2.8. Revenue and Cost Drivers 
In the telecommunications industry, as in any other industry, the cost and revenue drivers depend 
on several factors that are impossible to predict. However, some indicators have a strong 
explanatory factor and, as many industry analysts use, can constitute fair assumptions to predict 
future revenues, costs and business evolution. 
2.8.1.  Revenue Drivers 
The revenue of a typical operator can be decomposed through the formula below.  
(15)                                         
However, this is a very simplistic way of describing the revenue. In order to be more accurate, we 
should detail the revenues into more categories such as data ARPU and voice ARPU (and the same 
for number of subscribers). Furthermore, we should also include the revenue from handsets sold 
and make a distinction between fixed and mobile ARPU and subscribers. As a result, the formula 
could be broken down into formula 16. 
(16)                                                                                      
Thus, by looking at the formula above, we see three main categories that we need to further 
investigate: subscribers, ARPU and handset sales.  
The number of subscribers can be predicted using elements such as country penetration forecasts, 
GDP evolution, infrastructure development and new products release. Coming back to figure 4, 
there is a good correlation between penetration and GDP per Capita (PPP), so, using forecasted 
GDP per capita can be a good way of measuring future subscribers. 
Then, the best way to measure future ARPU, or average revenue per user, is by looking to the past 
and identifying possible future trends. For instance, in the Brazilian market, the ARPU is decreasing 
due to expansion of mobile services to lowered income people, but, at the same time, operators 
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are currently making efforts to increase ARPU through bundled services, premium data plans, 
higher penetration of the post-paid segment, and so on. Thus, it is a fair assumption to slightly 
increase the ARPU in the upcoming years. 
Finally, handset sales are probably the easiest factor to estimate. By looking to historical data, we 
can easily see how many handsets are bought per year per subscriber. Let’s say it is 0.25 (meaning 
each subscriber buys one handset every four years): by knowing the subscriber base forecasts and 
assuming the same prices per handset, we can predict the number of handset sales every year, and 
in this way, make fair estimations about the revenue coming from mobile phones. 
2.8.2. Cost Drivers 
Cost drivers are more difficult to estimate because there are more categories to estimate and, 
hence, depend on more factors.  Taking the example of Vivo and TIM, these operators follow a 
typical cost structure of any telecom operator. They have network and interconnection costs, 
selling and marketing costs, personnel, costs of goods sold, general and administrative costs and 
others. 
Network and interconnection costs are all costs related with the service provided, such as 
maintenance, site rentals, electricity, IT, interconnection costs (fees paid to other operators for 
calls in other networks) and so on. As a result, predicting a fair estimation of these costs can be 
extremely difficult. One way analysts often use to predict these costs is by looking to minutes of 
usage or usage of data, meaning that the costs of network are linked to the usage of the network 
and consequently, subject to network overload and maintenance. However, network costs are 
usually not directly linked to the evolution of these factors (operators can create synergies), thus, 
we can use only a “divider” to forecast the network evolution. Another way to look at this is by 
looking at the age of the infrastructure (the older the infrastructure is, more maintenance should 
be required) however, this information is commonly not disclosed. 
On the other hand, selling and marketing expenses could be seen as the effort to increase 
subscribers to the network. As a result, we can link the evolution of marketing and selling expenses 
to the evolution of subscribers.  
Personnel, is also another difficult factor to estimate. Taking as a benchmark figure 25, where we 
see the number of subscribers per employee, we can conclude that, although with high dispersion, 
it is reasonable to assume between 2000 subscribers and 12,000 subscribers per employee. 
Moreover, we can also relate the country development with the number of employees since more 
developed countries should have fewer subscribers per employee (more services demand more 
employees) and also, population size makes the ratio go higher. Thus, we will use the current 
Brazilian ratio of subscribers per employee to predict to evolution of costs with employees, along 
with small differences for each operator. 
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Figure 25 – Number of subscribers per employee per country 
(#) 
 
Then, cost of goods sold, as explained before, is linked to number of handsets sold, so, we will use 
the forecast of mobile phones sold to predict the costs in this category. 
Finally, general and administrative costs is usually not directly linked with the operational activity 
of the company but, since it is usually around 3-5% of revenues, we will use the average revenue 
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3. Vivo Valuation 
3.1. Introduction 
After having a deep understanding of the telecommunications industry and the Brazilian market, we 
will take a look at Vivo’s valuation. We will firstly have an overview of Vivo stock price and then, 
we will review each component of the free cash flow to the firm. Then, we will perform a 
sensitivity analysis to macro, operational and discount factors variables. 
Vivo stock price had, in the past decade, a sustainable growth and is currently traded at nearly 46 
Brazilian reais. On the other hand, while the Brazilian stock market index (BOVESPA) has been 
growing more in the past than Vivo’s stock, by end of 2013, the Vivo stock value was worth more 
than the stock index (starting from a base value of 100 in the beginning of 2004).  
Nevertheless, Vivo’s stock price had a quite stable evolution in 2013, with a maximum peak of BRL 
51.2 and a low of BRL 40.1 per share. 
Figure 26 – Vivo stock price evolution 
(Beginning of 2004 = 100) 
 
3.2.  FCFF projections 
In this first section, we will present the projected cash flows for each category that makes the free 
cash flow to the firm. We will use a bottom-up approach, where each category will follow a 
different trend, depending on the drivers assumed and the assumptions made. 
3.2.1.  Revenues 
In terms of revenues, we expect Vivo to keep growing the total turnover at a pace of 4.3% per year, 
1% more than in the previous three years, mainly driven by an increase on the data consumption, 
both on the mobile and fixed businesses. As presented on the previous chapter, Vivo is increasing 
the LTE coverage throughout the country, while expanding the fiber footprint in São Paulo city. 
We forecast that the revenues will keep increasing from BRL 34.7 Billion in 2013, to BRL42.7 Billion 
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Figure 27 – Vivo revenues per category 
(BRL Bln) 
 
3.2.1.1. Mobile revenues 
Moving to the mobile revenues, we have forecasted each revenue stream based on each growth 
potential. Figure 28 summarizes each revenue driver and the forecasted growth year-over-year. 
We have computed an estimation of total access and usage revenues based on the multiplication of 
ARPU with the number of mobile subscribers. We assume that the ARPU will start growing slowly at 
a pace of 0.8% in 2014, and then at an average pace of 1% each year (assumptions supported by the 
growth of additional services, increased data consumption and additional phone usage). Then, 
network usage revenues stream should follow a similar trend of the subscriber’s growth, but we 
assume that ANATEL will enforce players to reduce the interconnection costs, so, we only consider 
half the growth.  Messaging P2P is all the revenues from short messaging services (SMS) and we will 
use the subscriber’s growth as a driver. Finally, Internet and Value Added Services (VAS) are the 
categories with the highest growth and these are computed using an index of forecasted data 
consumption with MOU growth. We expect that these two categories will be the major source of 
revenues for Vivo in the future and that Data and VAS will become the major source of revenues in 
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Figure 28 – Vivo Mobile revenue drivers  
 
As a result, we expect that the total mobile revenues will growth at an average pace of 4.2% per 
year until 2023, but the main drivers for this growth will be the internet and VAS, at an average 
year-over-year growth of 7%. Access and usage should follow subscriber’s evolution and 
interconnection costs will continue to be around BRL 3-4 Bn. 
Figure 29 – Vivo Mobile revenues forecast 
(BRL Bln) 
 
3.2.1.2. Fixed and handset revenues 
On the other hand, on the fixed business, we expect that Vivo will reverse the last three years 
tendency. Vivo has been making significant investments to support the growth of data usage such as 
residential fiber, mobile 3G and LTE as well as better service for the corporate segment. Moreover, 
Vivo is continuing his expansion of backbone data transmission. As a result, we forecast a strong 
growth on data transmission and Pay TV revenues and expect Vivo to leverage its existing fixed 
connections to offer triple play services (hence, increasing the fixed voice year-over-year as well). 
Category Driver
Access and usage
ARPU forecast * Vivo subscribers 
forecast * 12 months
1
Network usage
Vivo subscribers evolution / 2
(Assumes revenues/min will reduce overtime)
2
Messaging P2P
Average minutes of usage (MOU) per 
subscriber per month forecast
3
Internet and value 
added services
Index of data traffic and MOU forecasts
4
Source: BMI,Wireless inteligence, World Bank
Source: BMI,Wireless inteligence
Source: Vivo, Pyramid research
Source: Vivo, Pyramid research, Cisco VNI
Other services Average revenues of past 4 years
5
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Additionally, although Vivo has never been a handset seller such as TIM, we expect an increase in 
their efforts to cross sell more mobile devices and we define a ratio of one handset sold for every 
10 clients (a performance increase from the previous ratio of 14). Therefore, the handsets revenue 
stream should start growing faster than in previous years. 
In figure 30, we see all the drivers for each fixed revenue stream as well as handsets revenues. 
Figure 30 – Vivo Fixed and handset revenue drivers 
 
Consequently, following other telecommunications industry, the telecom industry is expected to 
change the sources of revenues to a more balanced equilibrium between fixed and mobile 
revenues. As a result, Vivo fixed revenues should change the downward trajectory, mainly due to 
new source of revenues that were not possible before such as Data transmission, Pay TV, value 
added services or bundled products. Moreover, the appearance of these new products will allow 
Vivo to leverage its network and slightly increase the fixed voice revenues. 
Figure 31 shows us the forecasted revenues for each year per fixed category. As we can see, both 
Pay TV and Data Transmission are expected to represent nearly 50% of total revenues, while fixed 
voice should stagnate with a conservative growth of only 2% per year. Interconnection should also 
decrease while handsets are expected to growth at an average pace of 5.2%.We expect that Vivo 
fixed revenues will be BRL 14.0 Billion in 2014 and keep growing at 4.6% each year. 
Category Driver
Handsets
Ratio of handsets sold per subscriber
(Derived from forecasted # of subscribers)
1
Voice and accesses ARPU forecast * subscribers forecast
2
Interconnection Average of last 3 years evolution
3
Data transmission Data traffic evolution forecast
4
Source: Cisco VNI
Other services Average % of revenues of past 4 years
6
Pay TV Consumer Video data traffic forecast
5
Source: Cisco VNI
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
% of growth per year
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In terms of costs, we have followed the same bottom-up approach, where we forecast each cost 
category, based on cost drivers and “potential” to growth. As a result, as revised previously on the 
industry review chapter, we have made several assumptions to estimate each cost member. 
Firstly, for services rendered, we used an index made of data and MOU evolution and used this 
index to forecast the expected growth. However, we are also assuming that the services cost 
evolution should not be directly proportionate to the evolution of data traffic since economies of 
scale can be obtained and since maintenance does not growth on the same proportion of the data 
or MOU evolution. As a result, we only considered 40% of the evolution of the index comprised of 
data usage and MOU. 
Selling expenses are all costs related with marketing and selling expenses, hence, we should link 
these costs to subscriber’s evolution. We considered that these costs should growth by half the 
speed of the customer base evolution. Personnel, on the other hand, as explained previously, will 
be linked to the number of subscribers per employee. Since Vivo had an average number of 
subscribers per employee between 3 and 4 thousand subscriber per employee, we have assumed a 
long-term ratio of 3.5 thousand subscribers.  
Costs of Good sold, on the other hand, will follow the same pattern as the handsets sold and, 
finally, we have assumed for the last cost category, general and administrative expenses, an 
average cost of 3% of total revenues, aligned with the historical expenses. 
Figure 32 summarizes these costs drivers and show for each year, the correspondent expected 
growth. 
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Figure 32 – Vivo costs drivers 
 
As a result, below, in figure 33, we show the cost structure evolution until 2023, where most costs 
follow an average evolution between 1.8% and 5.2%. Services rendered, or network and 
interconnection costs, will continue to represent almost 50% of total costs, selling and marketing 
expenses nearly 27% while personnel and COGS are around 10% of total costs each, and finally, 
general and administrative expenses, around 5% of total costs. 
We expect a deceleration of the costs growth to 3.4% growth year-over-year. 
Figure 33 – Vivo operational costs 
(BRL Bln) 
 
3.2.3. Depreciations, amortizations and CAPEX 
As we have seen previously, Vivo is investing in new infrastructure in order to keep the lead in the 
telecommunications industry. The telecom operator is investing in new infrastructure, such as 
mobile wireless connectivity, fiber-to-the-home in targeted cities, while converging and simplifying 
certain services such as the corporate segment or leading the new digital environment. 
Category Driver
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
% of growth per year
LT % of 
Costs
Personnel
Evolution of index, using ratio of 
subscribers per employee
(Assumed LT ratio of 3.5k per employee)
Source: Wireless inteligence
5.3% 5.0% 4.5% 4.2% 4.1% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8%
1.5%
11%
Services rendered Index of data traffic and MOU forecasts
Source: Vivo, Pyramid research, Cisco VNI
7.2% 6.3%
5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8% 47%
G&A Average % of revenues of past 4 years
9.9%
5.0% 4.0% 5.8% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 3.6% 3.3% 3.1% 5%
Source: Cisco VNI
COGS
Ratio of handsets sold per subscriber
(Derived from forecasted # of subscribers)
6.8% 6.4% 6.0% 5.7% 5.6% 5.2% 4.8% 4.5% 4.2% 4.0%
11%
Source: BMI,Wireless inteligence, World Bank
Selling expenses
3rd party services: evolution of subscribers
Bad Debt and others: average % of revenues
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As a result, according to Morgan Stanley, the CAPEX will increase in the next two years to 23.3% of 
total revenues in order to pursue its long-term strategy. Then, and in accordance with the 
historical CAPEX/Revenue ratio of the firm, we assume that Vivo will keep investing until it reaches 
the target of 16% CAPEX to revenues. 
In terms of depreciations and amortizations, we have computed the weighted average life of all 
tangible and intangible assets and used this ratio to determine the pace of depreciation of the 
newly invested capital. As we can see from figure 34, the ratio CAPEX/Depreciations tends to be 
lower than 100% from 2016 onwards, which is in accordance with the high investment depreciations 
taken in the next two years. We expect that after 2023 the ratio will start growing to at least 100%. 
Figure 34 – Vivo D&A and CAPEX forecast 
(BRL Bln) 
 
3.2.4. Working capital 
In terms of working capital, in the telecom space, although the absolute amounts of receivables 
and payables might be high, the net value of both positions is usually less than 3% of total 
revenues. 
For the working capital assumptions, we have assumed for account receivables and inventory, the 
average percentage of revenues from the past 4 years, 15.91% and 0.44% in 2014, respectively. On 
the other hand, for the account payables we have assumed the average percentage of costs from 
the past four years of total operational costs, of around 28.3%. 
As a result, total working capital requirements are forecasted in figure 35. The difference between 
each working capital requirements constitutes the investment in working capital that will be 














2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
D&A CAPEX
CAPEX / Revenues (%)
18.5% 23.3% 16.8% 16.7% 16.6% 16.5% 16.3% 16.2% 16.1% 16.0%
CAPEX / Depreciations (%)
114% 137% 97% 95% 95% 95% 94% 94% 94% 94%
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Figure 35 – Vivo working capital 
(BRL Mln) 
 
3.2.5. Debt and interest tax shields 
Vivo has been increasing the level of debt in the past few years to a total amount of BRL 8.8 Billion. 
Most of this increase is due to the big investments in infrastructure, as we have seen the CAPEX 
chapter. Vivo is able to finance with better terms than the Brazilian risk free due to overseas 
financing and also to Telefónica group access financing. Additionally, Brazilian Development Bank 
(public entity) helps companies to finance at reduced interest rates if investments are proven to 
have economic value for the country. 
In terms of short term debt, Vivo faced in the past 4 years a stable short-term Debt to EBITDA of 
around 13%. As a result, we forecast that short term debt will continue to be similar. Moreover, 
debentures are usually between 25% and 35% of debt, so we used this ratio to compute the 
different split between debentures and debt. 
In terms of long term financing, we have assumed that debt will keep high at around 60% of debt 
until 2016 (year where CAPEX is expected to keep high) and then, will keep reducing until it 
reaches the normal average of 40% of EBITDA. 
We assume that Vivo will keep being able to borrow at the average interest rate paid in the past 
few years, and we assume that the effective tax rate is 32%. 




-1,029 -980 -887 -921 -898 -829 -758 -704 -631 -537
5,843 6,236 6,620 
6,937 7,221 7,567 
7,884 8,164 8,428 8,692 
161 170 187 205 203 214 225 234 240 248 
-7,034 -7,386 -7,695 -8,064 -8,322 -8,611 -8,868 -9,102 -9,298 -9,477 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Receivable Inventories Payable
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Short term Debt 903 988 1,270 1,237 1,118 1,233 1,298 1,320 1,463 1,559 1,644 1,728 1,829 1,919
Short term Debenture 233 469 702 287 423 509 609 655 641 707 763 799 831 880
Long term Debt 3,390 3,959 3,775 3,215 4,120 4,615 5,490 5,384 5,673 5,618 5,592 5,587 5,595 5,540
Long term Debenture 1,214 788 2,254 4,015 3,627 3,317 2,579 2,673 2,484 2,547 2,595 2,585 2,542 2,541
Total 5,740 6,204 8,001 8,754 9,288 9,674 9,976 10,032 10,260 10,431 10,593 10,700 10,797 10,881
Debt / EBITDA 51% 52% 63% 83% 78% 76% 74% 70% 67% 64% 61% 59% 56% 54%
Interests 356 485 691 826 801 861 896 887 914 929 941 952 961 968
Interest tax shields 114 155 221 264 256 275 287 284 292 297 301 305 307 310
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3.3. Vivo valuation using the APV approach 
After computing each category of cash flows, we will finally see each the valuation using the 
adjusted present value. As reviewed in the literature review, this valuation separates the value of a 
firm between the unlevered cash flows and the tax savings from the use of debt, under the form of 
interest tax shields. 
The free cash flows will follow a three stages approach. The first stage, from 2014 to 2023, 
forecasts the FCFF by estimating each category of the FCFF, namely, the explicit period. Then, the 
second stage, from 2024 to 2028 uses the past FCFF evolution and estimates an evolution year-over-
year that will reach to the long-term GDP evolution forecasted by OECD. Then, the terminal value, 
or the stage 3, will assume a perpetual growth equal to the long term GDP of Brazil: nearly 2.5% 
per year. 
Table 2 summarizes all the cash flows to arrive to the unlevered cash flows. We forecast that in 
2015 the unlevered FCFF will be lower due to the increase in CAPEX explained before. 
Table 2 - Vivo Free cash flow forecast 
(BRL Mln) 
 
The discount rate was forecasted using data from Bloomberg, Damodaran and Moody’s. The risk-
free rate used was the 10-year US government bond adjusted by inflation (formula 2), and the 
correspondent adjusted Beta for Vivo, from Bloomberg. We used an adjusted market risk premium 
as proposed by Damodaran, where we add the country risk premium forecasted for Brazil (3.29%) 
and we unlevered the Beta by using formula 12. The cost of debt used was approach proposed by 
BRL Millions 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
EBIT*(1-T) 3,988    4,135      4,359     4,621      5,135      5,575     6,029   6,496    6,986     7,552   
growth % 18.9% 3.7% 5.4% 6.0% 11.1% 8.6% 8.1% 7.8% 7.5% 8.1%
 + D&A 5,972    6,575      7,038     7,473      7,800      8,133     8,446   8,720    8,965     9,098   
growth % 5.8% 10.1% 7.0% 6.2% 4.4% 4.3% 3.8% 3.3% 2.8% 1.5%
 - ∆WC 122-       49            93           33-            23            69           71        54          73           94        
growth % -82.3% -140.0% 89.9% -136.0% -167.5% 206.2% 3.0% -23.7% 34.3% 28.5%
 - CAPEX 6,793    8,990      6,837     7,124      7,416      7,693     7,948   8,180    8,393     8,590   
growth % 21.7% 32.3% -24.0% 4.2% 4.1% 3.7% 3.3% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3%
FCFF 3,289    1,671      4,467     5,004      5,496      5,946     6,455   6,982    7,485     7,966   
growth % -19.9% -49.2% 167.3% 12.0% 9.8% 8.2% 8.6% 8.2% 7.2% 6.4%
 - Tax Shields 256       275          287        284          292          297        301      305       307        310      
growth % -2.9% 7.4% 4.1% -1.1% 3.1% 1.7% 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7%
Unlevered CFs 3,033    1,396      4,181     4,720      5,204      5,649     6,154   6,677    7,178     7,656   
growth % -21.1% -54.0% 199.5% 12.9% 10.2% 8.6% 9.0% 8.5% 7.5% 6.7%
BRL Millions 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
FCFF 8,570    9,134      9,642     10,080    10,437    10,700   10,970   
growth % 7.6% 6.6% 5.6% 4.5% 3.5% 2.5%
 - Tax Shields 309       309          309        312          316          324        333        
growth % -0.2% -0.1% 0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 2.5%
Unlevered CFs 8,261    8,825      9,332     9,769      10,120    10,376   10,638   
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Damodaran, where the author adds a default spread depending on the company rating, in this case, 
2%. 
Furthermore, the bankruptcy costs follow the long-term default probability used by Moody’s for the 
correspondent Vivo’s long-term debt rating and we forecasted the cost of bankruptcy by using the 
proposed ratio of loss given default of Schuermann (2004). 
Table 3 - Cost of Equity and Debt 
 
As a result, when discounting each cash flow at the proper discount rate, we arrive to the 
unlevered value of Vivo of BRL 53.2 billion, which, combined with the present value of the interest 
tax shields and bankruptcy costs, we estimate an enterprise value of BRL 56.8 Billion. This 
corresponds to a price per share of nearly 49 Brazilian Reais (Table 4), after adding the net Debt 
from 2013. 
Table 4 – Vivo valuation and price per share 
   
Cost of Equity (Ru) Cost of Debt (Rd)
Rf US 3.03% Default Spread 2.00%
Brazill ian Inflation 5.68% Tax Rate 32.00%
US Inflation 1.10% Cost of Debt (Rd) 9.70%
Adjusted Rf Brazil 7.70%
Adjusted Beta 0.67000 Bankrupcy costs (BC)
Beta Unlevered 0.5811   Credit rating by Moodys BAA1
Market Risk Premium 8.29% Probability of Default 1.664%
Cost of Unlevered Equity (Ru) 12.51% Cost of Bankruptcy 47.00%
APV Valuation (Mln BRL)
PV of Unlevered  CFs 53,238   
PV of ITS 3,390     
Expected Bankruptcy Costs 416-        
Entreprise Value 56,211   
Net Debt 2013 1,860     
Equity Value 54,351   
# of Shares outstanding (Mln) 1,123     
Price per Share (BRL) 48.39     
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3.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
As in every valuation, it is always subject to judgement and some sensitivity. Sometimes, small 
adjustments in one input may impact the value of a company and completely change the valuation 
results. As a result, we decided to add this chapter where we pretend to be exhaustive on the type 
of the assumptions that may influence the valuation. Firstly we will see three main scenarios and 
see the valuation results, then, we will take a look at each assumption separately to understand 
the impact of a 10%/25% increase or decrease in the final result, and, finally, we will perform a 
sensitivity analysis to the growth rate and cost of capital to understand the impact on the 
enterprise value. 
3.4.1. Bull-Bear scenarios 
We have performed three scenarios to understand the final value of Vivo, depending on the 
assumptions taken. We considered a bear market, where all assumptions are revised downwards 
and, thus, the worst case scenario. Then, we also considered a bull market, where best forecasts 
are taken into account – the best case scenario. 
Figure 36 show us a table where we include all the assumptions taken and the respective valuation, 
price per share, EBITDA growth and EBITDA margin obtained, depending on the assumptions. As we 
can see, a review of the main assumptions downwards can result in projected valuation that is 
nearly 28% lower than the base case scenario, whereas high expectations of operator performance 
can increase the valuation by 20%. 
Moreover, it is important to refer that the Brazilian market is, undoubtedly, a growing market, 
thus, even in a worst case scenario, we see an EBITDA growth of 3.0% year-over-year. 
Figure 36 – Vivo Bear – Bull scenarios 
 













LT CFs evolution 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
Data costs divider 2.3 2.5 2.7
Subs per employee 3000 3500 3800
LT CAPEX (% of Rev) 15% 16% 17%
Data rev. divider 1.20 1.00 0.95
Subs per handset sold 12 10 8
Enterprise Value (BRL Mln) 40,411 56,211 67,386
EBITDA Growth (2014 – 2023) 3.0% 6.1% 8.2%
EBITDA Margin (2014/2023) 31% / 31% 32% / 38% 33% / 42%
Note: 1) Values correspond to 2014, 2015, 2019, 2023 respectively
Price per Share (BRL) 34.32 48.39 58.34
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3.4.2. Sensitivity to individual variables 
Figure 37 presents a sensitivity analysis for each variable that had a relevant assumption.  The 
biggest drivers of the valuation are clearly the ratio of CAPEX per Revenues and the data revenue 
and costs dividers, while, surprisingly, the long-term cash flow evolution does not play such an 
important role as we would expect. Most of the variables make the valuation range 15% on average, 
between mid BRL 50 Billion and mid BRL 60 Billion, leading to the conclusion that each of these 
variables are certainly relevant and should be studied with caution. 
Figure 37 – Vivo individual sensitivity analysis 
 
As a result, these analyses serve as a basis for the assumptions made in the previous chapter, where 
we defined three scenarios: Bear, Base and Bull. The differences between Bear and Bull result in 
more pessimistic or more optimistic views of each variable and, as we realize from the 
individualized sensitivity analysis, we suspect that the grouping of positive or negative scenarios 
may have a higher impact on the final valuation, thus, ranging from BRL 40 Billion to BRL 67 Billion, 
as we have seen previously. 
3.4.3. Sensitivity to the discount rate and growth rate 
In table 5 we see the sensitivity analysis to the cost of equity and growth rate. As represented, 
moving to a discount rate of 7.51%, we can increase the value of Vivo by almost 60%, while, on the 
other hand, increasing the discount rate to 17.51%, it could also reduce the value nearly BRL 16 
Billion. Thus, the discount rate used is critical in assessing the right value of Vivo.  
Furthermore, the growth rate is also relevant since different assumptions can lead to different 
valuations, ranging between BRL 52 Billion and BRL 63 Billion, if assumed the same cost of equity. 
-10% +10%-25% +25%
ARPU Growth 55,735 56,211 56,69155,029 57,418
Base case
Long term CAPEX 60,831 56,211 51,61167,734 44,815
Subs per handset 55,360 56,211 56,91053,673 57,754
Subs per employee 54,611 56,211 57,53651,468 59,145
Data revenue divider 58,432 56,211 54,49263,304 52,540
Data costs divider 53,826 56,211 58,11148,848 60,331
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3.5. Relative Valuation 
After performing the Vivo valuation using the adjusted present value approach, we have made a 
relative valuation to understand how Vivo compares with their peers. We have extracted data from 
Bloomberg for the 50 operators with the closest market capitalization from Vivo. Then, we filtered 
the peer group according to three main assumptions: Sales, market capitalization and CAPEX/Sales 
ratio between 50% and 300% of Vivo indicators. Additionally, we have taken into account the 
individual firms that we were selecting for the peer group and selected only companies that were 
present in emerging markets or with a similar financial situation as Vivo. 
Figure 38 present us the multiple valuation and the equity valuation is estimated between BRL 48 
Billion and BRL 64 Billion, depending on the multiple used. One explanation for this disparity is the 
low level of debt relative to its peers (all of them present a net debt at least 5 times higher but can 
be as high as 44 times the current level of Vivo). Moreover, we also note that the market seems to 
value the enterprise value of Vivo between BRL 56.0 and BRL 62.3 Billion, when using the EV ratios, 
almost BRL 6 Billion higher than APV estimation. This can be explained by the lower cost of capital 
from the entire peer group, compared to the cost of capital of Vivo (around 12.5%). Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that this is the best peer group possible to form, according to the available 
companies and methodology used. 
Figure 38 - Vivo multiple analyses 
 
7.51% 8.51% 9.51% 10.51% 11.51% 12.51% 13.51% 14.51% 15.51% 16.51% 17.51%
0.02% 77,919     71,252     65,541   60,583   56,237   52,397   48,983   45,932   43,191   40,720   38,484   
0.52% 79,569     72,548     66,589   61,452   56,972   53,030   49,535   46,418   43,625   41,111   38,839   
1.02% 81,472     74,015     67,761   62,414   57,779   53,719   50,132   46,943   44,092   41,529   39,217   
1.52% 83,690     75,692     69,079   63,483   58,667   54,472   50,781   47,511   44,594   41,978   39,623   
2.02% 86,310     77,626     70,574   64,679   59,651   55,299   51,490   48,127   45,136   42,462   40,058   
2.52% 89,451     79,881     72,282   66,025   60,745   56,211   52,265   48,798   45,725   42,984   40,526   
3.02% 93,287     82,544     74,253   67,553   61,971   57,223   53,119   49,531   46,366   43,551   41,034   
3.52% 98,078     85,739     76,553   69,300   63,354   58,351   54,064   50,338   47,066   44,169   41,585   
4.02% 104,231   89,641     79,271   71,320   64,926   59,619   55,115   51,230   47,837   44,845   42,187   
4.52% 112,429   94,514     82,534   73,679   66,728   61,052   56,292   52,221   48,690   45,591   42,849   
5.02% 123,897   100,776   86,522   76,473   68,816   62,689   57,622   53,332   49,640   46,419   43,582   


















Harmonic Mean 5.89                   11.35                 12.98                 
EBITDA 2013 EBIT 2013 Earnings 2013
(000') 10,575,500       4,932,200         3,715,800         
Enterprise Value (000') 62,299,870       55,982,373       50,077,223       
Net Debt 2013 (000') 1,859,900         1,859,900         1,859,900         
Equity Valuation (000') 64,159,770       57,842,273       48,217,323       
# of shares (mio) 1,123                 1,123                 1,123                 
Price per Share (BRL) 57.1                   51.5                   42.9                   
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In figure 39 we see the valuations, using different multiples ratio and the APV valuation. The 
difference between different methods can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the difference 
between EV to EBITDA and EV to EBIT is explained by the high depreciations in Vivo (the incumbent 
is having an above the average D&A due to high investments), that substantially reduces from the 
EBITDA to the EBIT. And then, the low leverage of Vivo also explains why the Enterprise value also 
reduces to values between BRL 50 and BRL 62. (As seen before, net debt of the peer group is 
substantially higher than Vivo). 





Vivo’s enterprise value is worth approximately BRL 56,211 Million, which corresponds to an Equity 
valuation of BRL 54,351 Million, or 48.4 Brazilian Reais per share. This valuation has followed a 
three stages approach, where in the first stage we forecasted the Profit and Losses map to forecast 
free cash flow to the firm, then a second stage where we adjust the FCFF to meet the long term 
growth equal to the GDP long term growth. In addition, this valuation is consistent with the current 
stock market price, which is close to BRL 45. 
Nevertheless, since small changes may have a great impact in the final valuation of Vivo, we should 
maintain a conservative vision and reflect in detail to the different sensitivity analysis performed.







EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E APV
Note: Range corresponds to results using harmonic and arithmetic average
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4. TIM Valuation 
4.1.  Introduction 
After valuing Vivo, we will take a look at the valuation of TIM Participações.  We will review each 
growth driver assumed for the operator, forecast revenues, costs, D&A and all the required 
categories for the estimation of the free-cash flow to the firm and then, after predicting TIM’s 
valuation, we will perform sensitivity analysis to the main assumptions taken. 
The Italian subsidiary has grown in the past three years more than Vivo due to the high growth of 
the mobile business and the value of the stock price today is worth almost four times more than the 
one decade ago. However, the stock price has showed a strong volatility, ranging between BRL 7.5 
to BRL 13.7 in the past 16 months, which is consistent with the rumours of a possible sale from the 
parent company Telecom Italia. 
Nevertheless, we estimate a price target for TIM Participações S.A. of BRL 11.25, a value consistent 
with the market expectations of TIM and within 2014’s current range. 
Figure 40 – TIM stock price evolution 
(Beginning of 2004 = 100) 
 
4.2. FCFF projections 
Following the same approach used in the Vivo valuation, we will use a bottom-up approach to 
calculate each cash flow category.  
4.2.1.  Revenues 
TIM has seven main revenue drivers but only three of them constitute more than 70% of total 
revenue: usage, VAS and handset revenues. 
Usage and monthly fee revenues will follow the same approach used in Vivo, where we forecast an 
estimation of revenues by multiplying ARPU with total subscribers. As we have seen in the industry 
review, TIM had in the past 4 years the second lowest ARPU and we expect that TIM will make an 
effort to increase revenue per user throughout new services and more appealing tariff plans. Thus, 











22nd of April, 
2014: BRL 11.07
TIM price @
2nd of Jan, 
2004: BRL 2.81
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year until 2023. Mobile subscribers were forecasted by wireless intelligence until 2017, and then we 
assume that TIM subscribers should follow the Brazilian market growth. 
Value added services are the revenue stream that should have the highest revenue growth due to 
new market environment and increase in internet consumption. We used the combination of Cisco 
Visual Networking index forecasts for Brazil with the expected MOU for TIM to forecast the 
expected revenues for this category. On the other hand, long distance revenues are all the 
revenues coming from roaming agreements with other operators. In this case we only used the MOU 
to forecast. 
Then, interconnection costs used the average evolution of the last four years and other sources of 
revenues are expected to remain similar to the current values. We also assumed that fixed 
revenues will have a small tendency to growth due to services convergence and more corporate 
segmentation focus.  
Finally, regarding handsets sold, TIM has been the most active player in this market, where in the 
past 4 years, TIM achieved a number of subscribers per handset sold of 6. We assume that TIM will 
keep the same performance to forecast the revenues in this segment. 
Figure 41 – TIM Revenue drivers 
 
As a result, the next figure show us the revenue evolution until 2023 based on the previous 
assumptions. We project that TIM revenues will continue to grow but not at the same pace as in the 
previous years. The category that should grow the most is VAS and is expected to represent almost 
25% in 2023. 
Category Driver
Usage and monthly 
feee
ARPU forecast * TIM subscribers 




Index of data traffic and MOU forecasts
2
Long Distance Minutes of usage evolution
3
Interconnection Average evolution of last 4 years
4
Fixed revenues
Fixed ARPU forecast * fixed subscribers 
forecast
6
Others Average revenues of last 3 years
5
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
% of growth per year
-1.4%
0.3%
-0.8% -1.8% -0.9% -0.8% -1.1% -1.2% -1.0% -1.0%
2.7%
4.3% 4.1% 3.7% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9%
12.2% 10.5% 8.8% 7.9% 8.4% 7.2% 6.3% 5.5% 4.8% 4.3%


















Source: BMI,Wireless inteligence, World Bank
Source: TIM, Pyramid research, Cisco VNI
Source: TIM, Pyramid research
Handset revenues
Ratio of handsets sold per subscriber
(Derived from forecasted # of subs)
7
5.8%
4.2% 3.7% 3.3% 2.8% 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3% 14%
Source: Vivo, Wireless inteligence, BMI
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Moreover, TIM does not report the discounts per category, so we have to forecast the discounts and 
calculate the net revenue separately. We used the average % of revenues of the past 3 years to 
calculate the discount every year. 
As a result, and in accordance with analysts’ projections, we forecast a mid-single digit growth for 
TIM, where it should growth from BRL 20 Billion in 2013 to BRL 30 Billion in 2023. 
Figure 42 – TIM revenues per category 
(BRL Bln) 
 
4.2.2.  Costs 
In terms of costs, we will use a similar approach to Vivo, where we forecast each category 
individually. Network and Interconnection costs are expected to growth at an average pace of 3.7% 
every year due to increased capacity installed and also due to higher data and MOU traffic. Selling 
and marketing expenses will follow the same approach of half the subscriber’s evolution, whereas 
costs of goods sold will follow the same projection of handset sold. 
Personnel expenses, on the other hand, were projected based on a salary increase of 1% every year 
and assuming that TIM will be able to have one employee for every six thousand subscribers. 
8.9 10.3 11.1 
11.3 12.2 13.0 
13.8 14.5 15.1 15.7 






















































































Long distance 12.0% 4.0%
Interconnection 0.7% -0.9%
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Figure 43 – TIM cost drivers 
 
Concluding, figure 44 presents us the forecasted cost structure of TIM for the next 10 years, where 
we see that some categories growth at a higher speed (such as personnel or network). We expect 
TIM increase its cost structure by 30% in the next 10 years, 5 times slower than in the previous 
years.  
Figure 44 – TIM operational costs 
 
4.2.3. Depreciations, amortizations and CAPEX 
TIM is in the middle of a restructuring process where the company is investing big amounts of 
money to deal with the new telecommunications industry. As a result, TIM is deploying fiber to 
connect major cities, while continuing its expansion of 3G and 4G network throughout the country. 
According to the latest industrial plan released in 2013, TIM is focusing on significant network 
investments. We forecast that the ratio CAPEX/Revenues will reach a maximum of 25.7% in 2015 
and then will keep adjusting until an average long- term target of 14% of revenues in 2023. 
Moreover, since TIM main business in primary mobile, we assume the operator will invest less than 
Category Driver
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
% of growth per year
LT % of 
Costs
Personnel
Evolution of index, using ratio of 
subscribers per employee
(Assumed LT ratio of 6k per employee)
Source: Wireless inteligence
7.1%
5.5% 5.1% 4.6% 4.2% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6% 6%
Network and 
interconnection





5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8% 40%
G&A Average % of revenues of past 4 years 2.2%
5.8%
4.9% 4.5% 4.3% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6% 4%
COGS
Ratio of handsets sold per subscriber
(Derived from forecasted # of subscribers)
5.8%
4.2% 3.7% 3.3% 2.8% 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3%
22%
Source: BMI,Wireless inteligence, World Bank
Selling and 
marketing expenses
Y-o-Y subscriber base growth / 2
3.0%
2.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 23%
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the incumbent in terms of CAPEX per revenues, since Vivo also has to invest more intensively in the 
fixed business. 
In terms of depreciations and amortizations, we have calculated the average life period of total 
tangible and intangible assets to an average of 8.5 years, and, as a result, we have forecasted both 
depreciations and amortizations according to this average life period, which can be summarized in 
figure 45. 
Nevertheless, it is also relevant to say that the CAPEX/Depreciations ratio is slightly below 100% 
between 2017 and 2023 due to the high investments in 2014 and 2015, which will increase the 
depreciations in the following years. We expect a ratio slightly above 100% from 2023 onwards. 
Nevertheless, the average ratio CAPEX to Depreciations during the explicit period is 109%. 
Figure 45 – TIM D&A and CAPEX forecasts 
(BRL Bln) 
 
4.2.4.  Working Capital 
We have forecasted the working capital requirements based on the ratios receivables or inventories 
to sales and also payables to operating costs. We estimated an average ratio based on historical 
data and used it to compute the expected working capital requirements. As a result, figure 46 
shows the projected working capital needs. The difference between each working capital 
requirements corresponds to the investment/disinvestment required each year. 










3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 
4.2 4.2 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
D&A CAPEX
CAPEX / Revenues (%)
16.6% 25.7% 16.4% 16.0% 15.7% 15.3% 15.0% 14.6% 14.3% 14.0%
CAPEX / Depreciations (%)
121% 177% 105% 98% 98% 98% 97% 98% 98% 97%
Working Capital
-600 -638 -655 -736 -796 -607 -597 -574 -542 -486
3930 4189 4404
4574 4726 4948 5121
5276 5419 5559
385 356 373 389 413 435 441 455 469 483
-4915 -5183 -5432 -5699 -5935 -5991 -6159 -6306 -6430 -6527
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Receivable Inventories Payable
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4.3. TIM valuation using discounted cash flow approach with WACC 
Table 6 summarizes all the components for the calculation of the free cash flow to the firm.  We 
have used the same approach used in Vivo, comprising 3 different stages for the FCFF projections. 
The first stage projects each category of the Profit and Losses map as well as CAPEX and NWC. The 
second stage uses the compounded annual growth rate from 2019 to 2023 and slightly adjusts year-
over-year until it reaches a long term growth equals to the GDP long term forecast for Brazil: 2.5% 
(which is used for the third stage period). In addition, we expect a negative FCFF in 2015 due to 
increase in CAPEX but from 2016 onwards a sustained growth of FCFF.  
Table 6 – TIM free cash flows to the firm forecast 
(BRL Mln) 
 
According to left side of figure 47, TIM has historically shown a quite stable capital structure, 
varying from 22% to 24.5%. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that TIM will keep maintaining a 
stable capital structure of 25%. 
As a result, we computed the Weighted Average Cost of Capital using 25% of debt capital and 75% 
equity capital. We used the adjusted Beta of TIM Participações S.A. from Bloomberg and assumed a 
market risk premium in accordance with Damodaran, where the author adds the forecasted country 
risk premium (3.29%) to the US equity risk premium (5%). In addition, as per formula (2), we have 
adjusted the US risk free rate to the Brazilian forecasted inflation rate. We assumed the approach 
used by professor Damodaran, where the author adds a default spread to the risk-free rate in order 
to calculate the debt discount rate (in this case, 2%). It was used an effective tax rate of 32%. 
BRL Millions 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
EBIT*(1-T) 1,848        1,949      1,985      2,059     2,335     2,591      2,848    3,151     3,455           3,724   
growth % 9.5% 5.4% 1.9% 3.7% 13.4% 11.0% 9.9% 10.6% 9.6% 7.8%
 + D&A 2,926        3,271      3,680      4,025     4,090     4,170      4,250    4,260     4,269           4,328   
growth % 5.7% 11.8% 12.5% 9.4% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 0.2% 0.2% 1.4%
 - ∆WC 846           38-            17-            81-           60-           189          10          23           32                 57        
growth % 48.2% -104.5% -56.4% 389.6% -26.5% -415.5% -94.7% 129.0% 41.7% 75.8%
 - CAPEX 3,528        5,777      3,866      3,948     4,027     4,087      4,132    4,165     4,188           4,202   
growth % -8.9% 63.8% -33.1% 2.1% 2.0% 1.5% 1.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3%
FCFF 401           519-          1,816      2,217     2,458     2,486      2,956    3,223     3,504           3,793   
growth % 2572.9% -229.3% -449.7% 22.1% 10.9% 1.1% 18.9% 9.0% 8.7% 8.3%
BRL Millions 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
FCFF 4,216        4,613      4,968      5,264     5,488     5,626      5,768           
growth % 11.1% 9.4% 7.7% 6.0% 4.2% 2.5%
3rd stage - TV
TV
1st stage - Explicit period
2nd stage - adjusting period
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Figure 47 – TIM capital structure and cost of capital 
 
The value of TIM, in the end of 2013, is of BRL 26,451 Million and the equity value is of BRL 27,195 
Million due to negative net debt. The price per share is BRL 11.25, in line with the stock market 
expectations of the past year. 
Table 7 – TIM valuation using DCF-WACC approach 
 
4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
Following the same methodology used with Vivo, we will also take a look to the effect of changing 
some assumptions in the final valuation to understand which variables have a higher impact. Firstly 
we will review the bear, base and bull scenarios, then we will take a look at the elasticity of each 
assumption and finally, to the sensitivity of the discount and long term growth rates. 
4.4.1.  Bull-Bear scenarios 
In figure 48 we see the results for all three scenarios considered. There is a difference on nearly 
BRL 12 Billion between the best and worst scenarios, which goes in line with the type of 
assumptions made. For instance, the bear case scenario has a 0.3 higher discount on the revenues 
for data and the number of handsets sold is nearly 40% less in the bear case scenario than in the 
best case scenario. 
We assume that the ARPU will grow in the long-term even in the bear case since TIM will start 
monetizing all the CAPEX currently investing with higher VAS or data services. Moreover, in line 
with the expectations of the telecommunications industry in Brazil, the bear case is forecasted to 

















D/(D+E) 24% 22% 24% 25%
Cost of Equity (Ke)
Rf US (Gov. Bond 10yr) 3.03%
Brazil l ian Inflation 5.68%
US Inflation 1.10%
Adjusted Rf Brazi l 7.70%
Adjusted Beta 0.7553
Market Risk Premium 8.29%
Cost of Equity 13.95%
Cost of Debt (Kd)
Cost of Debt 9.70%
Tax Rate 32.0%
% of Equity 75.0%
% of Debt 25.0%
WACC 12.11%
Perpetual Growth 2.5%
DCF -  WACC approach
Total Enterprise Value (BRL M) 26,451         
Net Debt 2013 743-               
Equity Value (BRL M) 27,195         
Shares Outstanding  (Mln) 2,418           
Price per Share (BRL) 11.25           
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In addition, the Bull case also tries to achieve an EBITDA margin closer to its main competitor 
(Vivo), of 37%. 
Figure 48 - Bear – Bull scenarios 
 
4.4.2. Sensitivity to individual variables  
TIM has clearly a higher sensitivity than Vivo for each variable. Figure 49 shows the effect on TIM’s 
valuation, if changed assumptions individually. As we can see, data costs divider and ratio of CAPEX 
/ revenues plays the most important roles, with valuation ranging almost 40% in each case. 
Nevertheless, the other assumptions are also important such as Data revenue divider, subscribers 
per employee or subscribers per handset sold. 
As a result, this high variability suggests that, when both factors combined under Bear or Bull 
scenarios, the difference in valuations must be relevant, as we previously presented. 
Figure 49 - TIM individual sensitivity analysis to the enterprise value 
 













LT CFs evolution 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
Data costs divider 2.3 2.5 2.7
Subs per employee 5500 6000 6500
LT CAPEX (% of Rev) 12.5% 14.0% 15.5%
Data rev. divider 1.20 1.00 0.90
Subs per handset sold 7 6 5
Enterprise Value (BRL Mln) 19,795 26,451 32,073
EBITDA Growth (2014 – 2023) 3.8% 6.3% 8.5%
EBITDA Margin (2014/2023) 25% / 27% 27% / 33% 27% / 37%
Note: 1) Values correspond to 2014, 2015, 2019, 2023 respectively
Price per Share (BRL) 8.50 11.25 13.57
-10% +10%-25% +25%
ARPU Growth 25,898 26,451 27,01125,081 27,863
Base case
Long term CAPEX 28,940 26,451 23,94632,607 20,193
Subs per handset 25,887 26,451 26,91324,760 27,466
Subs per employee 25,824 26,451 26,96624,575 27,584
Data revenue divider 28,584 26,451 24,81433,325 22,970
Data costs divider 24,797 26,451 27,75921,292 29,725
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4.4.3. Sensitivity to the discount rate and growth rate 
Table 8 follows the same methodology used for Vivo. As we can see, TIM presents a much higher 
variability of valuations, depending on the Weighted Average Cost of Capital chosen. Thus, choosing 
the right discount rate is crucial for an accurate valuation of TIM Participações. 
For instance, assuming the same long-term growth rate, TIM’s enterprise value can go from as low 
as BRL 16 Billion to as high as BRL 43 Billion. On the other hand, the long term growth rate does not 
have the same impact as the cost of capital, where a zero growth rate only differs BRL 6 Billion 
from a 5% year-over-year growth in the long term.  
Table 8 - TIM sensitivity analysis to the cost of and long-term growth rate 
(BRL Bln) 
 
4.5. Relative Valuation 
TIM multiples valuation goes in line with the results obtained in the DCF valuation, when compared 
the EV to EBITDA or the EV to EBIT. However, as explained in Vivo multiples valuation, the price-to-
earnings is slightly lower than the real equity value due to a lower net debt of TIM.  
We used a harmonic mean to calculate the multiples average and multiplied each by the 
correspondent value by end 2013. The selection of the peer group follows the same methodology 
used in Vivo, where we select the 50 operators from Bloomberg with the closest market cap and 
then, we filter to obtain only operators that are within 50% and 300% of TIM’s indicators, being 
them the market capitalization, the level of sales and the CAPEX / Revenues ratio. Additionally, we 
have filtered for some operators that did not represent the TIM business reality, such as a French 
operator (Iliad) or a Taiwanese operator (Chunghwa Telecom). The selected peer group is 
represented by its logo on the left side of figure 50.   
9.1% 10.1% 11.1% 12.11% 13.1% 14.1% 15.1% 16.1%
0.02% 36,943 31,767 27,631 24,269 21,494 19,175 17,216 15,545 
0.52% 37,917 32,452 28,124 24,630 21,763 19,378 17,370 15,664 
1.02% 39,011 33,212 28,666 25,024 22,054 19,596 17,536 15,791 
1.52% 40,249 34,062 29,264 25,455 22,370 19,832 17,714 15,927 
2.02% 41,662 35,016 29,928 25,928 22,715 20,087 17,905 16,073 
2.52% 43,289 36,095 30,670 26,451 23,092 20,364 18,112 16,229 
3.02% 45,183 37,327 31,503 27,032 23,506 20,666 18,336 16,397 
3.52% 47,416 38,746 32,446 27,680 23,964 20,996 18,579 16,578 
4.02% 50,087 40,398 33,521 28,408 24,472 21,359 18,844 16,775 
4.52% 53,341 42,346 34,760 29,233 25,040 21,761 19,134 16,988 
5.02% 57,390 44,675 36,203 30,173 25,677 22,206 19,453 17,221 
















The case of Vivo and TIM   62 
 
Figure 50 - TIM multiple analysis 
 
Finally, figure 51 compares both multiples methodologies with the DCF approach. The range in each 
column represents the results obtained by using two different methodologies: arithmetic average 
and harmonic average. 
Furthermore, by looking at the figure below, we understand that the valuation using the Price to 
Earnings leads to a different valuation results, compared with the Enterprise value multiples. This 
difference lies on the fact that TIM is one of the few mobile operators with negative net debt, and, 
as a result, given that the peer group has a positive net Debt between -1.4 to 3.8 Net Debt to 
EBITDA and an average of 1.6, it was expected that the equity value of TIM was not estimated 
correctly. 




TIM Participações S.A. has an equity value of BRL 26,451 Million, or an estimated price per share 
11.25 Brazilian Reais. However, we should be extremely cautious on the valuation’s final result 
since TIM presents a high volatility to small changes in assumptions, consistent with the stock 
market price volatility. 
  
Selected peer group EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E
Harmonic Mean 5.90                   11.09                 12.72                 
EBITDA 2013 EBIT 2013 Earnings 2013
5,250,654         2,482,782         1,569,755         
Enterprise Value 30,972,715       27,536,222       19,225,097       
Net Debt 2013 (743,433)           (743,433)           (743,433)           
Equity Valuation 31,716,147       28,279,654       19,968,529       
# of shares 2,418                 2,418                 2,418                 








EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT P/E DCF
Note: Range corresponds to results using harmonic and arithmetic average
The case of Vivo and TIM   63 
 
5. Parent companies review 
In this section we will briefly look at both parent companies of Brazilian telecom operations: 
Telecom Italia and Telefónica. We will briefly understand the current state of each Telco Group, 
which will give us the base for a possible acquisition of TIM Participações by Vivo. 
5.1. Telecom Italia 
Telecom Italia is the Italian incumbent with 34.2% market share. However, it has faced strong 
competition from Vodafone and Wind, and have lost nearly 5% market share in the past six years.  
Figure 52 shows the evolution of the stock price of Telecom Italia Group, compared to the Italian 
stock market index and S&P500. As we can see, Telecom Italia has fallen more than the Italian 
index and today is worth nearly 25% of the stock price from the beginning of 2004. 
The group has been facing strong pressure to reduce its debt level and, as a result, the stock price 
has been falling since mid-2005 until 2013, to an approximate value of 70 cents per share. 
Nevertheless, the Italian incumbent has also been able to maintain a stable value per share from 
2009 to 2014, through its divestment plan to reduce debt. 
Figure 52 – Telecom Italia stock comparison with FTSE MIB and S&P500 
(Beginning of 2004 = 100) 
 
The Italian incumbent is facing strong pressure from many fronts. Firstly, the fixed-line business is 
declining due to broadband/mobile substitution, second, the heavy pre-paid subscriber base is 
lowering the ARPU, and, the last but not the least, the domestic market is facing an economic 
downturn. Furthermore, Telecom Italia future growth may be compromised due to lack of 
opportunities and high levels of debt.  
As a result, the incumbent is facing strong revenue erosion, where it has lost nearly 10% in revenues 
year-over-year from 2012 to 2013. Following these results, Telecom Italia had had its long-term 
debt rating downgraded to BBB- by Fitch in 2013 and analyst’s forecasts that in 2014 the outlook 
may be even worse. 
Additionally, the Regulatory authority is making pressure to separate the fixed and mobile business 
units, which disable possible future opportunities to sell bundled services within Italy (e.g.: Triple 













TI price @ 22nd of 
April, 2014: EUR 0.69
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Figure 53 show us the Italian incumbent revenues, EBITDA margin and ratio of net debt-to-EBITDA. 
As we can see, net debt is currently at 3 times the EBITDA value and the liabilities represent more 
than 70% of total asset values at book market.  
Figure 53 - Telecom Italia Revenues and EBITDA margin 
(EUR Bln, %) 
 
In the past few years, Telecom Italia has been divesting in many core assets from the group in order 
to generate cash to pay the Debt. Figure 54 represents the last divestures made from Telecom 
Italia Group. As shown in the figure below, a natural thought would be the sale of TIM Brazil.  
Figure 54 – Historic divesture of Telecom Italia 
 
 
In 2013, several newspapers admitted the possibility of TIM Brasil sale9 as a way of reducing debt 
level of the parent company but it was denied due to the strategic importance of TIM in the group. 
                                                     












41% 42% 42% 41% 41%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 CAGR(%)
-2.1%
Net Debt / EBITDA
2.55 3.18 2.90 3.07 2.99 3.13 2.86 2.77 2.76 2.93
-3.3%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
TIM Hellas sold to Apax 
Partners and Texas Pacific
TIM Peru sold to America Movil
Entel Chile sold to Almendral
Finsiel sold to italian investors
Hansenet sold to Telefónica
Digitel (Venezuela) 
sold to CANTV
Sell of 40.5% stake in 
Avea to Turk Telekom
Alice France 
sold to Free




Entel (Bolivia) sold to 
Bolivian Government
Loquendo sold to 
Nuance
Sale of 27% stake 
in ETECSA (Cuba)
Sale of controlling 
stake in Telecom 
Argentina to Fintech
La7 sold to Cairo 
Communications
MTV Italy sold to Viacom
Spin-off of Telecom Italia 
Media Broadcast
Source: Telecom Italia and news search
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Our main dissertation assumption is that Telecom Italia is deferring TIM sale in order to optimize 
business strategy and find maximum price upon sale. As a result, if Telecom Italia sells TIM at the 
moment, a higher multiple would not be achieved. 
 
5.2. Telefónica 
Telefónica is one of the largest telecoms operators in the world, and it has a footprint of more than 
310 million subscribers in 22 countries and is the fourth biggest mobile operator group by revenues, 
after China Mobile, Vodafone Group and América Movil. The group provides access services to 
customers in the mobile, fixed line, broadband, Pay TV and business segments. It was founded in 
1924 as a governmental company but became private in 1997. 
Telefónica Spain is the Spanish incumbent with a market share of 37.6%. In the past 10 years it has 
been doing relevant investments in Spanish speaking countries such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay 
and Brazil.  Telefónica is focusing on mobile market growth, but also in some selected fixed 
segments, through expansion of its infrastructure in the region, both wireless and wireline.  
In the past few years, Telefónica share price has fallen to nearly 12 Euros per share, almost 50% 
less than from the beginning of 2010. However, this evolution is consistent with the economic 
downturn that Spain has been facing in the past years. Nevertheless, the Spanish index IBEX 35 in 
the past year has recovered almost 25% of value, while Telefónica remained at 75% of the value 
presented in 2004, mostly due to the high level of Debt and recently divestures. 
Figure 55 – Telefónica Group stock comparison with IBEX 35 and S&P500 
(Beginning of 2004 = 100) 
 
The group has showed a year-over-year revenue growth of more than 7%, which is consistent with 
the investment strategy that it has implemented in the past years. However, the EBITDA margin has 
fallen from 42% in 2010 to 33% in only 3 years, mostly due to higher competition in countries with 
operations, as well as economic crisis in the European countries. Nevertheless, the group continues 
to have nearly EUR 60 Billion in revenues and is one of the largest mobile telecommunication 














Telefónica price @ 22nd of 
April, 2014: EUR 11.97
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Additionally, Telefónica group has an estimated net debt to EBITDA of 2.88, ratio close to the 
Telecom Italia ratio of 2.93, which can harm the group in terms of strategic acquisition 
opportunities. As a result, since Telefónica has a strong asset base, in 2011, Telefónica Group 
started to divest in some European and Central America subsidiaries such as O2 in Ireland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia or small subsidiaries in Central America: Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Guatemala. 
Figure 56 – Telefónica Group revenues and EBITDA margin 
(Eur Bln, %) 
 
The Spanish incumbent is one of the largest telecom operators in the world and is the largest 
company by country footprint. As a result, figure 57 shows the group footprint and, as we can see, 
Telefónica has a big footprint in most of the Latin American countries, with the exception of 
countries such as Paraguay or Bolivia. 
In terms of revenues, Brazil represents almost 25% of total group revenues and, as a result, it 
constitutes a key asset in Telefónica strategy. Nevertheless, the group has a participation in both 
Vivo and TIM (73.9% and 10.0%, respectively) and many analysts refer that in the long term, 
Telefónica must divest an operation in the Brazilian country, either in TIM or in Vivo, or buy TIM 
operations to Telecom Italia. 
















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 CAGR(%)
5.1%
Net Debt / EBITDA
2.14 2.23 2.95 2.19 2.14 2.14 2.43 3.37 2.94 2.88
7.3%
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6. The Synergies analysis 
6.1. Some selected benchmarks 
In this first chapter we will take a brief look at four benchmarks of Telecom operator’s mergers and 
acquisitions to understand where synergy’s value come from and how operators can 
reduce/increase significant cash flows on several categories. The first example will provide us some 
conclusions regarding the type of synergies that two telecom operators in the same country can 
achieve, the second will illustrate the economies of scale achieved by merging two global telecom 
groups, then, we will show an example of how integration costs play a significant role in the first 
year after the merger and, finally, a Brazilian example that will work as a benchmark for the 
synergies split between OPEX, CAPEX and Revenue. 
Starting with a Portuguese example, the merger between ZON and Optimus, 2 years ago, was an 
example of a merger between two entities in the same country. As a result, the synergies are much 
higher since both companies can reduce significant OPEX in interconnection fees, network, 
marketing or selling expenses. Figure 58 presents a snapshot of the press release held last year by 
the merged entity. 
The merged company identified several areas of cost reduction but network and IT represented 
almost 50% of total expected synergies. Moreover, other areas of cost reduction are lower fees paid 
to content providers, marketing expenses but also other categories such as administration and 
general expenses, customer care or sales and distribution channels.  
Figure 58 – Synergies summary between ZON and Optimus merger 
 
The merger between VimpelCom and Orascom in 2010 occurred in order to gain scale and to 
become a global group in the telecom industry. Since both companies had operations in multiple 
countries (and were present in the same countries in some of them), the synergies achieved were 
related with economies of scale, OPEX infrastructure and CAPEX investment. As a result, the type 
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of synergies identified were in the COGS category (handsets, SIM cards and scratch cards), some IT 
and Network and, most importantly, CAPEX, in areas such as less investment needs in new 
infrastructure or IT improvements.  
Figure 59 – Synergies summary between VimpelCom and Orascom 
 
Then, the third case study is the Poland example of Netia Group acquisition of Crowley and Dialog.  
By looking at figure 60, the “focus” in 2012 and 2013 was about optimization and efficiency 
increase in multiple areas such as sales and marketing, procurement, network and other supporting 
functions. Furthermore, this case is interesting because the deal released some information 
regarding integration costs and we understand that the merged entity had integration costs related 
with the merger of different IT platforms. By looking at the merger timeline, we see that during 
the merger, the first year had higher integration costs than synergies achievements and thus, this 
might work as a reference in our forecasts. 
Figure 60 - Synergies summary between Netia Poland acquisition of Crowley and Dialog 
 
Finally, the last but not the least, the fourth example is a Brazilian example of the merger between 
Vivo and Telesp (Telecomunicações de São Paulo) in 2012. Figure 61 provides us a split between 
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Costs, CAPEX and Revenue synergies achieved with the merger and we conclude that OPEX savings 
plays the most important role. Nevertheless, Revenue and CAPEX synergies still represent nearly 
20% each. Moreover, the exhibit also gives us some sensitivity in terms of time to exploit synergies. 
As used in this case, we should also expect three to four years to fully accomplish the maximum 
level of synergies, and we will base our assumptions accordingly. 
Figure 61 - Synergies summary between Vivo and Telesp merger 
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6.2. Synergies analysis 
In this section we will finally look at the different synergies the merger can achieve, both in terms 
of operational expenditures, CAPEX, revenues enhancements and integration costs and then, we 
will summarize all the potential operational synergies as well as define a methodology for synergies 
split. 
6.2.1. Cost synergies 
In order to calculate the cost synergies, we have followed the same bottom-up approach, where we 
forecast each cost category according to each potential for cost savings. Figure 62 give us an 
overview of the cost categories, which we will now explain. 
As we can see, different categories follow different approaches on cost savings, thus, leading to 
different long-term savings, between 4% and 12%. 
Figure 62 – Cost synergies overview 
 
Personnel synergies assume that the new merged company will have a ratio of subscribers per 
employees somewhere in the middle between Vivo and TIM ratio. Since the combined ratio is 4.59 
thousand subscribers per employee, we made a conservative assumption of 5 thousand subs per 
employee from 2016 onwards, which corresponds to a long-term savings of 12%, compared to the 
combined expenses without synergies. Table 11 summarizes the main calculations. Moreover, by 
using the benchmark showed in the industry review (figure 25), it is reasonable to assume that ratio 
of subs per employee will be slightly lower than the old Brazilian average, getting closer to mature 
markets ratios below 4 thousand. 
Table 9 – Personnel synergies 
 














New reference in 2016
New Ratio: 5k subs/emp.
Selling and Marketing
expenses
% savings in TIM
2
6.8%
Vivo: BRL 7.98 Bln
TIM: BRL 4.23 Bln
Combined: BRL 12.2 Bln
Savings: 20%/year in TIM






Vivo: 3.1% of Rev
TIM: 3% of Rev
Combined: 3.1% of Rev
New reference: 2.75% 
of revenues
Cost of Goods sold
% savings with 
economies of scale + 




Vivo: BRL 2.5 Bln
TIM: BRL 3.8 Bln
Combined: BRL 6.4 Bln
5% savings from 2016 




Overlap of Base 









BRL Millions/ # of employees 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
TIM + VIVO 31,264   32,417   34,224   35,858   37,420   38,906   40,369   41,723   42,974   44,130   45,201   45,888   
Combined Ratio 4.69       4.67       4.64       4.61       4.59       4.56       4.53       4.50       4.47       4.44       4.41       4.41       
Total # of employees 31,264   32,417   33,450   34,379   34,843   36,002   37,107   38,093   38,971   39,749   40,437   41,044   
Using new Ratio Subs/employee 4.69       4.67       4.77       4.89       5.00       5.00       5.00       5.00       5.00       5.00       5.00       5.00       
Difference in Employees -         -         774        1,479     2,577     2,904     3,263     3,630     4,003     4,381     4,764     4,845     
Personnel Expenses without sinergies 3,132     3,364     3,557     3,738     3,913     4,081     4,251     4,409     4,558     4,698     4,829     4,914     
growth % 7.8% 7.4% 5.7% 5.1% 4.7% 4.3% 4.1% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 1.8%
Personnel Expenses with sinergies 3,132     3,364     3,474     3,577     3,624     3,752     3,877     3,989     4,090     4,180     4,260     4,334     
growth % 7.8% 7.4% 3.3% 3.0% 1.3% 3.5% 3.3% 2.9% 2.5% 2.2% 1.9% 1.7%
Sinergies -         -         82           161        289        329        374        420        468        518        569        580        
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Selling and Marketing expenses, on the other hand, will also have a conservative savings on nearly 
20% of TIM marketing and selling expenses. These cost savings come from less investment in 
marketing activities but also from lower content payments to services such as Pay TV, mobile 
applications, among others. However, we could even assume a higher rate of cost savings from TIM 
since the new operator does not require doubling the marketing investments, but the 20% 
assumption comes from the fact that both operators will maintain the same selling efforts and 
commissions to third party sellers, and thus, we only decrease one fifth of TIM expenses. 
Table 10- Selling and marketing synergies 
  
Thirdly, general and administrative expenses will also achieve some synergies. The combined ratio 
of G&A was 3.06% of total revenues and we assume a combined ratio of 2.75%, nearly 10% lower 
than the previous combined cost structure. 
Table 11 – General and administrative synergies 
 
On the other hand, Cost of Goods sold represents the amount spent by the operators on mobile 
handsets, routers, etc. We assume that the combined operator will be able to get a higher 
bargaining power and economies of scale with its suppliers. As a result, they will achieve a higher 
discount on handset shipping, of nearly 5% of total combined cost. Moreover, the new COGS also 
reflect the increased number of handsets sold, thus, the amount of synergies achieved is in fact 
lower than 5%, close to 3.7%, due to an increase of handset sold of nearly 1.5% in the long term. 
Table 12 – Cost of Goods sold synergies 
 
In order to calculate the network and interconnection synergies, we have extracted the public 
information on BTS’s10 from ANATEL website. Figure 63 show us the BTS population per state. 
                                                     
10 Base transceiver station is the technical term for the structure containing the antennas that provide wireless and mobile 
communications 
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Total Selling expenses 10,287   11,364   11,700   11,940   12,213   12,454   12,680   12,895   13,083   13,250   13,403   13,539   
growth % 3.9% 10.5% 3.0% 2.1% 2.3% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0%
Synergies achieved in TIM -         -         7% 13% 20.00% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
New Total Selling expenses 10,287   11,364   11,430   11,387   11,367   11,594   11,806   12,009   12,187   12,346   12,491   12,620   
growth % 3.9% 10.5% 0.6% -0.4% -0.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0%
Absolute synergies achieved -         -         270        553        846        861        874        885        896        905        912        919        
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Old combined % of Revenues 3.12% 3.06% 3.09% 3.08% 3.06% 3.08% 3.07% 3.07% 3.08% 3.07% 3.07% 3.07%
% of Revenues with Synergies 3.12% 3.06% 2.95% 2.85% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75%
New G&A 1,643   1,674   1,712   1,745   1,767   1,851   1,938   2,019   2,096   2,169   2,237   2,302   
growth % 5.3% 1.9% 2.3% 1.9% 1.3% 4.8% 4.7% 4.2% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9%
Synergies -       -       79        142      201      221      229      237      248      256      264      272      
% savings 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 7.5% 10.2% 10.7% 10.6% 10.5% 10.6% 10.5% 10.5% 10.6%
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Total COGS 4,407   5,469   5,805   6,099   6,382   6,654   6,917   7,164   7,395   7,612   7,817   8,010   
growth % 16.3% 24.1% 6.2% 5.1% 4.6% 4.3% 4.0% 3.6% 3.2% 2.9% 2.7% 2.5%
Total COGS with Synergies 4,407   5,469   5,548   5,897   6,211   6,462   6,711   6,942   7,156   7,356   7,542   7,716   
growth % 16.3% 24.1% 1.4% 6.3% 5.3% 4.0% 3.9% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.5% 2.3%
Synergies -       -       258      203      171      192      206      222      239      257      275      294      
% savings 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 3.3% 2.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 3.7%
The case of Vivo and TIM   73 
 
Although we have not performed a BTS by BTS analysis to understand how close these antennas 
might be, we have assumed that the combined firm will decommission 25% of the infrastructure 
with the lowest footprint. For instance, in Rio de Janeiro, Vivo has 1,441 BTS’s and TIM has 1,613, 
thus, we have estimated a decommissioning of 347 BTS’s, corresponding to 25% of Vivo BTS’s. 
As a result, we forecast an expected decommissioning of 3,230 BTS’s across the whole 27 states, 
which will be sold to external entities, other players or simply dismantled and sold piece by piece. 
We expect that this decommissioning will take approximately 3 years to complete, and, as a result, 
we expect additional cash flows from the selling of these BTS’s during the same period. 
Figure 63 – Number of BTS per operator per state 
(# of BTS, Vivo + TIM)  
 
In addition, Interconnection costs also play a relevant role in synergies. Since TIM pays the 
incumbent and Vivo also pays TIM for using their infrastructure, the combined firm will be able to 
reduce the costs in almost BRL 2 Billion per year. Nevertheless, this is just an accounting 
procedure, since the costs of one operator are the revenues of the other, and thus, the revenues 
should decrease in the same amount.  
Table 13 provide us the synergies per year for the merged firm. We assume that the 
decommissioning of infrastructure will be concluded in three years, by end of 2016 and then, the 
expected savings of 10.8% (percentage corresponding to the number of BTS decommissioned over 
the number of old number of BTS) in Network and IT should be the same until the end of the 
explicit period.  
We forecast that the synergies will be nearly BRL 2.15 Billion in 2014 and should growth to almost 
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Table 13 – Network and Interconnection synergies 
 
 
6.2.2. Revenue synergies 
In terms of revenue synergies, we forecast a total increment in revenues of nearly BRL 1 Billion per 
year from 2016 onwards (excluding interconnection fees since it is simply an accounting 
procedure). The revenues should come from four different sources: mobile and fixed usage, 
handsets and value added services. 
Since the merged company has an estimated market share of 51.8% in 2014, this creates a telecom 
operator that enables its subscribers to make low-cost calls between each other (since there are no 
interconnection fees, the price per call is lower). Therefore, we forecast that the pace of 
subscriber growth will be higher than in other players due to this network effect. We assume 0.5% 
additional growth in 2014 and then 1% growth in 2015. As a result, the forecasted mobile usage 
revenues should increase by this percentage from 2014 onwards, which is reflected in figure 64. 
Moreover, value added services and data revenues should also have an increased performance due 
to bigger and better quality network. We forecast 0.5% additional growth in 2014 and 2015, and 
then, 0.25% additional growth in 2016 and 2017. 
In the same line of thought, the fixed infrastructure will also suffer revenue enhancements. In this 
case, a bigger fixed infrastructure also means more people having access to the fixed network, fast 
broadband and Pay TV. As a consequence, the merged entity should have 1% growth in 2014, 
followed by 0.5%in 2015 and 2016 and then, at a slower pace, a revenue increase of 0.25% in 2017 
and 2018. 
The last but not the least, for the handset revenues, we estimate that Vivo will leverage the best 
practices made by TIM in terms of handset selling. We estimate a ratio of 7.75 subscribers per each 
handset sold, below the ratio of Vivo (12.8) and, obviously, above TIM ratio (5.9).  
On the other hand, as we explained before, we should also have interconnection revenues erosion 
due to fewer fees paid from operators. However, we only consider this impact as an “accounting” 
impact, since the revenue erosion is also followed by a cost reduction from the other merged party, 
and thus, it is no longer taken into account. 
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Total NW costs 15,518   15,949   17,182   18,258   19,163   20,001   20,904   21,679   22,342   22,911   23,400   23,823   
Network and IT 39.5% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1%
Others 60.5% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9%
Network and IT 6,125     5,761     6,207     6,595     6,922     7,225     7,551     7,831     8,070     8,276     8,452     8,605     
Interconnection costs 9,392     10,188   10,976   11,663   12,241   12,776   13,353   13,848   14,271   14,635   14,947   15,218   
% of synergies achieved in NW and IT 0% 0% 3.60% 7.20% 10.80% 10.80% 10.80% 10.80% 10.80% 10.80% 10.80% 10.80%
Total NW costs with synergies 15,518   15,949   15,035   15,857   16,508   17,348   18,236   19,001   19,660   20,232   20,723   21,153   
Network and IT with Synergies 6,125     5,761     5,983     6,120     6,174     6,444     6,735     6,985     7,198     7,382     7,539     7,676     
Interconnection with Synergies 9,392     10,188   9,052     9,736     10,334   10,904   11,501   12,016   12,462   12,850   13,184   13,477   
Total NW and Inter Synergies -         -         2,147     2,402     2,655     2,653     2,667     2,678     2,681     2,680     2,677     2,671     
NW Synergies -         -         224        475        748        781        816        846        872        894        913        930        
Interconnection Synergies -         -         1,924     1,927     1,907     1,872     1,851     1,832     1,810     1,786     1,763     1,741     
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Concluding, revenue enhancements should have an impact of almost 1.5% of the combined firm in 
2016 onwards, reflecting the adjustments explained previously, which corresponds to more than 
BRL 1.1 Billion in the mid-long term. 
Figure 64 – Revenue synergies per category 
(BRL Mln) 
 
6.2.3. CAPEX synergies 
The CAPEX synergies account for more than BRL 1 Billion each year and is mostly driven by the 
savings in network deployment. Figure 65 summarizes the forecasted savings per CAPEX type and 
the long term forecasted savings. As we can see, following the same approach used in the network 
decommissioning, we assume 25% decrease in TIM CAPEX due to overlap of infrastructure 
deployment. On the other hand, Licenses have a CAPEX savings of 50% of TIM, since the merged 
operator will not have the same spectrum requirements as the two standalone operators and 
finally, IT CAPEX expenditures are expected to reduce to nearly 9.3% in the long-term, 
corresponding to 40% of the expected CAPEX of TIM in IT. We forecast additional expenditures in IT, 
due to the combination of two complex IT platforms with more than 50 million subscribers each, 
nevertheless, once the platform is together, we expect IT CAPEX synergies to become more 
evident. 
Figure 65 – CAPEX synergies summary  
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6.2.4. Incremental cash flows with merger 
Following the explanation about where the merged entity will obtain synergies, it is also important 
to refer the expected incremental gains and investments due to the merger.  
6.2.4.1. Incremental gains 
Starting with the incremental gains, since we will decommission 3,230 BTS’s, a well-defined 
dismantling plan has to be put in place. We expect that this procedure will take 4 years to be 
accomplished, thus, the gains should only be fully obtained by end of 2017.  
Nevertheless, these gains should account for BRL 710 Million, distributed along 4 years (Figure 62). 
We forecast an estimated selling price per BTS of nearly BRL 220,000, which is in accordance with 
telecom benchmarks of nearly USD 100,000 per tower11.  
Figure 66 – Gains with BTS sold 
(BRL Mln) 
 
6.2.4.2. Incremental expenses 
In terms of additional expenses, we forecast three main sources of additional expenses. Firstly, as 
in every merger, consulting and investment banking support is essential to successfully accomplish 
the right deal. We assume 40 consultants and investment bankers in the first year, with an 
estimated fee per resource of BRL150,000 per month. Then, we estimate that the fees paid to 
these firms will reduce until it reaches a marginal expense of BRL 5 Million in 2017, corresponding 
to implementation fees. 
Moreover, we also forecast a substantial increment of expenses related with marketing campaigns 
and IT investments. The first category will be responsible for the “education” of both Vivo and TIM 
subscribers, where a strong marketing campaign must be in place to ensure the new merged entity 
is recognized in the market. Furthermore, IT investment is also crucial, since the new entity will 
have to make a strong effort to combine both IT platforms and ensure the merger runs smoothly 
and without any disruption. As a result, we forecast an increase in IT expenses of 20% in the first 
year, which will reduce in the following years to marginal BRL 89 Million in 2017. 
                                                     





2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F
# of BTS sold
808 1,077 808 538
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Table 14 – incremental expenses summary 
 
 
6.2.5. Synergies summary 
Concluding, we forecast a loss in the first year due to high integration costs (especially Marketing 
and IT integration), and reduced synergies gains but, in the second year after the merger, we 
already start achieving significant synergies, with an expected cumulative value of BRL 0.5 Billion. 
Most of these synergies will come from cost synergies, such as selling and marketing expenses, as 
well as personnel, but CAPEX synergies are also expected to be relevant, with a total amount in the 
first year of BRL 428 Million. 
Figure 67 summarizes the dynamics during the first four years of the merger. We expect that the 
synergies will be fully achieved in the third year. 




In terms of division between the different categories, in accordance with several benchmarks 
reviewed before, we forecast that the cost synergies will represent nearly 57% of total synergies, 
whereas CAPEX 22% and revenues slighly above 20%.  
We have excluded integration costs from this analysis since it would distort the overall picture and 
since these are only one-time cash flows that do not account for the main purpose of the merger. 
2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F
Consulting 72        48        16       5         
Marketing 1,714   1,143   381    127    
IT investment 1,197   798      266    89       
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As a result, as stated before, we expect that the synergies impact is fully obtained only in 2017 and 
should growth at a similar pace as the overall business, 2.8%. 
Figure 68 – Synergies split per category 
(BRL Bln, %) 
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6.2.6. Synergies split analysis 
In order to compute the synergies assigned to each operator, we have analysed each cost, revenue 
and CAPEX category to understand the specific weight of each operator in the total cash flows. In 
Table 15, we have included all the divisions for both operators per cash flow category. As we can 
see, there are different splits depending on the class analysed. For instance, while personnel 
expenses have a split Vivo/TIM of 75%/25%, the fixed revenues has a split of 96%/4%, or handsets, 
on the other hand, has a bigger weight in TIM Participações, with a split of 28%/72%. 
The overall business split between Vivo and TIM, is 63.4%/36.6% and we will use this ratio as a 
reference when defining the premium paid to TIM Participações in the deal chapter. 
Table 15 - Synergies split per operator per category 
(BRL Mln, %) 
  
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Costs 913  1,533   2,255   2,383   2,498   2,610   2,723   2,829   2,933   2,995   
Personnel expenses 82     161      289      329      374      420      468      518      569      580      
Vivo 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 74%
TIM 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 26%
Selling & marketing expenses 270  553      846      861      874      885      896      905      912      919      
Vivo 65% 65% 65% 65% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66%
TIM 35% 35% 35% 35% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34%
Network & interconnection 224  475      748      781      816      846      872      894      913      930      
Vivo 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66%
TIM 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34%
General & administrative 79     142      201      221      229      237      248      256      264      272      
Vivo 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 65% 65% 65% 65%
TIM 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Cost Of Goods Sold 258  203      171      192      206      222      239      257      275      294      
Vivo 39% 39% 40% 41% 41% 42% 42% 43% 44% 44%
TIM 61% 61% 60% 59% 59% 58% 58% 57% 56% 56%
Revenues 285  734      915      990      1,040   1,066   1,087   1,105   1,119   1,129   
Mobile - Usage 99     316      332      347      362      375      387      399      410      420      
Vivo 59% 59% 59% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58%
TIM 41% 41% 41% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42%
Mobile  - VAS 60     131      177      230      248      266      282      298      312      326      
Vivo 62% 61% 61% 60% 60% 59% 59% 59% 59% 59%
TIM 38% 39% 39% 40% 40% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41%
Fixed 68     105      142      163      185      189      192      196      200      203      
Vivo 96% 96% 96% 96% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97%
TIM 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Handsets 58     182      264      249      245      237      226      212      197      180      
Vivo 28% 28% 29% 29% 30% 31% 31% 32% 33% 33%
TIM 72% 72% 71% 71% 70% 69% 69% 68% 67% 67%
CAPEX 405  1,141   1,074   1,106   1,120   1,137   1,151   1,161   1,166   1,170   
Vivo 66% 61% 64% 64% 65% 65% 66% 66% 67% 67%
TIM 34% 39% 36% 36% 35% 35% 34% 34% 33% 33%
Synergies for Vivo 982  2,081   2,664   2,831   2,963   3,076   3,186   3,287   3,382   3,442   
Synergies for TIM 621  1,327   1,580   1,648   1,696   1,738   1,776   1,808   1,836   1,851   
% of synergies for Vivo 61% 61% 63% 63% 64% 64% 64% 65% 65% 65%
% of synergies for TIM 39% 39% 37% 37% 36% 36% 36% 35% 35% 35%
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7. The Merged Company and the Deal 
This last chapter will integrate all the analysis made before, present the new merged firm with the 
synergies effect and we will spend some time explaining all the details of the deal such as the 
premium paid, the payment methods and the impact to both Vivo and TIM shareholders. In the end, 
we will also look at some sensitivity analysis to some important assumptions as the premium, the 
split between stock and cash payment to Telecom Italia and also the discount rate. Finally, we will 
look at some regulatory challenges that may be at stake if the deal happened in reality. 
7.1. The financials with synergies 
In this chapter, we will review all the components of the free cash flow to the firm. We will start 
by looking at revenues, followed by the costs, an update on the new depreciations and 
amortizations and finally, a comparison between the old and new EBIT under synergies effect. 
7.1.1. Revenue 
As reviewed in the last chapter, the merged firm is expected to generate a combined revenue 
enhancements of nearly BRL 1 Billion per year. Figure 69 shows the new revenue forecasts and, as 
we can see, the total revenue evolution is expected to be closer to 4.4% per year, more 0.3% per 
year, compared with the sum of parts revenue before.  
The mobile business will continue to be the major source of revenues, but the fixed business and 
handsets will still represent almost one third of the business. 
Figure 69 –Revenues of merged company with synergies 
(BRL Mln) 
 
7.1.2. Costs and EBITDA 
In terms of cost structure, we forecast a year-over-year growth of 2.1% during the explicit period. 
The combination of cost and revenue synergies is forecasted to provide a long term EBITDA margin 
of 41%, 4% higher than the highest EBITDA margin achieved by Vivo two years ago.  By observing 

















































Note: Including Interconnection costs effect
Absolute value of revenue synergies 
0 0 285 734 915 990 1,040 1,066 1,087 1,105 1,119 1,129
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figure 70, the synergies seems to have a low impact, but the effect is more clear in the Network 
and Interconnection and Selling and Marketing expenses during 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
In the low end of the same figure, we also see the absolute value of synergies saved each year and 
it represents almost 10% of total costs. 
Figure 70 –Costs of merged company with synergies 
(BRL Mln) 
 
As a result, figure 71 shows the EBITDA comparison between a sum of parts EBITDA without 
synergies and the combined firm under the synergies effect. The revenue enhancements and cost 
reductions enables an additional year-over-year growth of 2.7%, thus, it will have a big difference 
in terms of FCFF, and, as a consequence, in the final firm value. 
Figure 71 – EBITDA comparison with and without synergies 
(BRL Bln) 
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7.1.3. Depreciations and Amortizations 
In order to forecast the new Depreciations and Amortizations of the merged firm, we had to re-
calculate all the D&A again because there are adjustments in the CAPEX investments. As a result, 
the new asset average life period is 8.7 years and we have used this weighted average to estimate 
the depreciations over time. Following the same approach used for Vivo and TIM Participações, in 
figure 72 is represented the new depreciations (dark blue), compared with the sum of parts from 
Vivo and TIM. As observed, the depreciations are slightly lower in the long term because the 
investments are lower than if both companies were operating separately.  
In terms of CAPEX, we forecast a big increase in CAPEX in 2015, both in fixed and mobile 
infrastructure as well as quality improvement, but, in the following years, a substantial decrease, 
approaching a ratio of 13.7% in the mid-term. In addition, as explained in Vivo and TIM standalone 
valuations, we forecast a slightly lower ratio of CAPEX to D&A, which is in line with the big increase 
in CAPEX in the next 2 years. 




In terms of EBIT, it is expected that the firm will be able to achieve significant enhancements from 
2016 onwards. The merger should have a great impact on the EBIT margin, since the new merged 
company is able to increase revenues, reduce costs, and reduce depreciations and amortizations. 
As we will see further, this difference will have a big impact on the final valuation, with expected 
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7.2. The Deal  
7.2.1. Structure of the acquisition 
As we have seen previously, Telecom Italia has a relevant position in the Brazilian market but, at 
the same time, has been making significant divestments in numerous assets in order to reduce their 
debt. As a result, the proposed deal will ensure that Telecom Italia still keeps a strategic 
participation in the Brazilian market, through the combined firm, but, at the same time, divests 
some of his Brazilian participation due to debt reduction reasons. 
The deal will consist of an equity acquisition from Vivo to TIM Participações S.A. to all its 100% 
shareholders. The participation of Telecom Italia will be split between 50% Vivo stock issuance and 
50% cash payment, whereas the minority shareholders will be bought only through cash. 
Figure 74 – Deal structure 
 
As a result, as observed in (1) from table 16, Vivo will acquire 2.4 Billion shares, 67% to Telecom 
Italia and 33% to other institutional shareholders and free float.  
We have defined this scenario (another possible solution would be to only buy the stake from 
Telecom Italia) since TIM Participações is the only operator in Brazil with tag-along rights to all its 
minority shareholders, and, as a result, Vivo is obliged to purchase all 100% shares. 
We have chosen a 40% premium, which goes in line with the split of synergies offered to each 
shareholder. In order to better understand the rational for the premium offered, we will look with 
more detail afterwards. 
Vivo will have to issue shares corresponding to BRL 13.1 Billion and also pay the same amount with 
cash to Telecom Italia shareholders. At the same time, Vivo will reward each minority shareholder 
with BRL 16.29 per share, or a similar amount of BRL 13.1 Billion.  
In terms of number of new shares issued by Vivo (3), we used the corresponding exchange ratio of 
the date of the deal, 31st of December 2013, which is 37.8%, corresponding to division between the 
acquisition offer, BRL 15.75, and the stock price of Vivo, BRL 43.15, and then, multiplied by the 
number of TIM shares to acquire with stock (805 million shares). As a result, Vivo will have to issue 
a total number of 304.3 Million new common stock shares. 
Regarding the cash transaction, Vivo will have to pay 66% of the deal with cash. Therefore, the 
total cash required is BRL 26.26 Billion. Since the Vivo has only BRL 6.54 Billion in cash, and, 
assuming the operator will keep 5% in cash reserves for working capital requirements, the total 
cash available for the transaction will be BRL 6.22 Billion. Thus, Vivo will have to issue new debt in 
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order to complete the transaction (4). The Brazilian incumbent will have to issue BRL 20.04 in new 
debt, increasing the total Vivo debt to nearly BRL 28.79 Billion. 
Table 16 – Deal structure and main calculations 
 
Moreover, we assume that the Debt increase made by Vivo will have consequences in terms of costs 
and credit rating. We assume that the operator will be downgraded in one level, from Baa1 to 
Baa2, and, as a result the new debt will have to be financed at a higher cost. We used the approach 
used by Damodaran to estimate the cost of debt, depending on the credit rating, and we added 
0.5% to the estimated cost of debt. 
Nevertheless, this debt increase is still quite low, compared with other telecom operators. In the 
figure below, we have extracted 71 telecom operators’ data across the world (the ones that had 
information regarding debt issued) and categorized the operators, depending if the country of 
origin is a developed or an emerging market. The first main conclusion is that emerging market 
operators have clearly lower levels of debt, compared with developed countries, with an average 
debt to EBITDA of 3.18 in developed countries and 1.45 in emerging markets. As we have seen 
previously in the literature review, emerging markets are more risky than developed markets due 
to risk of expropriation, war or even corruption. Thus, it is normal to see lower leverage in 
emerging markets, compared with developed countries. Secondly, when looking to Vivo, point 1 
represents the previous levels of debt to EBITDA before the merger in 2013 (0.83 debt to EBITDA 
and 0.25 debt to revenues), while point 2 represents the new level of debt after the merger (1.76 
debt to EBITDA and 0.48 debt to revenues). As a result, we see that, even with an increase of 
nearly BRL 19 Billion in debt, the ratio of Debt-to-EBITDA still remains inside the emerging market 
cluster. 
(1) Onwership division in TIM (3) # of shares issued calculation
# of shares 2,417,632,647     Vivo current price per share 43.15                     
% owned by Telecom Italia 66.7% Acquiring offer 15.75                     
% Onwed by free float 33.3% Exchange ratio 36.5%
Equity value of TIM 27,194,807          # of shares to acquire to TI 805,984,973        
Premium 40.0% # of new shares issued 294,137,046        
Equity acquisition value 38,072,730          Vivo New # of shares 1,417,406,290     
Absolute premium value 10,877,923          
Acquisition value per share 15.75                     (4) Additional Debt to pay transaction
Total Cash : 6,543,900             
(2) Acquisition parts Assumed cash reserves 5.00%
Value to acquire: 38,072,730          Cash reserves 327,195                
To acquire to Telecom Italia 25,385,204          Cash available for transaction 6,216,705             
Free float and others institutional 12,687,527          Existing Debt 8,753,600             
Acquisition to Telecom Italia Cash required for acquisition 25,380,129          
Value in stock 12,692,602          Debt increase 19,163,424          
Value in cash 12,692,602          New Debt 27,917,024          
Acquisition to free float + other institutionals Total Debt / Revenues 47.9%
Amount in cash 12,687,527          Total Debt / EBITDA 1.76                       
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Figure 75 – Telecom operators debt levels for developed and emerging markets 
 
In table 17, we have included the forecasted debt and expected Interest tax shields from the new 
merged firm.  
We are assuming that the previous Vivo will keep having the same financing needs, and so, we 
simply added the forecasted debt from the standalone Vivo. Then, regarding TIM’s debt, we assume 
that Vivo will make the debt perpetual or will keep updating the debt by issuing new one at the 
same rate, so, we estimate this debt constant in the future. Finally, the additional debt is also 
assumed to be perpetual since the company gain significant interest tax shields and, as a result, 
the merged firm will be interested in maintaining this new leverage ratio.  
As a result, these three different debts will have different interest rates, and so, we have 
computed the interest rates separately. After that, we have computed the expected interest tax 
shields, which will be used to calculate the present value of interest tax shields, through the APV 
approach. 
Table 17 – New Debt with merger and expected ITS 
 
7.2.2. Discount rate 
In order to estimate the value of the new firm, we have to first calculate the new cost of capital, 
both the cost of equity and the cost of debt. 
We started by calculating the new combined levered beta, which is the weighted average beta of 


























2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
(1) Vivo debt 9,288 9,674 9,976 10,032 10,260 10,431 10,593 10,700 10,797 10,881
(2) TIM debt 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747 4,747
(3) Additional debt with Acquisition 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163 19,163
Total (1) + (2) + (3) 33,198 33,584 33,886 33,942 34,170 34,341 34,503 34,610 34,707 34,791
Debt / EBITDA 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
Interest from (1) @ 8.87% (avg.) 801 861 896 887 914 929 941 952 961 968
Interest from (2) @ 6.70% 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
Interest from (3) @ 10.20% 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954
Interest tax shields @ 32% 983 1,002 1,014 1,011 1,020 1,024 1,028 1,032 1,034 1,037
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Debt to Equity, 56.82%, we estimated the Beta unlevered. As a result, adding the Brazilian risk free 
rate (7.7%) and the multiplication between the Beta unlevered with the Brazilian market risk 
premium, we obtain a total cost of equity of 11.86%. 
In terms of cost of debt, we as stated before, we assumed that the new firm, by increasing the 
leverage, will be downgraded to Baa2, according to Moody’s rating scale, and, as a result, the 
previous credit default spread of 2.% should be increased to 2.5%. Therefore, the forecasted cost of 
debt will be 10.20%. 
Table 18 – Discount rates of new merged firm 
 
7.2.3. Merged Firm Valuation 
The calculation of the free cash flows to the firm follow the same approach used in TIM and Vivo 
valuations. We have computed three forecasting stages, where the first one corresponds to the 
forecasted explicit period, then, on the second stage, we adjust the FCFF growth rate until it 
reaches the forecasted long-term growth rate of 2.5% in the third stage. 
Table 19 summarizes the free cash flow to the firm as well as the expected interest tax shields to 
the merged firm. As we can see, we expect that in 2016, the year where we forecast the full 
accomplishment of total synergies, the FCFF to triple the amount to nearly BRL 9 Billion, and then, 
expanding at an average pace of 5.6% per year. 
In terms of working capital, we have added both values from Vivo and TIM to calculate the future 
working capital requirements. 
Furthermore, for the terminal value calculation, we estimate a year-over-year growth rate of 2.5%, 
the expected long term GDP growth rate of Brazil. 
Risk Free rate (BR) 7.70% New Cost of Capital with new Debt effect
Market Risk Premium 8.29% Combined beta levered 0.697                
Vivo Discount rate D/E 56.82%
Enterprise value (Mln) 56,211                  New Beta unlevered 0.503                
Beta levered 0.670                     New cost of Unlevered Equity (Ru) 11.86%
Old cost of unlevered Equity 12.51%
TIM Discount rate New credit Rating Baa2
Enterprise value (Mln) 26,451                  Implicit spread for cost of Debt 2.50%
Beta levered 0.755                     Cost of Debt (Rd) 10.20%
Old cost of unlevered Equity 12.82%
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Table 19 – Free cash flow to the Firm of the merged firm with synergies 
 
In terms of bankruptcy costs, we also used the same methodology used in Vivo valuation. Table 20 
shows us the expected bankruptcy costs, assuming the downgrade of the credit debt to Baa2, the 
probability of default increases to 2.575%. 
By discounting the free cash flow to the firm as well as interest tax shields at the proper discount 
factor, and, after subtracting the expected bankruptcy costs, the total enterprise value is 
estimated at BRL 113,883 Million. In terms of net debt, the amount of BRL 26,846 Million 
corresponds to the new debt value, net of the cash available, which is in this case the cash 
available by TIM and the 5% cash reserves assumed in Vivo before the transaction. 
Therefore, we estimate an equity valuation for the merged firm of BRL 86,976 Million, which 
corresponds to a total share price of BRL 61.26. 
Table 20 – APV valuation for the merged firm 
 
BRL Millions 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
EBIT*(1-T) 4,805      6,594     8,455     9,278      10,005   10,503    11,564   12,625   13,690   14,721   
growth % -4.7% 37.2% 28.2% 9.7% 7.8% 5.0% 10.1% 9.2% 8.4% 7.5%
 + D&A 8,807      9,610     10,299   10,949    11,700   12,544    12,554   12,535   12,508   12,483   
growth % 4.7% 9.1% 7.2% 6.3% 6.9% 7.2% 0.1% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2%
 - ∆WC 723          11           76           115-          37-           258          81           77           105        150        
growth % -141.0% -98.5% 602.3% -250.3% -67.6% -792.4% -68.5% -5.1% 36.5% 43.0%
 - CAPEX 9,916      13,626   9,629     9,966      10,324   10,642    10,929   11,185   11,415   11,621   
growth % 4.9% 37.4% -29.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.1% 1.8%
FCFF 2,973      2,568     9,049     10,375    11,419   12,147    13,108   13,898   14,678   15,432   
growth % -48.4% -13.6% 252.3% 14.7% 10.1% 6.4% 7.9% 6.0% 5.6% 5.1%
 - Tax Shields 983          1,002     1,014     1,011      1,019     1,024      1,028     1,032     1,034     1,037     
growth % 1.9% 1.1% -0.3% 0.9% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2%
Unlevered CFs 1,990      1,566     8,035     9,364      10,400   11,122    12,080   12,867   13,643   14,395   
growth % -21.3% 413.2% 16.5% 11.1% 6.9% 8.6% 6.5% 6.0% 5.5%
BRL Millions 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
FCFF 16,390    17,287   18,105   18,829    19,443   19,934    20,437   
growth % 6.2% 5.5% 4.7% 4.0% 3.3% 2.5%
 - Tax Shields 1,028      1,021     1,020     1,026      1,041     1,067      1,094     
growth % -0.9% -0.6% -0.1% 0.6% 1.5% 2.5%
Unlevered CFs 15,362    16,266   17,086   17,804    18,402   18,867    19,343   
growth % 6.7% 5.9% 5.0% 4.2% 3.4% 2.5%
2nd stage - adjusting period
TV
1st stage - Explicit period
3rd stage - TV
(1) Value unlevered (BRL 000') 104,194,499    APV Valuation (1) + (2) - (3)
PV of explicit period 69,746,021      Total Enterprise Value (BRL 000') 113,822,890    
TV 34,448,478      Net Debt 2013(BRL 000') 26,846,396      
(2) PV of ITS (BRL 000') 10,889,405      Equity Value (BRL 000') 86,976,494      
PV of explicit period 7,872,862        Shares Outstanding  (000') 1,417,406        
TV 3,016,543        Price per Share (BRL) 61.36                
(3) Bankrupcy costs (BC) (BRL 000´) 1,261,014        
Credit rating by Moodys Baa2
Probability of Default 2.575%
Cost of Bankruptcy 47.00%
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7.2.4. Synergies valuation and shareholder’s gain 
After estimating the new value of the firm, BRL 113.8 Billion, we can estimate the value of 
synergies and study the origin of these synergies. As a start, the sum of total synergies is BRL 31.16 
Billion, corresponding to the difference between the value of the new firm and the sum of 
standalone valuations from TIM and Vivo (BRL 82.7 Billion). 
In Figure 76 we observe the valuations and synergies breakdown. The merged firm is expected to 
gain significant value by simply changing their cost of asset to 11.86%, from the previous 12.51% 
from Vivo and 12.11% from TIM. The difference in the discount rate, as explained before, has a 
great impact on the present value of the cash flow today, and, as a result, we estimate an 
additional BRL 4.7 Billion only by having different cost of unlevered capital. This amount was 
computed by adding the free cash flows without synergies and discounting at the new unlevered 
cost of capital (we have unlevered it taking into account the new Debt to Equity of 57%) and 
previous cost of debt (since in this scenario we are still not considering the new debt acquisition, 
we still discount at the old cost of debt, 9.7%). 
Moreover, the issuance of perpetual debt will also achieve significant savings, corresponding to the 
tax value of the debt issued (32%), in this case, BRL 6.1 Billion. Nevertheless, a higher debt value 
also implies higher risk, thus, the expected bankruptcy costs should increase, reducing the value by 
nearly BRL 600 Million.  
In any case, the present value of the operational synergies, such as CAPEX reductions, cost 
efficiencies or revenue enhancements must improve the value of the firm by BRL 20.9 Billion. 
Figure 76 – Present value of Synergies and breakdown 
(BRL Bln)  
 
In fact, the BRL 20.9 Billion in operational synergies is quite significant and can be explained by 
several factors more or less correlated. Firstly, by looking to the free cash flow to the firm with 
and without synergies, we see a significant difference between 40% and 25% every year (figure 77). 
Moreover, by only summing the difference in cash flows between both scenarios, the difference is 
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value: BRL 31.16 Bln
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Moreover, this big difference in the FCFF can be also explained by other factors such as the EBIT 
margin. While in the original case, the combined EBIT margin was between 15% and 20%, the new 
enhanced EBIT margin is between 20% and 26%, reducing the financial pressures that both 
companies were facing before. 




In terms of synergies split, using the forecasted split in chapter 6.2.6, we have divided the 
synergies for both operators, using a Vivo/TIM ratio of 63.4%/36.6%. 
As a result, figure 78 summarizes the synergies attributable to each operator and compares it with 
the premium paid by Vivo to TIM shareholders. On one hand, we can see that Vivo probably are 
paying the minimum amount to TIM shareholders, on the other hand, TIM shareholders are being 
extremely well rewarded, compared with Vivo shareholders, only 27%. 
Moreover, since Telecom Italia is facing strong financing needs, Vivo has some bargaining power to 
decide which premium to offer to TIM, and thus, Vivo decided to pay the minimum acceptable 
amount. 
In terms of shareholder returns, we forecast an average shareholder return to Telecom Italia of 
nearly 70%. This return lies on the fact that the operator will be able to get the standard 40% 
premium and, since the performance is now linked to Vivo stock price, it will also get additional 
return due to the synergies achieved. 
On the other hand, minority shareholders from TIM Participações will get a return equal to the 
premium paid, 40%, and Vivo shareholders will achieve an expected return of 27%, corresponding to 































19% 123% 44% 44% 44% 44% 39% 36% 34% 31% 29% 27% 26% 25% 24% 24% 24%
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Figure 78 – Synergies split and shareholder’s return per share 
 
7.2.5. Value created and “Meet the premium line” 
In the literature review, we have looked at some good practices that identifies from where value 
comes from to understand if investors are being too optimistic or too pessimistic. Starting with the 
value created, replicating figure 2, the figure below presents the forecasted value and the value 
created to Vivo shareholders. As we can see, we have added all the synergies achieved with the 
merger, BRL 31.2 Billion, and the premium paid to all TIM shareholders. As a result, Vivo will 
achieve a value created of nearly BRL 20.3 Billion, almost double the amount of the premium paid, 
which goes in line with the expected Vivo synergies allocated in the previous chapter. 
Figure 79 – Value created to Vivo shareholders 
(BRL Bln) 
 
On a different perspective, we have also computed the “Meet the premium line” presented in the 
literature review. However, it is important to reflect that this model does not take into account 
several important synergies that arise from the merger, such as a lower discount rate, higher 
interest tax shields and a significant reduction in CAPEX. Therefore, although the model is a good 
tool to set boundaries on the premium paid, at the same time, it is a too simplistic tool that, 
unfortunately, does not consider value created through other sources. As a result, we should 
remain cautious about the model presented below, since it may distort the overall picture. 
In terms of calculations, we have assumed cost synergies to be all the costs synergies divided by 
TIM standalone total costs in the long term (BRL 2,995 Million in synergies divided by TIM costs, BRL 
20,209 Million) and, in terms of revenue synergies, also all revenue enhancements divided by total 




Premium paid TIM synergies Vivo synergies Total synergies
Synergies split
(BRL Bln) TIM Shareholder return
Previous Share value 11.25       
Acquisition offer 15.75       
Minority Shareholder return 40.0%
Telecom Italia Shareholder return 69.5%
Vivo Shareholder return
Previous Share value 48.39








TIM with premium Value created
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Million). We assumed the EBITDA margin from 2013 as the operational profit for the model 
calculation. 
In our case, and since we are dealing with a merger in the telecom industry in the same country, 
the synergies in terms of infrastructure and marketing and selling expenses are higher than in a 
traditional merger or acquisition since there are several categories that can be halved. We believe 
that 15% synergies are more than reasonable and that this percentage could even increase if we 
take more aggressive assumptions. Therefore, under the model suggested by Sirower and Sahni 
(2006), we fall outside the plausibility box. Nevertheless, under our estimations, we still achieve a 
combined value above the premium line, which demonstrates a good indication that the premium 
paid is not too high (and still, without considering other variables such as the discount rate, 
interest tax shields or lower CAPEX). 
Figure 80 – Meet the premium line for the merger 
 
 
7.2.6. Sensitivity analysis 
7.2.6.1. Bull-Bear scenarios 
Following the same approach used in the standalone valuations, we have computed three scenarios 
for the merged firm.  
In terms of assumptions, we estimate that, in the bear case, the number of subscribers, value 
added services and fixed business will not change from previous forecasts and that ARPU will 
slightly reduce. In terms of cost synergies, COGS will only have a marginal cost saving, of nearly 
2.5% and that the marketing will be 18% synergies and network decommissioned will be 17%. 
On the other hand, in the bull case scenario, we include in all the assumptions a more optimistic 
view on the synergies, where subscribers and ARPU should grow and cost synergies should be 
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The difference between a Bear case scenario and a Bull case scenario can impact the final 
valuation in almost BRL 20 Billion, corresponding to a Vivo shareholder return of approximately 16% 
or 46%, respectively.  
Figure 81 – Bull-Bear scenarios for the merged company 
 
7.2.6.1. Sensitivity to Premium, Stock issuance and discount rate 
After reviewing the impact of Bull-Bear scenarios, it is also important to understand how different 
premiums and different payment methods can influence the final Vivo valuation. A higher premium 
implies that the firm will require more cash to pay and, therefore, more debt issuance, and, as a 
result, higher interest tax shields.  
In addition, a different Cash/Stock split for telecom Italia shareholders can also have a great 
impact on the cash required for the acquisition and so, it also impacts the total new debt issued 
and the ITS achieved. 
The discount rate, as we have seen in the individual valuations, also plays an enormous role and has 
a great impact in the synergy’s value. Therefore, we also considered it for analysis. 
In the next three tables, we have computed a sensitivity analysis to all these three variables. We 
have included the enterprise value of the new firm, as well as the synergies forecast, shareholder’s 
returns and also two commonly used ratios to evaluate the leverage of the firm – debt to EBITDA 
and debt to revenues. 
In the first table, we see that a different premium paid, does not impact the enterprise value of 
the firm in a significant value, since the increase amount to pay in the premium will be financed 
with additional debt. As a result, the small differences are related with additional interest tax 










Enterprise Value (BRL Mln)
Base case




16% / 61% /40% 27% /70%/ 40% 46% / 84% /40%
Note: 1) Values correspond to 2014, 2015, 2016,2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively
Subs change1 0%/0%/0%/0%/0%/0% 0.5%/1%/0%/0%/0%/0% 2%/2%/1%/0.5%/0.5%/0.25%
Mobile VAS change1 0%/0%/0%/0%/0%/0% 0.5%/0.5%/0.25%/0.25%/0%/0% 0.75%/0.75%/0.5%/0.25%/0%/0%
Fixed services change1 0%/0%/0%/0%/0%/0% 1%/0.5%/0.5%/0.25%/0.25%/0% 2%/2%/2%/2%/2%/2%
Subs / Employee 4.75 5 5.25
COGS synergies 2.5% 5.0% 7.5%
Marketing synergies 18% 20% 22%
G&A expenses 3% 2.75% 2.5%
% network synergies 27% 25% 23%
% IT CAPEX reduced 45% 40% 35%
% NW CAPEX reduced 27% 25% 23%
% Licenses CAPEX red. 55% 50% 45%
Additional Marketing 16% in the first year 15% in the first year 14%  in the first year
Additional IT 21% in the first year 20% in the first year 19% in the first year
ARPU change1 -0.5%/-0.5%/-0.25%/-0.25%/0%/0% 0%/0%/0%/0%/0%/0% 0.5%/0.5%/0.25%/0.25%/0%/0%
Subs per handsets 8.00 7.75 7.50
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shields obtained. On the other hand, the leverage changes from a minimum of 1.47 to 2.04, which 
in any case is still a reasonable debt to EBITDA, as we have seen previously in figure 75. 
Table 21 – Sensitivity analysis to the premium paid 
 
On the other hand, a different split between stock and cash payment to Telecom Italia also have a 
marginal impact on the value of the merged firm (only through higher ITS). However, in terms of 
leverage, the debt to EBITDA ratio in this case can go up to 2.56, if the transaction was paid with 
100% cash. On the other hand, a 0% stock payment highly rewards existing Vivo shareholders since 
there is no stock dilution, while with 100% purchase of Telecom Italia shares with Vivo stock, it 
could dilute the stock price due to additional 52.3% issued shares. 
Table 22 - Sensitivity analysis to the percentage of stock payment to Telecom Italia
  
As we have seen in the standalone valuations of Vivo and TIM, the discount rate have a big impact 
in the enterprise value of the firm. As a result, from a discount rate of 14.4% to 9.4%, the EV almost 
doubles the amount from BRL 87.2 Billion (with marginal synergies of only BRL 4.5 Billion) to BRL 
161.3 Billion. In terms of Debt ratios, the discount rate variability is not expected to have any 
impact, as we can see empirically in the table below. 
Table 23 - Sensitivity analysis to the cost of equity 
 
  
15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65%
Value of Merged Firm (BRL Bln) 113.6     113.6     113.7     113.7     113.8     113.8     113.9     113.9     114.0     114.0     114.1     
Synergies (BRL Bln) 30.9       30.9       31.0       31.1       31.1       31.2       31.2       31.3       31.3       31.4       31.4       
Return of Vivo SH's (%) 38.2% 35.8% 33.5% 31.3% 29.0% 26.8% 24.7% 22.5% 20.4% 18.3% 16.3%
Return of TIM SH's (%) 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% 40.0% 45.0% 50.0% 55.0% 60.0% 65.0%
Return of Telecom Italia SH's (%) 46.6% 51.4% 56.1% 60.7% 65.2% 69.5% 73.8% 78.0% 82.1% 86.2% 90.1%
Debt to EBITDA 1.47       1.53       1.59       1.64       1.70       1.76       1.82       1.87       1.93       1.99       2.04       
Debt to Revenues 41.5% 43.1% 44.7% 46.3% 48.0% 49.6% 51.2% 52.8% 54.4% 56.0% 57.6%
% Premium paid
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Value of Merged Firm (BRL Bln) 114.6     114.4     114.3     114.1     114.0     113.8     113.7     113.5     113.4     113.2     113.1     
Synergies (BRL Bln) 31.9       31.8       31.6       31.5       31.3       31.2       31.0       30.9       30.7       30.6       30.4       
Return of Vivo SH's (%) 38.1% 35.4% 32.9% 30.7% 28.7% 26.8% 25.1% 23.5% 22.1% 20.7% 19.4%
Return of TIM SH's (%) 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Return of Telecom Italia SH's (%) 40.0% 47.3% 53.7% 59.6% 64.8% 69.5% 73.8% 77.7% 81.3% 84.5% 87.5%
Debt to EBITDA 2.56       2.40       2.24       2.08       1.92       1.76       1.60       1.44       1.28       1.12       0.96       
Debt to Revenues 72.1% 67.6% 63.1% 58.6% 54.1% 49.6% 45.1% 40.5% 36.0% 31.5% 27.0%
% Stock payment
9.4% 9.9% 10.4% 10.9% 11.4% 11.9% 12.4% 12.9% 13.4% 13.9% 14.4%
Value of Merged Firm (BRL Bln) 161.3     149.1     138.5     129.2     121.1     113.8     107.3     101.5     96.3       91.5       87.2       
Synergies (BRL Bln) 78.6       66.4       55.9       46.6       38.4       31.2       24.7       18.9       13.6       8.9         4.5         
Return of Vivo SH's (%) 96.0% 78.3% 62.8% 49.3% 37.4% 26.8% 17.4% 8.9% 1.2% -5.7% -12.0%
Return of TIM SH's (%) 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Return of Telecom Italia SH's (%) 123.9% 109.9% 97.8% 87.2% 77.8% 69.5% 62.1% 55.5% 49.5% 44.0% 39.1%
Debt to EBITDA 1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       1.76       
Debt to Revenues 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6%
Discount Rate
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7.2.7. Regulatory constraints 
In May 2012, the Brazilian congress approved the new anti-trust law and policy in order to 
modernize and better regulate the economic and business environment. It included, among several 
amendments, the adoption of a pre-merger review system, which is regulated through a Brazilian 
agency called CADE (“Conselho Admnistrativo de Defesa Económica”). The new anti-trust law, 
enforces that, before any operational alignment between two parties, the merger must be 
approved by CADE and, according to Article 90 of Law No.12.529/2011, the new Brazilian 
competitive act, the new merged company cannot practice economic activities that may lead to 
cartel scenarios or anticompetitive behaviour. 
Given the above, the table below presents the revenue share per Brazilian state and, under the 
scenario of a possible merger between Vivo and TIM, the seventh column represents the combined 
revenue share of Vivo and TIM (without synergies). As we can see, several states present market 
shares above 50% and, in some of them, even above 70% and 80%. Therefore, CADE and ANATEL 
could block the merger since in some states there is clearly an anti-competitive environment that 
the new anti-trust law does not allow. 
In addition, the table below pretends to illustrate a possible asset by asset TIM sale, where in each 
state, the best operator for acquisition would be the one that had the lowest revenue share.  
Table 24 – Revenue share per Brazilian state 
 
Furthermore, some industry analysts and investment bankers such as JP Morgan made it clear that 
in order to M&A in the Brazilian telecommunications industry to occur, TIM would have to be 
Estado Vivo TIM Claro Oi Others TIM + Vivo TIM + Claro TIM + Oi
Acre 70% 7% 17% 7% 0% 77% 24% 14%
Alagoas 17% 35% 27% 21% 0% 52% 62% 56%
Amazonas 71% 18% 4% 7% 0% 89% 22% 25%
Amapá 68% 19% 4% 9% 0% 87% 23% 28%
Bahia 32% 24% 24% 20% 0% 56% 48% 44%
Ceará 6% 39% 23% 32% 0% 45% 62% 71%
Distrito federal 28% 23% 25% 21% 3% 51% 48% 44%
Espirito Santo 78% 8% 6% 8% 0% 86% 14% 16%
Goiás 31% 20% 33% 15% 1% 51% 53% 35%
Maranhão 27% 33% 11% 29% 0% 60% 44% 62%
Minas Gerais 40% 28% 11% 20% 1% 68% 39% 48%
Mato Grosso do Sul 54% 14% 27% 5% 0% 68% 41% 19%
Mato Grosso 62% 12% 18% 8% 0% 74% 30% 20%
Pará 43% 36% 7% 14% 0% 79% 43% 50%
Paraíba 13% 35% 22% 30% 0% 48% 57% 65%
Pernambuco 11% 35% 25% 28% 1% 46% 60% 63%
Piauí 18% 34% 33% 14% 1% 52% 67% 48%
Paraná 22% 53% 14% 9% 2% 75% 67% 62%
Rio de Janeiro 30% 15% 20% 11% 24% 45% 35% 26%
Rio Grande do Norte 9% 39% 26% 27% 0% 48% 65% 66%
Rondônia 32% 14% 35% 18% 1% 46% 49% 32%
Roraima 72% 17% 4% 7% 0% 89% 21% 24%
Rio Grande do Sul 51% 14% 22% 13% 0% 65% 36% 27%
Santa Catarina 29% 42% 15% 12% 2% 71% 57% 54%
Sergipe 65% 12% 10% 12% 1% 77% 22% 24%
São Paulo 35% 24% 16% 10% 15% 59% 40% 34%
Tocantins 27% 16% 29% 28% 0% 43% 45% 44%
Source: JP Morgan
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divided into parts in order to reduce some concentration in some states. For instance, the 
communications regulator in Brazil could enforce a sale of TIM Participações state by state, in order 
to ensure a revenue share lower than 50%. 
In any case, as we have seen previously, Telecom Italia has a high leverage and has been selling key 
assets to pay debt. Brazil is also one of the few countries with four main mobile operators and so, 
we truly believe that some concentration in Brazil will occur in the next three to five years.  
On a different point of view, on the figure below, we have made a benchmark, where we select, 
per country, all operators with more than 10% market share and we have calculated the average 
number of subscriber per operator. As we can see, Brazil has already one of the highest number of 
subscribers per operator, and, thus, reducing the number of players to three could put Brazil on the 
third place, right before China and India in terms of subscribers per operator. As a result, the 
regulator could, once again, block a possible merger in the country. 
Figure 82 – Number of subscribers per operator per country  
(# Millions; excluding operators with market share smaller than 10%) 
 
We have made a small study that compares the HHI concentration index with the practiced EBITDA 
margin of each country and we see that EBITDA margins are higher, the more concentrated the 
industry is, with an R-squared of 58%. 
The current HHI index in Brazil is 25%. If we compute the current TIM and Vivo market share 
together and we recalculate the new HHI, it increases to nearly 40%. As a result, we believe that 
both ANATEL and CADE could seriously restrict a full acquisition of TIM by Vivo, and, thus, the 
acquisition would have to be asset by asset or through a combination of players, as we have 
concluded in table 24. 
Figure 32 present us a selected benchmark of developed and emerging markets HHI’s and weighted 
average EBITDA margins per country. We can conclude that, the higher the concentration, the 
higher the EBITDA margin. The same would happen in Brazil, where we forecast that the new 
telecom industry would have a HHI of nearly 40% and an average country EBITDA margin of 32.7%, 
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8. Conclusions 
A merger in the Brazilian telecommunications industry would completely re-shape the industry and 
the footprint of Telefónica in Latin America. The merger would create a telecom operator with 180 
million mobile subscribers and with almost BRL 70 Billion in revenues by 2017. As we have seen 
previously, although the consolidation is likely to occur, ANATEL and CADE could enforce certain 
restrictions due to anti-competitive and monopolistic environment in certain Brazilian states. 
Nevertheless, we forecast that an acquisition of TIM Participações from Vivo would certainly have a 
huge impact on the Brazilian domestic industry, with one clear market leader and with estimated 
synergies above the current market value of TIM. The combined firm would be able to develop a 
stronger, bigger and with higher quality mobile and fixed infrastructure that would enable even 
more Brazilians to have access to communications (e.g.: remote areas). Moreover, in terms of 
synergies, since we are dealing with an in-country merger, it would have an enormous impact, in 
terms of costs, revenues, CAPEX, but also on the discount factor and interest tax shields from the 
acquisition. 
We estimate an enterprise value for Vivo and TIM of BRL 56.2 Billion and BRL 26.5 Billion, 
respectively and a combined value of BRL 113.8 Billion, corresponding to a synergies value of BRL 
31.2 Billion. This huge difference is due to a significant increase in terms of FCFF (through higher 
EBIT), but also a lower cost of capital and additional interest tax shields totalling BRL 6.1 Billion. 
In terms of shareholder’s returns, we forecast that Vivo shareholders will have an expected return 
of 27% (even after accounting for the shares dilution of more than 25% of existing shares), while 
Telecom Italia will have returns of almost 70% (due to the Vivo stock payment) and TIM free float 
returns of 40%, corresponding to the premium paid. 
Concluding, this deal would represent a complete shift in the telecommunications industry in 
Brazil, where we would have a clear first player in the market with healthier EBITDA margins and 
higher debt levels, closer to mature market ratios. 
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Appendix 
Table 25 –Moody’s probability of Default in 10 years 
 
Table 26 – Loss Given default by industry 
 
Figure 84 – TIM long-term infrastructure strategy from 2014 to 2016 
  
Rating Default rate Rating Default rate
Aaa 0.000% Ba1 3.682%
Aa1 0.000% Ba2 10.164%
Aa2 0.000% Ba3 17.791%
Aa3 0.173% B1 28.372%
A1 0.055% B2 32.415%
A2 0.515% B3 51.105%
A3 0.535% Caa1 50.512%
Baa1 1.664% Caa2 46.832%
Baa2 2.575% Caa3 54.381%
Baa3 4.487% Ca-C 66.259%
Industry % loss
Utilities 26%




Healthcare and Chemicals 44%
High technology 53%
Aerospace and Auto 48%
Forest and Building products 46%
Consumer and Service 53%
Media and Leisure time 48%
Energy and Natural resources 40%
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Table 27 – Vivo Profit and Losses map 
  
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Total revenues 33,920      34,722      36,717      38,750      40,695      42,700      44,765      46,757      48,647      50,420      52,093      53,686      
growth % 2.3% 2.4% 5.7% 5.5% 5.0% 4.9% 4.8% 4.5% 4.0% 3.6% 3.3% 3.1%
Net operating mobile revenue 21,398        23,002        24,165        25,460        26,719        28,016        29,332        30,608        31,819        32,952        34,018        35,035        
growth % 9.2% 7.5% 5.1% 5.4% 4.9% 4.9% 4.7% 4.4% 4.0% 3.6% 3.2% 3.0%
Net service mobile revenues 20,437      21,691      22,766      23,970      25,139      26,348      27,570      28,755      29,876      30,921      31,901      32,833      
growth % 9.7% 6.1% 5.0% 5.3% 4.9% 4.8% 4.6% 4.3% 3.9% 3.5% 3.2% 2.9%
Access and usage 10,876        11,266        11,825        12,377        12,910        13,429        13,970        14,485        14,967        15,419        15,843        16,241        
growth % 11.8% 3.6% 5.0% 4.7% 4.3% 4.0% 4.0% 3.7% 3.3% 3.0% 2.7% 2.5%
Network usage 3,830         3,270         3,338         3,403         3,462         3,516         3,570         3,617         3,659         3,696         3,728         3,755         
growth % -7.8% -14.6% 2.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%
Data and VAS 5,648        6,877        7,436        8,031        8,595        9,209        9,856        10,477      11,071      11,626      12,154      12,659      
growth % 21.7% 21.8% 8.1% 8.0% 7.0% 7.1% 7.0% 6.3% 5.7% 5.0% 4.5% 4.2%
Messaging P2P 1,921         1,973         2,097         2,166         2,237         2,332         2,416         2,506         2,603         2,700         2,802         2,909         
growth % 23.0% 2.7% 6.3% 3.3% 3.3% 4.3% 3.6% 3.7% 3.9% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8%
Internet 2,826         3,740         4,011         4,407         4,777         5,167         5,590         5,989         6,362         6,707         7,027         7,326         
growth % 19.4% 32.4% 7.2% 9.9% 8.4% 8.2% 8.2% 7.1% 6.2% 5.4% 4.8% 4.3%
VAS 901            1,164         1,327         1,458         1,581         1,710         1,850         1,982         2,105         2,219         2,325         2,424         
growth % 26.4% 29.2% 14.0% 9.9% 8.4% 8.2% 8.2% 7.1% 6.2% 5.4% 4.8% 4.3%
Other services 83             278            166            160            172            194            173            175            178            180            177            178            
growth % -26.4% 236.6% -40.2% -3.9% 7.4% 13.0% -10.8% 1.0% 2.1% 0.9% -1.9% 0.5%
Net handset revenues 961           1,311        1,400        1,490        1,580        1,669        1,762        1,854        1,943        2,031        2,117        2,202        
growth % 0.7% 36.4% 6.8% 6.4% 6.0% 5.7% 5.6% 5.2% 4.8% 4.5% 4.2% 4.0%
Net operating fixed revenue 12,522      11,720      12,552      13,289      13,976      14,683      15,433      16,149      16,828      17,468      18,075      18,652      
growth % -7.8% -6.4% 7.1% 5.9% 5.2% 5.1% 5.1% 4.6% 4.2% 3.8% 3.5% 3.2%
Voice and accesses 6,929         6,160         6,284         6,410         6,539         6,671         6,805         6,942         7,081         7,223         7,369         7,517         
growth % -14.5% -11.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Interconnection 475            460            455            455            448            444            441            437            433            429            425            421            
growth % 4.1% -3.1% -1.1% 0.0% -1.4% -0.9% -0.8% -1.0% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9%
Data transmission 3,563         3,651         4,162         4,573         4,957         5,361         5,801         6,215         6,602         6,959         7,291         7,602         
growth % 3.3% 2.5% 14.0% 9.9% 8.4% 8.2% 8.2% 7.1% 6.2% 5.4% 4.8% 4.3%
PaycTV 594            491            635            770            897            1,022         1,142         1,255         1,359         1,455         1,541         1,619         
growth % -8.3% -17.3% 29.3% 21.2% 16.5% 13.9% 11.7% 9.9% 8.3% 7.0% 5.9% 5.0%
Other services 961.8         957.5         1,015.67     1,081.23     1,134.32     1,185.08     1,244.38     1,301.35     1,353.10     1,401.65     1,448.75     1,493.25     
growth % 3% -0.4% 6.1% 6.5% 4.9% 4.5% 5.0% 4.6% 4.0% 3.6% 3.4% 3.1%
Operational costs 21,217-      24,146-      24,881-      26,094-      27,246-      28,431-      29,414-      30,426-      31,336-      32,146-      32,854-      33,483-      
growth % 0.4% 13.8% 3.0% 4.9% 4.4% 4.3% 3.5% 3.4% 3.0% 2.6% 2.2% 1.9%
Personnel 2,403-         2,532-         2,665-         2,798-         2,925-         3,047-         3,174-         3,292-         3,403-         3,507-         3,605-         3,659-         
growth % 5.8% 5.4% 5.3% 5.0% 4.5% 4.2% 4.1% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 1.5%
Cost of services rendered 10,164-        10,637-        11,408-        12,123-        12,723-        13,279-        13,879-        14,394-        14,833-        15,212-        15,536-        15,817-        
growth % -3.3% 4.7% 7.2% 6.3% 5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
Interconnection (4,012)        (3,842)        (4,121)        (4,379)        (4,596)        (4,797)        (5,013)        (5,199)        (5,358)        (5,495)        (5,612)        (5,713)        
growth % -11.4% -4.2% 7.2% 6.3% 5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
Taxes and contributions (1,810)        (1,721)        (1,846)        (1,962)        (2,059)        (2,149)        (2,246)        (2,329)        (2,401)        (2,462)        (2,514)        (2,560)        
growth % 2.9% -4.9% 7.2% 6.3% 5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
Third-Party Services (3,287)        (3,582)        (3,841)        (4,082)        (4,284)        (4,471)        (4,673)        (4,847)        (4,995)        (5,122)        (5,231)        (5,326)        
growth % 7.7% 9.0% 7.2% 6.3% 5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
Others (1,056)        (1,492)        (1,600)        (1,700)        (1,784)        (1,862)        (1,946)        (2,018)        (2,080)        (2,133)        (2,179)        (2,218)        
growth % -10.5% 41.3% 7.2% 6.3% 5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
Cost of Goods sold (1,802)        (2,118)        (2,261)        (2,407)        (2,552)        (2,696)        (2,847)        (2,995)        (3,139)        (3,281)        (3,420)        (3,557)        
growth % 4.3% 17.5% 6.8% 6.4% 6.0% 5.7% 5.6% 5.2% 4.8% 4.5% 4.2% 4.0%
Selling expenses (6,444)        (7,427)        (7,644)        (7,795)        (7,985)        (8,151)        (8,311)        (8,467)        (8,605)        (8,728)        (8,841)        (8,943)        
growth % 8.0% 15.2% 2.9% 2.0% 2.4% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2%
Provision for Bad Debt (654)           (741)           (706)           (773)           (821)           (845)           (894)           (934)           (969)           (1,006)        (1,039)        (1,070)        
growth % 15.8% 13.3% -4.8% 9.5% 6.2% 2.9% 5.8% 4.5% 3.7% 3.9% 3.3% 3.0%
Third-Party Services (5,493)        (6,397)        (6,531)        (6,658)        (6,773)        (6,879)        (6,984)        (7,077)        (7,159)        (7,230)        (7,293)        (7,347)        
growth % 12.9% 16.5% 2.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%
Others (297)           (288)           (407)           (364)           (390)           (428)           (433)           (456)           (477)           (491)           (509)           (525)           
growth % -44.8% -3.0% 41.3% -10.7% 7.4% 9.6% 1.1% 5.5% 4.6% 2.9% 3.6% 3.1%
G&A Expenses (1,091)        (1,050)        (1,154)        (1,212)        (1,260)        (1,333)        (1,395)        (1,455)        (1,516)        (1,570)        (1,622)        (1,672)        
growth % 3.3% -3.8% 9.9% 5.0% 4.0% 5.8% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 3.6% 3.3% 3.1%
Third-Party Services (832)           (805)           (879)           (925)           (963)           (1,017)        (1,065)        (1,111)        (1,157)        (1,199)        (1,239)        (1,277)        
growth % 3.9% -3.3% 9.3% 5.3% 4.1% 5.7% 4.7% 4.3% 4.2% 3.6% 3.3% 3.1%
Others (260)           (245)           (275)           (287)           (297)           (316)           (330)           (344)           (359)           (371)           (384)           (396)           
growth % 1.3% -5.6% 12.1% 4.4% 3.8% 6.1% 4.4% 4.3% 4.3% 3.5% 3.3% 3.1%
Other Operating Loss 688            (383)           251            240            199            76             191            176            161            151            170            165            
growth % 70.6% -155.8% -165.4% -4.4% -17.1% -61.6% 150.6% -7.8% -8.9% -5.9% 12.4% -3.1%
EBITDA 12,703      10,576      11,836      12,656      13,448      14,269      15,351      16,331      17,312      18,274      19,239      20,203      
growth % 5.6% -16.7% 11.9% 6.9% 6.3% 6.1% 7.6% 6.4% 6.0% 5.6% 5.3% 5.0%
EBITDA margin 37.4% 30.5% 32.2% 32.7% 33.0% 33.4% 34.3% 34.9% 35.6% 36.2% 36.9% 37.6%
Depreciation and Amortization (5,492)       (5,643)       (5,972)       (6,575)       (7,038)       (7,473)       (7,800)       (8,133)       (8,446)       (8,720)       (8,965)       (9,098)       
growth % 7.0% 2.8% 5.8% 10.1% 7.0% 6.2% 4.4% 4.3% 3.8% 3.3% 2.8% 1.5%
Depreciation (3,675)        (3,815)        (3,620)        (3,583)        (3,837)        (4,079)        (4,253)        (4,436)        (4,607)        (4,756)        (4,890)        (4,962)        
growth % 2.4% 3.8% -5.1% -1.0% 7.1% 6.3% 4.3% 4.3% 3.9% 3.2% 2.8% 1.5%
Amortization of intangibles (797)           (797)           (2,352)        (2,993)        (3,201)        (3,394)        (3,547)        (3,697)        (3,838)        (3,964)        (4,075)        (4,135)        
growth % 33.3% 0.0% 195.2% 27.3% 7.0% 6.0% 4.5% 4.2% 3.8% 3.3% 2.8% 1.5%
Other amortizations (1,020)        (1,031)        -            -            -            -            -            -            -            -            -            -            
growth % 8.0% 1.1% -100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
EBIT 7,211        4,932        5,864        6,081        6,411        6,796        7,551        8,198        8,866        9,554        10,274      11,105      
growth % 4.5% -31.6% 18.9% 3.7% 5.4% 6.0% 11.1% 8.6% 8.1% 7.8% 7.5% 8.1%
EBIT margin 21.3% 14.2% 16.0% 15.7% 15.8% 15.9% 16.9% 17.5% 18.2% 18.9% 19.7% 20.7%
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Table 28 – TIM Profit and Losses map 
   
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Gross Revenues 27,756      29,706     31,546      33,350      35,022       36,563      38,148      39,606      40,960      42,236      43,442      44,584      
growth % 12.1% 7.0% 6.2% 5.7% 5.0% 4.4% 4.3% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9% 2.6%
Mobile 22,880      24,037     25,590      27,169      28,629       29,973      31,381      32,679      33,889      35,038      36,129      37,167      
growth % 10.6% 5.1% 6.5% 6.2% 5.4% 4.7% 4.7% 4.1% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9%
       Usage and Monthly fee 11,087       11,310      12,229       13,024       13,779        14,481       15,112       15,669       16,191       16,679       17,137       17,568        
growth % 8.0% 2.0% 8.1% 6.5% 5.8% 5.1% 4.4% 3.7% 3.3% 3.0% 2.7% 2.5%
       Value added services - VAS 4,405        5,354        6,008        6,637        7,221         7,795        8,450        9,062        9,629        10,158       10,649       11,109        
growth % 39.1% 21.5% 12.2% 10.5% 8.8% 7.9% 8.4% 7.2% 6.3% 5.5% 4.8% 4.3%
Long distance 3,218        3,333        3,423        3,571        3,717         3,854        4,010        4,168        4,330        4,502        4,679        4,862         
growth % 1.2% 3.6% 2.7% 4.3% 4.1% 3.7% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9%
Interconnection 3,969        3,761        3,707        3,717        3,686         3,620        3,585        3,556        3,516        3,475        3,440        3,405         
growth % 3.1% -5.3% -1.4% 0.3% -0.8% -1.8% -0.9% -0.8% -1.1% -1.2% -1.0% -1.0%
        Others 201           280          222           220           226            223           223           224           223           223           224           223            
growth % -12.4% 39.2% -20.6% -1.1% 2.8% -1.5% 0.1% 0.5% -0.3% 0.1% 0.1% -0.1%
     Fixed 1,470       1,072       1,093       1,115       1,138        1,161       1,184       1,208       1,232       1,257       1,282       1,308        
growth % -3.6% -27.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
   Gross Revenues Handset sales 3,406       4,597       4,862       5,065       5,255        5,429       5,584       5,720       5,838       5,942       6,031       6,108        
growth % 34.1% 35.0% 5.8% 4.2% 3.7% 3.3% 2.8% 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3%
Discounts on Gross Revenues (8,992)      (9,740)      (10,295)     (10,872)     (11,447)      (11,937)     (12,456)     (12,939)     (13,380)     (13,799)     (14,196)     (14,570)     
growth % 17.2% 8.3% 5.7% 5.6% 5.3% 4.3% 4.4% 3.9% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9% 2.6%
Net Revenues 18,764      19,965     21,251      22,478      23,575       24,626      25,692      26,667      27,580      28,437      29,246      30,014      
growth % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Operating Expenses (13,753)     (14,715)    (15,606)     (16,342)     (16,976)      (17,574)     (18,167)     (18,685)     (19,142)     (19,544)     (19,896)     (20,209)     
growth % 10.7% 7.0% 6.1% 4.7% 3.9% 3.5% 3.4% 2.9% 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 1.6%
     Personnel expenses (729)          (832)         (891)          (940)          (988)           (1,034)       (1,077)       (1,117)       (1,155)       (1,191)       (1,224)       (1,256)        
growth % 15.2% 14.1% 7.1% 5.5% 5.1% 4.6% 4.2% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6%
     Selling & marketing expenses (3,843)       (3,938)       (4,056)       (4,146)       (4,228)        (4,303)       (4,369)       (4,427)       (4,478)       (4,523)       (4,562)       (4,596)        
growth % -2.3% 2.5% 3.0% 2.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%
     Network & interconnection (5,353)       (5,312)       (5,774)       (6,136)       (6,440)        (6,722)       (7,025)       (7,285)       (7,508)       (7,700)       (7,864)       (8,006)        
growth % 13.4% -0.8% 8.7% 6.3% 5.0% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
     General & administrative (551)          (625)         (638)          (675)          (708)           (740)          (772)          (801)          (828)          (854)          (878)          (901)           
growth % 9.7% 13.3% 2.2% 5.8% 4.9% 4.5% 4.3% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6%
     Cost Of Goods Sold (2,605)       (3,351)       (3,544)       (3,693)       (3,831)        (3,958)       (4,070)       (4,170)       (4,256)       (4,332)       (4,397)       (4,453)        
growth % 26.3% 28.6% 5.8% 4.2% 3.7% 3.3% 2.8% 2.4% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3%
     Bad Debt (251)          (240)         (256)          (270)          (283)           (296)          (309)          (321)          (332)          (342)          (352)          (361)           
growth % 8.4% -4.4% 6.4% 5.8% 4.9% 4.5% 4.3% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6%
     Other operational expenses (420)          (417)         (446)          (482)          (497)           (521)          (546)          (564)          (584)          (603)          (620)          (636)           
growth % 24.8% -0.8% 7.0% 7.9% 3.3% 4.8% 4.6% 3.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.8% 2.7%
EBITDA 5,011       5,251       5,644       6,137       6,599        7,053       7,525       7,981       8,438       8,894       9,350       9,804        
   EBITDA Margin 26.7% 26.3% 26.6% 27.3% 28.0% 28.6% 29.3% 29.9% 30.6% 31.3% 32.0% 32.7%
growth % 7.4% 4.8% 7.5% 8.7% 7.5% 6.9% 6.7% 6.1% 5.7% 5.4% 5.1% 4.9%
Depreciation & amortization (2,689)      (2,768)      (2,926)      (3,271)      (3,680)       (4,025)      (4,090)      (4,170)      (4,250)      (4,260)      (4,269)      (4,328)       
   Depreciation (1,459)       (1,502)       (1,608)       (1,798)       (2,023)        (2,212)       (2,248)       (2,292)       (2,336)       (2,341)       (2,347)       (2,379)        
growth % 4.3% 3.0% 7.0% 11.8% 12.5% 9.4% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 0.2% 0.2% 1.4%
   Amortization (1,230)       (1,265)       (1,318)       (1,473)       (1,657)        (1,812)       (1,842)       (1,878)       (1,914)       (1,918)       (1,923)       (1,949)        
growth % 2.7% 2.9% 4.1% 11.8% 12.5% 9.4% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 0.2% 0.2% 1.4%
EBIT 2,322       2,483       2,718       2,866       2,919        3,028       3,434       3,811       4,188       4,634       5,081       5,477        
   EBIT Margin 12.4% 12.4% 12.8% 12.7% 12.4% 12.3% 13.4% 14.3% 15.2% 16.3% 17.4% 18.2%
growth % 12.3% 6.9% 9.5% 5.4% 1.9% 3.7% 13.4% 11.0% 9.9% 10.6% 9.6% 7.8%
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Table 29 – Multiple analysis for Vivo – Individual data (as a % of Vivo values) 
 
 




Country Name P/E EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT Mkt Cap (BRL) Price/Sales Sales EBITDA EBIT Capex
Sweden TELIASONERA 1.03x 1.63x 1.38x 1.33x 1.45x .97x 1.06x 1.24x .93x
U.K. BT GROUP 1.11x 1.47x 1.32x 2.13x 1.17x 1.67x 1.79x 2.00x 1.35x
Norway TELENOR 1.20x 1.46x 1.12x 1.47x 1.45x 1.10x 1.23x 1.60x .98x
Canada MOBILE TELESYSTEMS .53x .79x .63x .66x .98x .78x 1.12x 1.40x .78x
Netherlands KPN 2.79x 1.58x 2.07x .65x .54x .70x .78x .60x .65x
Brazil TIM PARTICIPACOES SA 1.43x 1.03x 1.03x .54x 1.02x .57x .49x .49x .61x
Russia TELUS CORP 1.44x 1.59x 1.35x .98x 1.65x .69x .80x .94x .73x
Netherlands VIMPELCOM .71x .85x .80x .66x .49x 1.40x 1.96x 2.09x 1.46x
Country Name P/E EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT Mkt Cap (BRL) Price/Sales Sales EBITDA EBIT Capex
Turkey TURKCELL .64x 1.20x 1.03x 1.05x 1.75x .65x .75x .91x .43x
Turkey ROSTELECOM .93x 1.61x 1.24x .86x 1.23x .75x 1.04x 1.40x .73x
Belgium BELGACOM .63x .79x .67x .86x .85x .90x .94x 1.09x .69x
Russia TURK TELEKOM .49x 2.17x 2.30x .50x .47x 1.11x 1.48x 1.25x 1.30x
Canada MOBILE TELESYSTEMS 1.00x .76x .62x 1.81x 1.61x 1.20x 1.62x 1.90x 1.20x
Netherlands KPN 1.94x 1.81x 1.44x 1.19x .53x 1.22x 1.59x 1.21x 1.06x
Russia TELUS CORP .37x 1.54x 1.31x 1.22x .95x 1.35x 2.28x 2.82x 1.28x
Sweden TELIASONERA .72x 1.41x 1.09x 2.43x 1.41x 1.69x 2.15x 2.52x 1.52x
Norway TELENOR .84x 2.71x 2.15x 2.71x 1.42x 1.92x 2.49x 3.23x 1.61x
Canada BCE .90x .68x 1.13x 2.79x 1.36x 2.14x 3.19x 3.92x 2.10x
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Table 31 – Merged firm Profit and Losses map with synergies 
 
  
BRL Millions 2012 2013 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Total Revenues 52,684    54,687   58,253   61,962   65,185   68,316   71,497   74,490   77,315   79,962   82,457   84,829   
growth % 4.8% 3.8% 6.5% 6.4% 5.2% 4.8% 4.7% 4.2% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9%
Mobile revenues 35,855    37,645   39,972   42,565   44,779   46,992   49,224   51,336   53,332   55,204   56,971   58,656   
growth % 8.8% 5.0% 6.2% 6.5% 5.2% 4.9% 4.7% 4.3% 3.9% 3.5% 3.2% 3.0%
Usage 18,317    18,626   19,980   21,309   22,380   23,418   24,394   25,283   26,120   26,902   27,634   28,322   
growth % 8.5% 1.7% 7.3% 6.6% 5.0% 4.6% 4.2% 3.6% 3.3% 3.0% 2.7% 2.5%
VAS and data 8,723      10,790   11,980   13,191   14,300   15,468   16,712   17,891   19,003   20,041   21,016   21,938   
growth % 30.7% 23.7% 11.0% 10.1% 8.4% 8.2% 8.0% 7.1% 6.2% 5.5% 4.9% 4.4%
Interconnection 6,461      5,581     5,513     5,502     5,445     5,359     5,302     5,247     5,184     5,117     5,055     4,992     
growth % -5.9% -13.6% -1.2% -0.2% -1.0% -1.6% -1.1% -1.0% -1.2% -1.3% -1.2% -1.2%
Others 2,354      2,648     2,498     2,563     2,654     2,748     2,816     2,915     3,024     3,144     3,267     3,403     
growth % -7.5% 12.5% -5.7% 2.6% 3.5% 3.5% 2.5% 3.5% 3.7% 4.0% 3.9% 4.2%
Fixed revenues 13,524    12,283   13,177   13,942   14,659   15,385   16,152   16,870   17,555   18,201   18,816   19,403   
growth % -8.1% -9.2% 7.3% 5.8% 5.1% 5.0% 5.0% 4.4% 4.1% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1%
Usage 7,930      6,724     6,909     7,063     7,222     7,372     7,524     7,663     7,807     7,956     8,110     8,268     
growth % -14.1% -15.2% 2.7% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 2.1% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0%
Data transmission 3,563      3,651     4,162     4,573     4,957     5,361     5,801     6,215     6,602     6,959     7,291     7,602     
growth % 3.3% 2.5% 14.0% 9.9% 8.4% 8.2% 8.2% 7.1% 6.2% 5.4% 4.8% 4.3%
Others 2,030      1,909     2,106     2,306     2,479     2,651     2,827     2,993     3,145     3,286     3,415     3,533     
growth % -0.1% -6.0% 10.3% 9.5% 7.5% 6.9% 6.6% 5.9% 5.1% 4.5% 3.9% 3.4%
Handsets revenues 3,305      4,758     5,105     5,455     5,747     5,939     6,121     6,284     6,428     6,557     6,670     6,770     
growth % 27.7% 43.9% 7.3% 6.9% 5.4% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.0% 1.7% 1.5%
Total Costs 34,970    38,861   42,379   42,654   42,452   43,724   45,083   46,501   47,755   48,861   49,817   50,698   
growth % 4.2% 11.1% 9.1% 0.6% -0.5% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 2.7% 2.3% 2.0% 1.8%
Personnel expenses 3,132      3,364     3,474     3,577     3,624     3,752     3,877     3,989     4,090     4,180     4,260     4,334     
growth % 7.8% 7.4% 3.3% 3.0% 1.3% 3.5% 3.3% 2.9% 2.5% 2.2% 1.9% 1.7%
Selling & marketing expenses 10,287    11,364   11,430   11,387   11,367   11,594   11,806   12,009   12,187   12,346   12,491   12,620   
growth % 3.9% 10.5% 0.6% -0.4% -0.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0%
Network & interconnection 15,518    15,949   16,959   17,783   18,415   19,220   20,088   20,833   21,470   22,017   22,487   22,894   
growth % 1.8% 2.8% 6.3% 4.9% 3.6% 4.4% 4.5% 3.7% 3.1% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8%
General & administrative 1,643      1,674     1,712     1,745     1,767     1,851     1,938     2,019     2,096     2,169     2,237     2,302     
growth % 5.3% 1.9% 2.3% 1.9% 1.3% 4.8% 4.7% 4.2% 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9%
Cost Of Goods Sold 4,407      5,469     5,548     5,897     6,211     6,462     6,711     6,942     7,156     7,356     7,542     7,716     
growth % 16.3% 24.1% 1.4% 6.3% 5.3% 4.0% 3.9% 3.4% 3.1% 2.8% 2.5% 2.3%
Others 16-            1,040     3,257     2,264     1,068     844        663        709        755        794        801        832        
growth % -110.0% -6427% 213.0% -30.5% -52.9% -21.0% -21.4% 6.9% 6.6% 5.0% 1.0% 3.9%
EBITDA 17,714    15,826   15,874   19,308   22,733   24,592   26,414   27,989   29,560   31,101   32,640   34,131   
growth % 6.1% -10.7% 0.3% 21.6% 17.7% 8.2% 7.4% 6.0% 5.6% 5.2% 4.9% 4.6%
EBITDA Margin 33.6% 28.9% 27.2% 31.2% 34.9% 36.0% 36.9% 37.6% 38.2% 38.9% 39.6% 40.2%
D&A 8,180-      8,411-     8,807-     9,610-     10,299-   10,949-   11,700-   12,544-   12,554-   12,535-   12,508-   12,483-   
growth % 5.9% 2.8% 4.7% 9.1% 7.2% 6.3% 6.9% 7.2% 0.1% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2%
EBIT 9,533      7,415     7,067     9,698     12,434   13,644   14,714   15,445   17,006   18,566   20,132   21,648   
growth % 6.3% -22.2% -4.7% 37.2% 28.2% 9.7% 7.8% 5.0% 10.1% 9.2% 8.4% 7.5%
EBIT Margin 18.1% 13.6% 12.1% 15.7% 19.1% 20.0% 20.6% 20.7% 22.0% 23.2% 24.4% 25.5%
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Table 32 – Operational synergies per category 
(Excluding interconnection costs effect) 
 
Table 33 – Operational synergies split per OPEX, CAPEX and Revenues 
  
Description 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Total synergies 1,202,319-          1,656,439          3,759,392      4,376,660      4,658,118    4,813,764    4,961,484    5,094,795    5,217,470    5,293,729    
growth % n/a -237.8% 127.0% 16.4% 6.4% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% 2.4% 1.5%
Costs 913,462             1,533,044          2,254,908      2,383,419      2,498,448    2,610,166    2,722,899    2,828,815    2,932,814    2,994,528    
growth % 67.8% 47.1% 5.7% 4.8% 4.5% 4.3% 3.9% 3.7% 2.1%
Personnel expenses 82,274               160,839             289,450         329,155         373,751       420,131       468,169       517,764       568,836       580,085       
Selling & marketing expenses 270,417             552,757             845,611         860,610         873,811       885,428       895,629       904,572       912,400       919,243       
Network & interconnection 223,512             475,025             747,837         780,534         815,768       846,025       871,882       894,113       913,175       929,706       
General & administrative 79,460               141,734             200,967         221,206         228,636       236,564       248,042       255,749       263,720       271,925       
Cost Of Goods Sold 257,799             202,689             171,042         191,914         206,481       222,019       239,177       256,617       274,684       293,569       
CAPEX 404,510             1,141,298          1,074,468      1,106,265      1,119,822    1,137,155    1,151,270    1,161,232    1,166,095    1,170,340    
growth % 182.1% -5.9% 3.0% 1.2% 1.5% 1.2% 0.9% 0.4% 0.4%
Revenues 285,144             733,953             915,274         989,512         1,039,848    1,066,443    1,087,315    1,104,748    1,118,561    1,128,861    
growth % 157.4% 24.7% 8.1% 5.1% 2.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1.3% 0.9%
Mobile 159,008             446,869             509,067         577,019         609,986       640,679       669,615       696,630       721,961       745,873       
Usage 99,404               315,942             331,824         347,210         361,688       374,870       387,284       398,871       409,726       419,927       
VAS and data 59,604               130,927             177,243         229,809         248,298       265,809       282,331       297,758       312,235       325,946       
Interconnection -                      -                      -                  -                  -                -                -                -                -                -                
Others -                      -                      -                  -                  -                -                -                -                -                -                
Fixed 68,404               104,728             142,485         163,460         185,179       188,594       192,148       195,812       199,591       203,486       
Usage 68,404               104,728             142,485         163,460         185,179       188,594       192,148       195,812       199,591       203,486       
Data transmission -                      -                      -                  -                  -                -                -                -                -                -                
Others -                      -                      -                  -                  -                -                -                -                -                -                
Handsets 57,731               182,357             263,723         249,033         244,683       237,170       225,552       212,306       197,009       179,502       
One time sale FCFF 177,650             236,867             177,650         118,433         -                -                -                -                -                -                
One time integration costs 2,983,085-          1,988,723-          662,908-         220,969-         -                -                -                -                -                -                
Marketing 1,714,485          1,142,990          380,997         126,999         -                -                -                -                -                -                
IT 1,196,600          797,733             265,911         88,637            -                -                -                -                -                -                
Consulting 72,000               48,000               16,000            5,333              -                -                -                -                -                -                
Description 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Costs 57% 45% 53% 53% 54% 54% 55% 56% 56% 57%
CAPEX 25% 33% 25% 25% 24% 24% 23% 23% 22% 22%
Revenues 18% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 21% 21%
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